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This book is the second volume of texts curated specifically for The 
Funambulist since 2011.1 The editorial line of this second series of 
twenty-six essays is dedicated to philosophical and political ques-
tions about bodies. This choice is informed by my own interest in 
the (often violent) relation between the designed environment and 
bodies. Corporeal politics do not exist in a void of objects, build-
ings and cities; on the contrary, they operate through the continuous 
material encounters between living and non-living bodies. Several 
texts proposed in this volume examine various forms of corporeal 
violence (racism, gender-based violence, etc.). This examination, 
however, can only exist in the integration of the designed environ-
ment’s conditioning of this violence. As Mimi Thi Nguyen argues in 
the conclusion of this book’s first chapter, “the process of attending 
to the body — unhooded, unveiled, unclothed — cannot be the so-
lution to racism, because that body is always already an abstraction, 
an effect of law and its violence.”2 
The designed environment does not merely stop at the perceptible 
limit of the various objects — whatever their size — that surround our 
bodies: it includes the atmospheric composition of our bodily condi-
tion of “Being-in-the-breathable,” as shown by Philippe Theophani-
dis in the second chapter dedicated to the “biopolitics of teargas 
warfare.”3 This notion of breathable strikes us for its resonance with 
the recent political affirmation about the reality of what it means to 
be an African American body through Eric Garner’s last words be-
fore being strangled to death by a New York police officer: “I can’t 
breathe!”4 Fifty-five years earlier, Frantz Fanon had described the 
colonial conditions under the following terms:
There is not occupation of territory, on the one hand, and indepen-
dence of persons on the other. It is the country as a whole, its history, 
1 See Léopold Lambert (ed), The Funambulist Papers: Volume 1, Brooklyn: punctum 
books, 2013.
2 Mimi Thi Nguyen, “Profiling Surfaces,” in this volume, 13.
3 Peter Sloterdijk, Terror from the Air, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009, 47. Philippe 
Theophanidis, “Caught in the Cloud: The Biopolitics of Teargas Warfare,” in this volume, 
14-23.
4 Eric Garner was killed by a white NYPD officer in Staten Island on July 17, 2014.
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its daily pulsation that are contested, disfigured, in the hope of a final 
destruction. Under these conditions, the individual’s breathing is an 
observed, an occupied breathing. It is a combat breathing.5
This book does not intend to produce a total or a proper knowledge 
about the body, since such a production never operates without a 
violence implicit within it. The most literal example of such a correla-
tion can be found in the active participation of doctors in various 
forms of modern torture, from the Nazi concentration camps to the 
CIA’s so-called “enhanced interrogation” techniques, and includ-
ing the French colonial doctor in Algeria, also described by Fanon.6 
This anatomic and biological literality should not however obscure 
another form of production of knowledge about the body, a less 
transcendental one: the empirical normative production of social 
performativites. This present volume attempts to produce knowl-
edge about the conditions through which the body is entangled in 
mechanisms of power, as well as how it is able, by its very material-
ity, to implement strategies of resistance against various forms of 
dominant discursive and physical violence.
As already briefly outlined, the critical treatments offered by this 
book’s contributors allow to go much further than the usual (and 
often blindly obsessive!) arguments developed in my own writ-
ings for The Funambulist.7 Although the readers won’t find indica-
tions about the disciplinary background of the contributors — the 
“witty” self-descriptions at the end of the book being preferred to 
academic resumés — the content of the texts will certainly attest to 
the broad imaginaries at work throughout this volume. Dialogues 
between dancers and geographers, between artists and biohack-
ers, between architects and philosophers, and so forth, provide the 
richness of this volume through difference rather than similarity.
Some of the authors here consider bodies as moving assemblag-
es (Hanna Baumann, Grégoire Chamayou, Adrienne Hart), others 
as sites of normative violence (Mimi Thi Nguyen, Tings Chak, Alex 
Shams, Sofia Lemos), others as the (sometimes esoteric) genera-
tive source of their material environment (Pedro Hernández Mar-
tínez, Alan Prohm, Erin Manning, Dan Mellamphy), and one author 
even interprets the notion of the body in its non-human character-
istics (Renisa Mawani): approaches are as rich as various. For this 
reason, I would like to formally thank the twenty-seven friends and 
contributors for having dedicated the time and efforts to their texts 
presented here. Together, we form a community of ideas that, I 
hope, will prove useful both for us and for our readers.
5 Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, New York: Grove Press, 1994, 47.
6 See Frantz Fanon, “Medicine and Colonialism,” in A Dying Colonialism, New York: 
Grove Press, 1994, 121-146.
7 See the volumes of The Funambulist Pamphlets (Brooklyn: punctum books, 2013-2015) 




BY MIMI THI NGUYEN
In June 2010, the New York Times published a feature provocatively 
titled, “The War is Fake, the Clothing Real,” about David Tabbert, a 
fashion-conscious costumer for a company that clothes play-acting 
Afghan or Iraqi insurgents and civilians in war games staged for 
the United States armed forces.1 “Though Mr. Tabbert, 28, person-
ally prefers G-star denim and concert tees, he was on the hunt for 
150 dishdashas, the ankle-length garments worn by men in Iraq and 
elsewhere in the Arab world. In July, actors will wear them in a simu-
lated Iraqi village, posing as townspeople, clerics and insurgents at 
a National Guard training ground in the Midwest.” Of his initial hesita-
tion to accept the job, Tabbert notes that while he was not pro-war, “I 
looked at what we were doing as a positive way to train the soldiers, 
in light of the fact that they are being deployed anyway.” In educat-
ing his eye to create usable profiles, Tabbert studies images on the 
Internet — “to determine, for example, the exact embroidery on the 
epaulet of an opposition leader’s military uniform” — and trains oth-
ers to do the same, thereby teaching soldiers to distinguish between 
“bad” and “good” Afghans or Iraqis (or et cetera) by their cover.2 
Making the criminal or terrorist visible, and educating the eye on how 
to see and otherwise interpret the signs of his lawlessness — which 
is also his availability for detaining, and killing — is central to mod-
ern state powers of surveillance, reconnaissance, and prediction. In 
differentiating from the background a possible criminal, or a prob-
able terrorist, the surfaces of the body bear the weight of instruction. 
Predicting a correspondence between the visible aspects of such 
surfaces, including tattoos, features, and clothes, and the unseen 
propensity for criminality in any individual, the profile also divides 
that which it surveys into actionable categories. Or, as Tabbert says, 
“It’s teaching the people how to not kill people,” with the unspoken 
corollary of teaching them also how to kill the right people, whom we 
might (supposedly, reasonably) suspect from their surfaces.3 

























































What cover then do clothes provide? Because clothes are both con-
tiguous and not with what they cover — skin, flesh — clothing is a 
mutable boundary that asserts itself within a field of matter, forcing 
us to confront the intimacy between bodies and things, and the in-
terface between their amalgam and the environment. In consider-
ing these dense interactions, I suggest these three presuppositions. 
First, clothes are often understood through an indexical relationship 
to the body who wears them, functioning as clues to their existence in 
the world. This is the premise of the sartorial profile in the war game 
or the criminal study, which depends upon the stability of surfaces for 
its visual reconnaissance. Second, for this reason clothes might pro-
vide an alibi for a racial, colonial optics as a surrogate for flesh, where 
flesh is the overdetermination of metaphysical substance — as the 
unseen truth of criminality, alienability, or deviancy. Such enlightened 
discrimination is based on calculations that hinge on the substitution 
— such as culture, which is often (as war-game training supposes) 
captured in clothes. But because clothes often act (or are accused 
of acting) as camouflage or costume to enable false perceptions, 
including the merging of surfaces into the background, in order not 
to be seen, clothes also heighten anxieties about epistemic surety. 
Lastly, then, do we really know what we know in seeing? 
Locating the apprehension of alienability on clothes does not consti-
tute any sort of departure from racial, colonial optics that target the 
body as a continuous surface of legible information about capacity 
and pathology. Profiles that include such surfaces as clothes (as well 
as tattoos or hair, in the profiling of gangs, and their cover, in the 
banning of niqab) teach us how to see race both with and without 
skin as an anchor. Consider the criminalization of sagging pants (es-
pecially worn by young black men) in the United States, and some 
forms of hijab (on Muslim women) in Canada or France, as a public 
contagion. Because these are liberal states that proclaim themselves 
champions of equality and freedom, clothes rather than the bodies 
that they cover are named as those suspicious things that trouble 
lawful persons who “merely” wish to see and secure something with 
certainty. For example, while a 2010 French law bans “the conceal-
ment of the face in public,” rather than directly prohibiting the wear-
ing of the niqab, the law allows leeway for motorcyclists, fencers, 
skiers, and carnival-goers, among other non-Muslim exceptions. But 
President Nicolas Sarkozy himself argued that the law is specific to 
Muslim veiling, with the presumption that veiling is religious coercion 
and therefore a rights violation. He and supporters therefore claimed 
the law is necessary to French secularism. So too did clothes be-
come suspect in Arizona’s draconian immigration law, SB1070, 
which made it a state misdemeanor to lack immigration documents 
(and more, to fail to carry such paperwork at all times), compelling 
police officers to have to determine immigration status via the highly 
suspect route of “reasonable suspicion.” Discussing this 2010 leg-
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islation, California State Representative Brian Bilbray appeared on 
a cable news show to defray the accusations of racism with claims 
that “trained professionals,” presumably criminal profilers and other 
experts in scientific methods of observation and evaluation, would 
be able to identify “illegals” by their clothes: “They will look at the 
kind of dress you wear, there is different type of attire, there is differ-
ent type of — right down to the shoes, right down to the clothes.”4 In 
the language of right down to the shoes, right down to the clothes, 
some essence of illegality and alienability is found on these surfaces 
as depths.
Through the abstraction of contiguous surfaces, blurring the distinc-
tion between surplus and ontology, surface and essence, the sar-
torial profile teaches us to project onto racial, colonial others the 
so-called truth of criminality, deviancy, or lawlessness. In doing so, 
clothes not only dramatize the materiality of bodies, but also dem-
onstrate that such materiality is itself animated by racial histories of 
abstraction. That is to say, the story of skin is not depth but more 
surface.5 Constructs of race teach us how to see, as Frantz Fanon 
observed so well, naming flesh an “epidermal schema” presumed to 
yield usable knowledge about humanness and its others through a 
series of abstractions shaping subjectivization from substance.6 The 
liberal disavowal of racism as the foundation for the rule of law thus 
proliferates such abstractions as alibis — the abstractions that script 
skin as visible or material evidence of ontological truth transfer to 
other matter, including clothing, as indices for criminality, or terrorism. 
If constructs of race and racism, as Ann Laura Stoler argues, do “not 
necessarily rest on immovable parts but [...] a changing constella-
tion of features and changing weighing of them,” then the strength 
of racial discourses is in their mobility and mutability, their slide from 
one surface to another.7 
But the promise to capture a stable presence in the profile is treach-
erous, not least because some surfaces are changeable, unreliable. 
There is no telling whether the signs encoded in an epaulet in the 
war game, or the blue bandana in the gang profile, correspond to 
the body it covers. The subject of instruction is classification, but its 
shadow is camouflage. Camouflage names those strategic practices 
of blending in such that the one’s presence is untraceable, invisible, 
or indistinguishable. Clothes are essential to such deceptions in 
which a body willingly effaces itself to an environment. The irony of 
the French ban is that the niqab does not offer self-concealment at 
4 Brian Bilbray on MSNBC (April 21, 2010).
5 For more on race as a modernist surface, see Anne Anlin Cheng, Second Skin: Jose-
phine Baker and the Modern Surface, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
6 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, London: Pluto Press, 1969, 112.
7 Ann Laura Stoler, “Racial Histories and their Regimes of Truth,” Political Power and 
Social Theory 11, 1997, 200.
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all; with the number of Muslim women who cover their faces hovering 
less than a hundredth of a percent of the population, to be so cov-
ered in public is to stand out and draw attention. Consider instead 
that famous scene in Gillo Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers (1966), 
in which women guerillas cast off their hijab and conceal themselves 
in “European” clothes in order to walk the crowded city streets un-
noticed, to plant their bombs. Artist and theorist Hito Steyerl in her 
video HOW NOT TO BE SEEN: A Fucking Didactic Educational.MOV 
(2013) also instructs the viewer in an adaptive logic of surface in an 
age of security. In one sequence, second-skin green suits (perhaps 
most familiar from behind the scenes of CGI-heavy films) enable 
bodies to move past the surveillance cameras found everywhere in 
public as no-bodies, no-spaces, registering only the shimmer of their 
displaced absence in tree-lined suburban malls and desert photo 
calibration targets for drone warfare. Such cover as clothes might 
provide confounds because it transforms the available surfaces for 
reading, extending and transforming the body’s boundaries into the 
world, rendering that body both more dangerous and more vulner-
able, depending on their movements. But even as fabric extends a 
fleshy body’s boundaries into the world, that body also emerges and 
disappears, materializes as a threat and dissipates into shadow.
Some clothes then, perceived to aid invisibility and anonymity (cov-
ering the face, eluding the eye), become hypervisible as objects of 
suspicion in and of themselves, contingent upon environment and 
proximity to other objects, which can include the bodies that such 
clothes cover. These contingencies are as Sara Ahmed writes, “an 
effect of how objects gather to clear a ground, how objects are ar-
ranged to create a background.8” Consider the New York City subway 
announcement that “suspicious backpacks and large containers are 
subject to search,” as if suspiciousness were a property of the ob-
ject, though these objects only become suspicious when contiguous 
with some bodies and not others. The gathering of some objects in 
a supposedly chance cluster — the large backpack, the black youth, 
which is no chance at all — thus justifies suspicion to then create a 
ground for surveillance and policing. 
The figuration of the hoodie as a suspicious thing, as another ex-
ample, demonstrates some of the operations of power that deem 
some bodies criminally, ontologically other and available for violence. 
In the 2012 murder of seventeen year-old Trayvon Martin by vigilante 
George Zimmerman, the hoodie Martin wore became a material wit-
ness. Zimmerman claimed that his suspicions were aroused by the 
“dark hoodie,” pulled up against the rain but more to the point, ac-
cording to the armed vigilante, against respectability, and therefore 
against rule of law. Racial subjectivization thus emerges through this 
8 Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others, Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006, 87.
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interaction between flesh and fabric. Imbued with animative power, 
Martin’s hoodie not only lends to him the resemblance of criminal 
behavior and deviant being (because it obscures recognition) but 
also propels his body physically, expressively, into another realm of 
possible activity. Implicit in this reading is the suspicion the black 
body is without the self-possession to “just” wear the hoodie. The 
hoodie instead wears him, wields the power to transform him into an-
other, the thug. Thus did execrable television personality Geraldo Ri-
vera appear on the Fox cable station morning show Fox & Friends to 
argue that parents should denounce the hoodie as a bad influence: 
“I am urging the parents of black and Latino youngsters particularly 
to not let their children go out wearing hoodies. I think the hoodie is 
as much responsible for Trayvon Martin’s death as George Zimmer-
man was.”9 In this ontological confusion between subject and object, 
between disclosure and deception, the hoodie scripts some part of 
the performance of racial optics and its claims to legitimate violence.
Clothes are not merely ornamental; when we subtract them from the 
surface, we do not otherwise uncover the truth. After Martin’s murder, 
proliferating commentaries worried at the hoodie’s nature (is it in-
nocent or dangerous, ineffective or utilitarian, soft or hard?), some-
times to dismiss the hoodie as evidence at all. To insist (as many 
do, understandably) on seeing Martin’s unadorned body, black and 
murdered, is to insist upon a return to a deeper condition beneath a 
numbing, noisy distraction that impedes our perception of the stabil-
ity of the real. But the process of attending to the body — unhooded, 
unveiled, unclothed — cannot be the solution to racisms, because 
that body is always already an abstraction, an effect of law and its 
violence. In profiling surfaces, especially where flesh and fabric are 
brought together close enough as to be imperceptible, we do not 
arrive at the truth of an interior. We find instead on such surfaces the 
optics through which someone is targeted as alienable from others, 
and the lethal structures that disappear them — unwillingly, devastat-
ingly — from our sight.10 
/// Published on January 2, 2015
9 Media Matters (Staff), Fox’s Geraldo Rivera: “I Think the Hoodie Is as Much Respon-
sible for Trayvon Martin’s Death as George Zimmerman,” on http://mediamatters.org/
blog/2012/03/23/foxs-geraldo-rivera-i-think-the-hoodie-is-as-mu/184418, 2012 (my em-
phasis).
10 Some parts of this essay are elaborated upon in Mimi Thi Nguyen, “The Hoodie as 




CAUGHT IN THE CLOUD: 
THE BIOPOLITICS OF
TEAR GAS WARFARE 
BY PHILIPPE THEOPHANIDIS
On June 12, 2013, a two-and-a-half minute amateur recording titled 
“Taksim’de Gaz saldırısının içinde kalan Kadının acı çığlıkları” was up-
loaded on YouTube. It shows what appears to be a sudden as well 
as massive tear gas assault being conducted against a large crowd 
gathered somewhere in the vicinity of Istanbul’s Taksim square, 
where people have been protesting against the planed demolition of 
Taksim Gezi Park since May.
This video, however, is striking in a number of ways. The speed at 
which the gas completely fills the whole area where the large crowd 
is assembled is astonishing. Forty seconds after the impact of the 
first cartridges, the sky is not visible anymore: a yellowish and dense 
smoke fills the entire frame of the image. Then, the camera turns its 
attention to a young woman nearby.1 Like the author of the video, 
she finds herself caught in the chemical cloud, on top of an immo-
bilized bus, apparently unable to flee. The rudimentary respiratory 
mask she’s wearing over her mouth is clearly unable to protect her 
adequately in this situation. The incapacitating effects of the gas are 
dramatically illustrated by the acute distress she quickly finds herself 
in: the video shows her as she falls on her knees, screaming. The ex-
perience must be terrifying. In her precarious position, the only thing 
she could do to avoid breathing the gas would be not to breathe at all 
which, in turn, would mean death. As Sloterdijk once observed, her 
body is coerced into collaborating to its own demise. It has no choice 
but to interface with the chemical agent filling the atmosphere:2
1 See this video online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rSlHCT3WRw 
2 I am not the only one to have thought of Sloterdijk’s essay on gas warfare in relation 
to the use of tear gas against civilian populations. A year ago, NAJ Taylor, a doctoral 
researcher at the University of Queensland, wrote a good opinion piece for Al Jazeera 
about the increasing use of tear gas by law enforcement agencies: “Teargas: Or, the state 
as atmo-terrorist” (May 5, 2012). More recently, Jussi Parikka linked Sloterdijk’s essay to 
the ongoing Turkey protests in a short comment he published in his blog jussiparikka.
net: “Breathless” (June 17, 2013). A more elaborated essay using Sloterdijk’s theory of 














































[...] the air attack of the gas terrorist (Gasterroristen) produces in the 
attacked the despair of being forced to cooperate in the extermina-
tion of their own lives, because they cannot not breathe.3
The following exploratory essay mobilizes two main conceptual frame-
works: for the most part, it borrows from Michel Foucault’s influential 
analysis of “biopolitics” and from Sloterdijk’s Spheres project. The 
objective is to situate what is happening in the video in the broader 
perspective of the contemporary conditions of our coexistence. Its 
argument can be summarized in the following three propositions:
- First, the tear gas attack against the crowd of protestors is, in 
some ways, exemplary of a contemporary regime of governmental-
ity concerned not only with mere subjects and bodies, but more 
broadly with the control of biological populations in a living envi-
ronment. Here, Sloterdijk’s analysis of atmospheric warfare clearly 
intersects with Michel Foucault’s environmental biopolitics.
- Second, biopolitics is not strictly reducible to the intention of a 
sovereign power. Although it may at one point express itself through 
the institution of a State government, biopower cannot be monopo-
lized nor possessed by a party in particular. It comes from human 
life in general and exists as a dynamic network of force relations. 
From this perspective, the video also raises the crucial problem of 
the conditions in which a form of life or a way of living could resist 
biopolitics.
- Third, the distress of the young woman dramatically points to-
wards a limit where politics of life turn into politics over life. This is il-
lustrative of the paradox of biopolitics already identified by Foucault 
where, most notably through wars, the political management of life 
turns into a work of death.
By further developing those three propositions it is possible to under-
stand the tear gas attack depicted in the video as a specific kind of 
biopolitical operation situated in the broader context of modernity’s 
coexistential crisis. In such a perspective, the situation of the young 
woman caught in a cloud of irritant gas concerns us all. Not so much 
in the sense that we all share it in a consensual unity, but quite the 
opposite. It is ours in the aporetical sense that what we share is what 
Sloterdijk has described as an “acute world war of ways of life.”4 Liv-
ing together has become the environment in which the political man-
agement of life takes place as the possibility of life’s own annihilation.
in Istanbul” which was published online as part of a virtual theme issue of Society and 
Space on “The Events in Turkey” (June 2013): http://societyandspace.com/2013/06/05/
the-events-in-turkey-a-virtual-theme-issue-for-background/.
3 Peter Sloterjik, Terror from the Air, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009, 23.




In the video, it is clear that gas cartridges are being indistinctly thrown 
and/or fired into the crowd. They are not targeted at specific individu-
als nor, as a matter of fact, at any body in particular.5 Instead, the gas 
released by the cartridges is meant for the atmosphere associated 
with the space where the crowd is gathered at a certain point in time. 
It is through the temporary modification of the living environment that 
some generic characteristics of the human body are targeted for the 
specific purpose of control. Officially, the tear gas is not meant nor 
designed to be lethal. Instead, the gas reacts to body’s moisture and 
provokes irritation and burning sensations. It consequently forces the 
body to seek a more hospitable space and, in the process, to leave 
the position it is occupying.
Michel Foucault calls “biopolitics” the massifying capture of life by 
political power.6 It is neither sovereignty over subjects, nor discipline 
over individualized bodies. Instead, biopolitics designate the statisti-
cal control of populations through actions on their living environment. 
In other words, it concerns the control of “human beings insofar as 
they are a species and their environment.”7
Subjects and bodies have not been abandoned as the locus of pow-
er, but rather integrated in a new form of control, of which the use of 
tear gas is exemplary. As a continuation of the gas warfare studied 
by Sloterdijk in Terror From The Air, the use of tear gas in the video 
especially brings attention to the shared quality of our biological liv-
ing conditions:
With the phenomenon of gas warfare, the fact of the living organism’s 
immersion in a breathable milieu arrives at the level of formal repre-
sentation, bringing the climatic and atmospheric conditions pertain-
ing to human life to a new level of explication.8
Human beings’s ability to modify the atmospheric conditions in 
which they live does not stop with tear gas. The video is a reminder 
that biopolitics is both a technological and a global affair. It is not 
because we are all breathing tear gas — we are not — nor because 
the same tear gas cartridges are being used in Turkey and in Brazil. 
Rather, it is because of our collective ability to transform the condi-
tions of our living environment at an unprecedented scale. Biopolitics 
5 Except of course when the cartridge itself is used as a projectile.
6 Foucault was not the first (nor the last) to elaborate a concept of “biopolitics.” For a 
solid overview of the history of the concept, see Roberto Esposito’s Bíos, Timothy Camp-
belle (trans), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008.
7 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-
76, Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana (eds), David Macey (trans), New York: Pica-
dor, 2003, 245.
8 Sloterjik, Terror from the Air, 23.
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includes “the problem of the environment to the extent that it is not 
a natural environment, that it has been created by the population 
and therefore has effects on that population.”9 This means that hu-
man populations are neither strictly situated in Jakob von Uexküll’s 
Umwelt nor exactly in Martin Heidegger’s In-der-Welt-sein (Being-in-
the-world). Instead, they inhabit an intermediate, constructed space 
which is precisely the object of Sloterdijk’s “spherology.” This space 
is neither as determined (closed) as the “environment” of animals, 
nor as indeterminate (open) as Dasein’s world.10
The problem of managing those intermediate environments is no-
toriously illustrated by the contemporary debates surrounding the 
increase in greenhouse gas production. Smog-saturated skies, like 
those sometimes seen over Singapore and Beijing, show the limits 
of control where actions on the environment create undesirable side 
effects. From this perspective, the tear gas attack seen in the video is 
the spectacularly visible expression of a much larger problem.
Power ///
Whereas disciplinary technologies could in some circumstances be 
assigned to a well defined sovereign power, biological technologies 
of control are not necessarily centralized in any form of “state,” “gov-
ernment,” or “system.” Foucault was quite clear about his definition 
of “power”:
By power, I do not mean “Power” as a group of institutions and mech-
anisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. 
[...] Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination 
exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through 
successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. The analysis, 
made in terms of power, must not assume that sovereignty of the 
state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are 
given at the outset; rather, they are only the terminal forms power 
takes.11
This does not mean that the action of the Turkish government should 
not be scrutinized. There is in fact such a thing as a “State control of 
the biological,” as Foucault once put it. One has only to think about 
laws regarding stem cell research, abortion and birth control — 
China’s one-child policy being a striking example of the latter. The 
politically strategic decisions of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
9 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 245.
10 For the relationship between Sloterdijk’s “spheres” and the concepts of environment 
and world, see Peter Sloterdijk, La Domestication de l’être, Paris: Mille et une nuit, 2000, 
42-43, as well as “Foreword to the Theory of Spheres,” in Melik Ohanian and Jean-
Christophe Royoux (eds), Cosmograms, New York: Lukas & Sternberg, 2005, 223-240.
11 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol I: An Introduction, Robert Hurley (trans), 
New York: Pantheon Books, 1978, 92.
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Erdoğan certainly have a role to play in the tear gas attack captured 
by the amateur video described in the opening of this essay.
However, what Foucault is saying in regard to biopolitics and bio-
power is that power is not a circumscribed predicate one could 
assign to a single individual or a class of individuals.12 Nor is it a 
substance that one group could appropriate to the detriment of an-
other group. “More power to the people” is a slogan not quite in 
line with Foucault’s theories. Within a biopolitical paradigm, “[p]ower 
is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it 
comes from everywhere.”13 This distributed “network of power rela-
tions” forms “transitory points of resistance.”14 In Turkey, for example, 
localized tactics of climatization emerged in response to the strategy 
of tear gas warfare. What is important, it seems, is to be aware of the 
ways by which those fluxes of resistance are susceptible to institu-
tional capture:
And it is undoubtedly the strategic codification of these points of re-
sistance that makes a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the 
way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power 
relationships.15 
Giorgio Agamben — who prolonged Foucault’s efforts in new direc-
tions — has shown how the very institution of human rights is pre-
cisely what allows for the political management of human life in the 
first place:
Declarations of rights represent the originary figure of the inscription 
of natural life in the juridico-political order of the nation-state. The 
same bare life that in the ancien régime was politically neutral and 
belonged to God as creaturely life and in the classical world was (at 
least apparently) clearly distinguished as zoē from political life (bios) 
now fully enters into the structure of the state and even becomes the 
earthly foundation of the state’s legitimacy and sovereignty.16
From this perspective, human rights belong to the genealogical 
background that eventually allowed for the emergence of tear gas 
warfare as a specific kind of biopolitical operation. In such a context, 
it is all the more important to keep thinking different forms of collec-
12 From Foucault’s perspective, it would seem appropriate to understand biopolitics as 
stabilized forms of governmentality (institutions, apparatuses, etc.), whereas biopower is 
the underlying “multiplicity of force relations” immanent to life upon which those stabi-
lized forms emerge. For more, see also Maurizio Lazzarato, “From Biopower to Biopoli-
tics,” Pli 13, 2002, 99-113.
13 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 93.
14 Ibid., 96.
15 Ibid., 96 (my emphasis).
16 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(trans), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, 75.
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tive life, aside from the institutional forms already provided by the 
massifying power of biopolitics. This opens up new lines of thought 
which are not based on “binary and all-encompassing opposition be-
tween rulers and ruled,” or of “massive binary division.”17 Examples 
of such efforts can be found in Giorgio Agamben’s deployment of 
“whatever singularities” and Jean-Luc Nancy’s attempt to think the 
“singular plural.”18 Both authors are engaged in an attempt to think 
new political forms of life — for which they both use the term “com-
munity” — through dynamics of (force) relations rather than through 
predetermined sets of fixed properties or values.
War ///
One could argue that the gas attack shown in the video does not 
qualify as “warfare” since it shows the use of tear gas by law enforce-
ment against civilians. It is true that while the military use of chemi-
cal weapons has been subjected to various international prohibitions 
since the Hague Conventions, the domestic use of tear gas for law 
enforcement purposes remains legal. The Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention considers “tear gas” to be a “riot control agent”: 
instead of a “chemical weapon” it is referred to as a “chemical com-
pound.”
However, it could be argued that the term “warfare” in particular, and 
the category of war in general, nevertheless apply to what is hap-
pening in Turkey. They also apply, in fact, to similar events happen-
ing elsewhere, even when tear gas or military-style operations are 
not involved. There are several reasons for this, both practical and 
theoretical.
In August 2012, the independent organization Physicians for Human 
Rights issued a report titled “Weaponizing Tear Gas” about the “un-
precedented use” of the control agent during the Bahraini uprising 
of spring 2011. The report clearly suggests that tear gas — to which 
PHR refers to as a “toxic chemical agent” — can be used as a weap-
on. Furthermore, the deputy prime minister of Turkey has threatened 
to deploy military forces in cities. If the army was indeed deployed 
against the civilian population, the conflict could very well qualify as a 
civil war. In fact, the threat alone is enough to link this conflict with the 
increasing extension of war zones inside the civilian sphere. Mean-
while, authorities in Brazil have announced the deployment of the Na-
tional Public Security Force (Força Nacional de Segurança Pública). 
The NPSF is composed of men from the Brazilian Military Police. The 
very qualification of a police force responsible for public order as 
17 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 94-96.
18 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, Michael Hardt (trans), Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 2003; Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, Robert Richard-
son (trans), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
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being “military” in nature could be seen as another indication of the 
indifferentiation between public civil and military spheres.
Civilian conflicts are not a new phenomenon. Their history can be 
traced back to the Greek stasis which designated a violent confron-
tation between the civil members of a given polis (or city-state). In 
contemporary times however, globalization has increasingly folded 
the external into the internal: the traditional distinction between the 
domain of war — which used to take place at a macro level, in-be-
tween states (or state nations) — and the civilian sphere has been 
blurred. The turn towards what has been called a “global civil war” 
has intensified since 2001, when the launch of the so-called “war on 
terror” effectively extended the theatre of military operations to the 
entire world.
It is one of the strengths of Foucault’s analysis to show how, in pres-
ent times, the politics of life are paradoxically always susceptible to 
being transformed into works of death. This situation has become 
possible because politics and war are but different strategies of cod-
ing the power of biopolitics: strategies where one is “always liable to 
switch into the other.”19 The most deadly conflicts of the last century 
have been carried in the name of safeguarding the integrity of life: the 
life of a population, a nation, a community:
Wars are not longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be 
defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; en-
tire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter 
in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital.20
Furthermore, the events represented in the amateur video I wrote 
about earlier are far from being exceptional or, rather, they appear 
to be exceptionally familiar. I won’t be the first to recall Walter Benja-
min’s comment to the effect that “the ‘emergency situation’ in which 
we live is the rule.” Civilian populations all around the world have 
been increasingly involved in incidents of extreme violence (although 
one needs to distinguish between an increase in the events them-
selves and an increase in media exposure). Wars, it could be argued, 
are now experienced at the micro level of various public and private 
spaces, whether they take the form of bombings, of targeted assas-
sinations, of mass murders, of explosive riots or of uprisings. Since 
I started writing this text, and while the conflict in Turkey was still on-
going, massive protests have also erupted both in Brazil and Egypt.
In the first volume of his Spheres trilogy, Sloterdijk describes this situ-
ation as a “war of foams”:
19 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 93.
20 Ibid., 137.
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The guiding morphological principle of the polyspheric world we in-
habit is no longer the orb, but rather foam. […] In foam worlds, the 
individual bubbles are not absorbed into a single, integrative hyper-
orb, as in the metaphysical conception of the world, but rather drawn 
together to form irregular hills. […] What is currently being confusedly 
proclaimed in all the media as the globalization of the world is, in 
morphological terms, the universalized war of foams.21
As soon as the protests started in Turkey, at the end of last May, ef-
forts were made to unify them with previous social movements such 
as the Occupy movement and the Arab Spring. It is true that while 
each of those events are still being characterized locally, they do cer-
tainly profit, to a certain extent, from a global momentum.
However, one cannot deny that what is shared globally, aside from 
what could be called a “longing for belonging,” is also a mode of 
being-together dramatically characterized by violence. The hypoth-
esis according to which the very desire for togetherness fuels to 
some extent those conflicts is certainly something worthy of further 
consideration. For the moment, it will suffice to note there may be a 
conceptual continuity between the ways in which Foucault, Sloterdijk, 
Nancy and others think of contemporary forms of political life through 
confrontations and wars.
A Valley of Tears ///
Renaissance humanism provided humanity with a position of superi-
ority, not quite alongside God, but well above the earth: “in the middle 
of the world,” as Pico della Mirandola writes in his Discourse on the 
Dignity of Man. Modernity is often interpreted as the moment when 
this privileged position was lost, when human beings were thrown 
back among the entities they used to contemplate from above. This 
transformation comes with the realization that human life is not abso-
lutely exceptional, but on the contrary that it is deeply embedded in a 
specific bio-technological environment which is both shaped by our 
very existence and shared with other species. The critical conditions 
of this “ecotechnological enframing,” as Jean-Luc Nancy once called 
it, have become strikingly visible on a daily basis.22
What Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics has shown, among many 
other things, is that the operations to control and organize life do 
not happen in another realm, in the high tower of a dark castle. In-
stead, the network of power management trying for better or worse 
to provide life with an adequate form coincides all around the world 
with life itself: it is us, as a human community. Instead of being in the 
21 Sloterjik, Spheres Volume I, 71.
22 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, François Raffoul and 
David Pettigrew (trans), Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007, 94.
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middle of the world, we find ourselves to be the very milieu in which 
biopolitics take place. The aporia of our situation, as we have seen, 
becomes clear: not unlike the young woman caught in a cloud of 
tear gas, the very conditions for the existence of a “we” — i.e. coex-
istence — seem to imply its demise.
/// Published on August 26, 2013
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BODIES ON THE LINE: 
SOMATIC RISK AND
PSYCHOGEOGRAPHIES IN 
URBAN EXPLORATION AND 
PALESTINIAN ‘INFILTRATION’ 
BY HANNA BAUMANN
Balbuk had been born on Huirison Island at the Causeway, and from 
there a straight track had led to the place where she had once gath-
ered jilgies and vegetable food with the women, in the swamp where 
Perth railway station now stands. Through fences and over them, Bal-
buk took the straight path to the end. When a house was built in the 
way, she broke its fence-palings with her digging stick and charged 
up the steps and through the rooms.1
Balbuk, an aboriginal woman in Stephen Muecke’s fictocritical trav-
elogue No Road (Bitumen all the Way), is a trespasser, a destroyer 
of private property. She is also merely maintaining her routine, do-
ing what she has always done and asserting her relationship with 
the land irrespective of changing ownership rights and newly-built 
obstacles. In a similar manner, the two types of infiltrators I discuss 
here also defy access restrictions in order to claim a space that has 
been taken away from them. Taking as my starting point the 2013 
documentary Infiltrators by Palestinian artist Khaled Jarrar, I juxta-
pose practices and discourses of Palestinians who enter Jerusalem 
without a permit with those of Urban Exploration (Urb-Ex). Urb-Ex, 
engaged in predominantly by elites in the cities of the global North, 
involves the recreational physical exploration of derelict and aban-
doned locations in the city, but also of exclusive securitised spaces. 
The practice has become highly visible due to spectacular actions 
that generated numerous media reports, but also thanks to self-pro-
motional films and blogs. (Incidentally, a low-budget action film also 
titled Infiltrators about urban explorers was released in 2014). While 
the physical acts involved in these two types of infiltration are similar, 


























the meanings attached to them differ in many, albeit not all, areas. 
This is an attempt, then, to link descriptions of somatic experience 
involved in ‘infiltration’ with the psychogeographies they produce, 
which are in turn also produced by them.
Academics writing on Urb-Ex — including geographer Bradley Gar-
rett, an avid practitioner of Urb-Ex himself  — have been criticized 
for failing to interrogate the various level of privilege at play in the 
practice.2 Mott and Roberts (rightfully) take issue with the assertion 
that, apart from those engaging in Urb-Ex, everyone has “stopped 
exploring.3” In fact, encounters with homeless people documented 
by Urb-Exers show that supposedly abandoned spaces are not un-
chartered territory, waiting only to be discovered with abseiling equip-
ment and an expensive camera. Instead they function as safe spaces 
for other types of trespassers, who seek to escape the surveillance 
apparatus of the city.
If Urb-Exers have not sufficiently acknowledged that they do not have 
a monopoly on trespassing within the cities of the global North, they 
also have failed to see the relationship of their activities to infiltra-
tion taking place on different scales. Indeed, millions of ‘illegal’ or 
undocumented migrants would most likely disagree that the world 
has stopped exploring. Both Urb-Ex and migration across interna-
tional borders involve overcoming a high-tech security apparatus in 
order to make use of spaces designed for the Other, and both entail 
gaining access to exclusive neoliberal spaces — be they high-rise 
buildings like London’s Shard or zones of economic privilege such 
as the EU.
Like many migrants, Palestinians are without citizenship rights or 
territorial sovereignty. Palestinian topography is defined by severely 
restricted movement, making it a particularly rich terrain for infiltra-
tion. Due to the ubiquity of ever-changing boundaries both around 
and inside the Palestinian territories, any form of movement becomes 
a transgression, any use of space for daily activities is interpreted 
as an expansive outward-movement, and the breach of boundaries 
becomes an integral part of going about one’s everyday life.4 The 
‘infiltrators’ shown entering Jerusalem from the West Bank in Jarrar’s 
film represent a cross-section of society. We don’t only see labour-
ers entering Jerusalem to make a living, but also older women wish-
ing to pray at al-Aqsa mosque, middle-aged men who laugh at their 
2 Bradley L. Garrett, Explore Everything: Place-Hacking the City, London: Verso, 2013.
3 Carrie Mott and Susan M. Roberts, “Not Everyone Has (the) Balls: Urban Exploration 
and the Persistence of Masculinist Geography,” Antipode 46:1, 2014, 236.
4 Ariel Handel, “Where, Where to, and When in the Occupied Territories: An Introduction 
to the Geography of Disaster,” in Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni and Sari Hanafi (eds), The 
Power of Inclusive Exclusion. Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territo-
ries, New York: Zone Books, 2009, 216.
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in own ineptitude in attempting to climb the Israeli Wall separating 
East Jerusalem from the West Bank, as well as a baby being car-
ried through a tunnel. A young boy shoves dozens of loaves of ka’ek 
bread through a drainage hole in the Wall, refusing to allow normal 
life — and everyday desires such as fresh bread from Jerusalem 
— to be interrupted by a massive piece of physical infrastructure. 
The rather casual, sometimes dilettantish, approach to trespassing 
seen in Infiltrators mirrors the recreational character of Urb-Ex in cer-
tain ways, but it masks a vastly higher level of physical risk. While 
Urb-Exers may spend a night in jail (and wear this as a badge of 
honour), Palestinians crossing the de-facto border without a permit 
risk — and, we are told, sometimes lose — their lives. Because they 
take place within structurally vastly different contexts, the somatic ex-
periences they involve and the spaces in which they take place are 
conceptualised differently.
The Tactics of Smoothing Striated Space ///
The city, according to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, is the “stri-
ated space par excellence” — and this striation is only exacerbated 
if the city is bifurcated by various kinds of borders.5 Urb-Exers work 
within, not against this system of constraint. If it weren’t for access 
restrictions, and the potential legal repercussions of entering securi-
tised spaces, the act of infiltration would lose much of its thrill. Garrett 
describes Urb-Ex as a form of “place-hacking” because, next to the 
physical feats required in trespassing on spaces that are off bounds, 
it involves the cerebral activity of identifying the weak spots in their 
striation — undermining the system while working within the grid of 
its logic.
Palestinians similarly use their intimate knowledge of the Israeli se-
curity apparatus to make use of gaps in the system, but their infiltra-
tion serves to smooth out the striated spaces through which they 
move.6 Not merely evading state control by avoiding soldiers and 
circumventing checkpoints, Palestinians are seen forging rhizomatic 
new paths by driving off the road and moving on foot through the 
landscape. By moving outside of the formal road system, and thus 
the parameters controlled by Israeli security services, they can more 
freely act outside the purview of the state. They utilise information 
networks to keep track of the ever-changing security landscape, and 
constantly update tactics to reflect the current closure of roads, staff-
ing of checkpoints, or army patrols. Infiltrators shows Palestinians 
scaling the Wall with the help of ladders, passing through drainage 
5 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Brian Massumi (trans), London: Continuum, 1987, 481.
6 Nurhan Abujidi, “Surveillance and Spatial Flows in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,” 
in Elia Zureik, David Lyon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban (eds), Surveillance and Control in 
Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power, London: Routledge, 2010.
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tunnels underneath the Wall, cutting through wire fences, evading 
and running from security personnel — physical acts not at all unlike 
those involved in Urb-Ex, yet with vastly different meanings.
Somatic Experiences and Psychogeographies ///
Infiltration is not merely about evading state control, it is also about 
taking back an area no longer under one’s control. Garrett describes 
Urb-Ex as a rebellion against the feeling that “the city is built for oth-
ers and we may look at it but we may not touch it.”7 This desire to 
establish more direct contact with the city and experience its inner 
workings first hand is a natural consequence of contemporary urban 
planning, if we are to follow Richard Sennett’s argument that “the 
stretched-out geography of the modern city, in concert with modern 
technologies for desensitizing the human body” have weakened the 
tactile sense.8 What Garrett calls “edgework” — actively seeking out 
dangerous activities in the spaces of exploration — leads to tangible, 
real experiences.9 The thrill of illegality and physical danger appear 
to bring about a heightened state of psychological awareness: what 
Garrett terms the “meld” is a feeling that comes about when Urb-
Exers perceive their personal body to merge with the social body 
of their group of explorers, but also with the urban body as a whole.
Urban explorers thus appear to achieve a feeling of oneness with 
the city, or, one might argue, even a sense of ownership over it. Doc-
umentation of the feats seems to constitute a major motivation for 
Urb-Ex, and photography is seen as a means to achieve an intimate 
connection with places. Another aspect of reaching this state of mind 
is to “inscribe yourself into the place” (by posting stickers in hard-
to-reach locations or rubbing objects with one’s “salival DNA”), the 
desire for which, Garrett writes, “becomes unbearable.”10
As opposed to Urb-Exers, who see overcoming obstacles to infiltrate 
off-limits spaces as a way to become one with the city, for Pales-
tinians moving through securitised spaces, the physical strains and 
dangers to which they are exposed serve as a constant reminder of 
their exclusion from Jerusalem. Lack of detection is of the highest im-
portance for Palestinians, and documentation of their tactics would 
endanger them. This is not to say, however, that Infiltrators do not 
7 Bradley L. Garrett, Place Hacking: Tales of Urban Exploration, unpublished PhD dis-
sertation, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2012, 259.
8 Richard Sennett, Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization, New 
York: Norton, 1994.
9 Garrett argues this is in part because these experiences are not mediated by con-
sumer society of spectacle, when in fact they are highly spectacular and marketable 
themselves.
10 Bradley L. Garrett, Explore Everything: Place-Hacking the City, London: Verso, 2013, 
52.
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recount their achievements with a certain degree of bravado. Retell-
ing episodes of risks taken and dangers survived serves both as a 
way of sharing information about constantly evolving circumstances 
and as a means to regain a sense of agency in a process involving 
asymmetrical power relations. The risk may therefore heighten the 
meaning of the act. The smugglers in Jarrar’s film proudly keep track 
of the number of individuals they have helped across the Wall. They 
appear to conceptualise this as a national duty rather than a way to 
make money. In fact, one smuggler is proud enough of his work that 
he provides his real phone number in case viewers want to call to 
thank him.
Not only the language of conquest reflects the masculinist approach 
inherent in Urb-Ex; the practice also grants authority to certain types 
of bodies, as Mott and Roberts argue, in particular those “performing 
an able-bodied, heteronormative and typically white masculinity.”11 
The physical challenges Palestinians face in scaling the Israeli Wall 
also privilege certain bodies, but because this transgressive form of 
mobility is imbued with rhetoric of national resistance, it also allows 
traditionally less mobile bodies more freedom to move. In framing 
movement across Israeli-imposed lines as resistance, women can 
at times also increase their mobility, challenging patriarchal forms of 
control.12 We see a fashionable young woman scaling the Wall with 
the help of a smuggler to attend a concert in Jerusalem , not to visit a 
dying relative or to ensure her family’s economic survival. Her motiva-
tions are pleasure and leisure, not survival, but the risk she is taking 
is potentially lethal.
The insistence on a Palestinian right to accessing Jerusalem be-
comes especially clear in such cases in which ‘infiltration’ takes 
place for casual reasons, or no reason at all. Palestinians enter the 
city without a permit, taking an enormous risk, in order to merely as-
sert their presence. Both Urb-Exers and Palestinians entering Jeru-
salem ‘illegally’ seek to (temporarily) appropriate space controlled by 
the Other, and subvert it, even if doing so clandestinely. Yet the Pal-
estinians shown in Jarrar’s film do not only exercise their right to the 
city — this city — but enact an alternative geography. Like Balbuk, 
the aboriginal woman pacing through a new spatial reality she does 
not accept, they disavow the meaning imposed by the concrete bar-
rier, they refuse to heed to the physical obstacle it poses. While Ur-
bExers’ conquests hinge on the sense of transgression, Palestinians 
entering Jerusalem without a permit do not need the border — they 
neither accept that their act should be one of trespassing, nor do 
they legitimise the Wall by adhering to the restriction it imposes. They 
may have to engage with its physical reality by developing tactics to 
11 Mott and Roberts, “Not Everyone Has (the) Balls,” 234.
12 Sophie Richter-Devroe, “Palestinian Women’s Everyday Resistance: Between Nor-
mality and Normalisation,” Journal of International Women’s Studies 12, 2009, 32-46.
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overcome it, but they refuse its symbolic demarcation, smoothing out 
its striation instead. In not acknowledging the occupier’s geography, 
they embody a psychogeography in which Jerusalem remains an 
integral part of Palestine.
Creating Thirdspace at the Edges of the City ///
In Urb-Ex, the edge (of buildings as well as the limits of the body’s 
capabilities) plays an essential role in freeing the autonomous sub-
ject from society’s constraints and underpinning his experience of 
conquering the city. Borders, and especially walled borders are con-
stitutive of the nation-state.13 For Palestinians, who do not have a 
state and who did not chose the border signified by the Wall, the un-
dermining of this imposed boundary may act as a constitutive move-
ment (and moment). The border zones at the edges of Jerusalem, 
which are permeated by acts of infiltration on a daily basis, act as a 
kind of thirdspace between here and there in the sense of Bhabha:
These “in-between” spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strate-
gies of selfhood — singular or communal — that initiate new signs 
of identity and innovative sites of collaborations in the act of defining 
the idea of society itself.14
If we understand thirdspace not merely as a space for hybridising 
cultural identity, but also for the marginalised to renegotiate power 
relations and act as spatial agents, it may be that the in-between 
spaces at the seam zones, the grey areas of legality, jurisdiction and 
ownership are the spaces in which Palestinians can affect the spatial 
power configuration.15 The act of infiltration, and the disregard for the 
(border)line it displays by putting bodies on the line and exposing 
them to potential physical harm, reshapes the territory itself, if only 
momentarily.
/// Published on May 15, 2014
13 Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, New York: Zone Books, 2010.
14 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, New York: Routledge, 1994.
15 See Edward Soja, Thirdspace. Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined 
Places, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
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PALESTINE MADE FLESH 
BY SOPHIA AZEB
In a 1998 opinion piece for Egyptian weekly Al Ahram, Edward Said 
memorably skewered Yasser Arafat’s intention to issue his second 
declaration of Palestinian statehood within a year. Said wrote, “I say 
[statehood] with some irony because, at first glance, the notion of 
declaring a state for a second time (Algiers, November 1998 was the 
first) must strike the untutored spectator as inherently funny, since in 
both instances, except for about 60 per cent of Gaza, there is very 
little land for this state.”1 Indeed, Arafat’s poorly thought out decrees 
for statehood never succeeded, resulting instead in the expected Is-
raeli backlash against Palestinians living under occupation and within 
the Israeli state. But as Said went on to criticise the most obvious 
flaws of the illusive ‘statehood’ Arafat strove for, he made quite a pro-
found assertion: “If by declaring that what, in effect, is a theoretical 
abridgement of true statehood is the first step towards the realization 
of actual statehood, then one might as well hope to extract sunlight 
from a cucumber on the basis of the sun having entered the cucum-
ber in the first place. This is an example not of serious, but of magical 
thought, something we have no need of now.”2 Lover of poetry and 
music though he was, Edward Said seriously devalues the radical 
potential of imagination in his article. Specifically, he slights the role 
that imagination plays in creating and sustaining a truly autonomous 
Palestinian nation. A nation with no land but also no borders; a na-
tion with no military but also no war, and a nation with no recognition 
based on the destructive logics of empire. This is all to say, a nation 
that is lived without restrictions through the innovative and agile prac-
tice of imagining otherwise. This brief essay’s exploration of imagin-
ing an ‘other’ way to recognize Palestine pays its respects to Edward 
Said’s dogged pursuit of liberation, but remembers that Edward Said, 
like millions of other Palestinians, lived, and died, elsewhere. 
“I was born a Black woman / and now / I am become a Palestinian,” 
African American poet June Jordan asserted after the 1982 mas-
sacre in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, positioning herself 
1 Edward Said, “A real state means real work,” Al Ahram 397 (October 1998), 1-7. Re-























within a proclamation of the existence of her fellow Palestinians.3 If 
June Jordan is Palestinian, if she, in fact, becomes Palestine, then 
does Palestine exist outside of the nation-state? Might Palestine ex-
ist within the very bodies that exceed the confines of statehood, of 
discernable cartographic recognition? Statelessness as a result of 
imperialism, exploitation, and forced displacement is unbearable 
and often unknowable, in any of its historic manifestations. But is the 
nation-state that the PLO twice declared, Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestin-
ian Authority won relative approval of from the United Nations, and 
several European states have voted to ‘recognize’ in 2014 a solution? 
The dilemma of statelessness is real, but the “solution” — a state — 
risks cementing the outcome of Palestinian liberation within the very 
structures that first orchestrated its subjugation. When has the nation-
state functioned as a tool of liberation? When has the nation-state 
escaped the confines of its origins in enslavement, imperialism, exile, 
and settler colonialism? The nation-state of borders and laws, that 
entity which classifies and determines what citizenship and belonging 
to the nation means… that nation-state is conquest and the root of 
occupation itself. We must not seek Palestine The State — we must 
instead continue to envision Palestine The Nation, the cultural nation, 
the people nation, the borderless, limitless imaginary of a nation. We 
are stateless, but we are certainly not uprooted or unlimbed. A fanta-
sy? Wholeheartedly. A ‘magical thought’ that our intellectual forefather 
Edward Said might find frustratingly idealistic, or even absurd. But in 
absurdity we may trouble the normative expectations of state-based 
liberation (aping the West’s epistemological and political structures, 
which have structured our own oppression and our own complicities 
in the oppression of others — there are always others), and with our 
very bodies we remain Palestinian. The Palestinians of a Palestine that 
was never recognized as Palestine but remains, always, a practice of 
Palestine. The whole globe may hold Palestine, may be peoples com-
ing together in June Jordan’s living room to build their homes as real 
and sustaining as the flesh that allows us to move, touch, and feel.  
The political importance of our bodies (cultural, social, corporeal, and 
ephemeral) to colonized peoples, especially for those whose bodies 
function in exile, is fundamental to our understanding of how Pales-
tine is practiced outside of the limitations of the nation-state and the 
politics of utterable recognition it demands. Though Palestinians un-
der occupation, in refugee camps, and in the diaspora are absented 
from Western epistemologies (“a land without a people for a people 
without a land” being the common refrain), their own way of being 
and knowing poses a radical threat to the tenuous logics of Zionism.4 
This is particularly intriguing in the case of the refugee — a figure 
3 June Jordan, “Moving towards Home,” in Living Room, New York: Thunder’s Mouth 
Press Inc, 1985, 132.
4 Beshara B. Doumani, “Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine: Writing Palestinians into His-
tory,” in Ilan Pappé (ed), The Israel/Palestine Question, London: Routledge, 1999, 13.
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theorised as constituting a great threat to the power of the state by 
Giorgio Agamben, who argues that the refugee’s very existence con-
tests the state’s role of sovereign over life: they manage to live without 
the state, in essence.5 In Achille Mbembe’s parallel estimation, the 
refugee is a political body within war, thus an act of absolute state 
power.6 In the case of Palestinians, both assertions might be consid-
ered equally full of imaginative utility: Palestinian refugees continue to 
exercise their existence by being without a (Palestinian) state, even 
while being subject to the (Israeli) state. Palestinians resist the finality 
of the loss of a homeland by practicing their existence through the 
very human material coloured by this loss. In essence, the bodies of 
Palestinians and their relations in exile act as an exercise of existence 
— bodies unrecognizable and unacknowledged as life forms by their 
oppressors but unable to be detached from themselves or their own 
self-knowing.7  
Hailing from the destroyed village of Al-Birwa, the poet Mahmoud Dar-
wish is firm on the tangibility of Palestine from within and elsewhere: 
My homeland is neither a bundle of tales, 
Nor is it only a memory. 
This land is the skin veiling my bones, 
And my heart
Vibrates over its grass like a bee.8 
Darwish anthropomorphizes the land from which he has been exiled 
from, molding from it a human form — “the skin veiling my bones” 
— and thus inhabiting its significance in spite of Israeli occupation 
and Palestinian dispossession. Darwish can no more hope to peel the 
skin off his bones and live than any other human — he is Palestine. 
Palestine shapes, creates, and forms him. This is a manifesto of Pal-
estinian existence. If we wear the homeland as our skin, do we need 
a nation-state to live? 
In another instance, spoken word poet and Palestinian-American 
Suheir Hammad embodies Palestine through the language offered 
by June Jordan decades past. In the pages of Born Palestinian, Born 
Black, she maintains, “Home is within me. I carry everyone and every-
thing I am with me wherever I go. Use my history as the road in front 
5 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, Cesare Casarino and Vin-
cenzo Binetti (trans) Minnesota: University of Minneapolis Press, 2000, 19.
6 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15:1 (2003), 34.
7 Mbembe identifies a potentially autonomous “spirit” within the reductive ‘othering’ of 
African life by non-Africans in On The Postcolony, noting it’s potential in the following line: 
“This ‘life world’ is not the only field where individuals’ existence unfolds in practice; it is 
where they exercise existence — that is, live their lives out and confront the very forms 
of their death.” Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001, 15.
8 Khalid A. Sulaiman, Palestine and Modern Arab Poetry, London: Zed Books, 1984, 199.
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of me, the land beneath me.”9 The land she walks upon is not static or 
tethered to an unyielding map; neither is it a nostalgic, timeless place. 
The Palestine Hammad calls home within her is phalasteen: 
We call back to the phalasteen
Of folks songs and village dances 
The phalasteen of martyrs and their mothers 
The phalasteen bulldozed over in beirut 
Whose mouth was jammed silent 
With food stamps in brooklyn.10 
Phalasteen in “Blood Stitched Time” is in Beirut, in Brooklyn, and in 
the physical violence, beauty, and pain inherent in oppression and 
resistance. If phalasteen is martyrs, folk songs, poverty, bulldozers, 
and silenced mouths, then where is it not? This the Palestine that is 
the whole world — Hammad speaks to a global condition of colonial 
violence that exists in phalasteen, the place she calls back to and the 
place within her, and in the United States, the place where her words 
are formed and delivered.  
To understand statehood as it exists in the Western imaginary is 
merely a structuralised form of violence, an entity that mediates life 
and death, is to understand that conceptualising freedom from the 
state must engage a radical departure from the state-based logics 
that govern our terms for liberation. Palestinians yearn for their historic 
place — the borders long imagined and inhabited and restructured 
from within and without — and call it a “homeland.” The yearning 
is real, and is valid, but a homeland exists anywhere the people do 
— and Palestinian people are everywhere, in all bodies. Perhaps the 
defining feature of occupation and dispossession for Palestinians and 
their kin is having been denied the ability to occupy space in land, in 
place, and in memory. The practice of memory is so often (as Said’s 
terse response to Arafat’s poorly planned statehood proclamation 
demonstrates) to reflect on what was, what should have been, and 
what might still be. Thus creating an alternate futurity, for Palestinians, 
is to remember imaginatively. Displaced from the land, from recogni-
tion, and from their own memories, Palestinians are also displaced 
from linear modes of history and existence. We have, therefore, ex-
actly the ingredients required to imagine a non-linear, placeless free-
dom — one well beyond the confines of a nation-state. It is a freedom 
we imagine, every day, by existing for and within ourselves, in these 
bodies born of Palestine. 
/// Published on December 15, 2014
9 Suheir Hammad, Preface to Born Palestinian, Born Black, Brooklyn: UpSet, 2010, 11.




SENSE OF MODERN WAR 
BY DEREK GREGORY
The work I ended up doing on the region and its wars […] is rooted, 
as human geography should be, in an embodiment of the conflict.
Val McDermid1
In his seminal account of the production of space Henri Lefebvre 
argued that the triumph of abstract space involved a relentless privi-
leging of visualization, an aggressive inscription of “phallic brutal-
ity,” and a repression, even a “crushing” of the human body. For 
Lefebvre, significantly, this “space of calculations” first emerged in 
the years surrounding the First World War, and although he did not 
address it in any detail, modern war clearly exemplifies these trans-
formations: an intensifying reliance on an optical-cartographic imagi-
nary, an excessive capacity for spectacular, masculinized violence, 
and an exorbitant violation of the human body.2 But if we take Neil 
Smith’s injunctions about the (co-)production of nature seriously, the 
dialectic of modern war reveals a second narrative, in which what 
Lefebvre called “the practico-sensory realm,” comes to the fore. For 
in order to survive ground troops had to invest in modes of appre-
hension that extended far beyond the visual; they remained not only 
vectors of military violence but also among its victims; and their bod-
ies have to be comprehended as intensely physiological and affec-
tive organisms.3
  
If the modern trajectories of the production of space and the produc-
tion of nature coincided in the figure of the body — Walter Benjamin’s 
“tiny, fragile human body” locked since the First World War (so he 
said) “in a field of force of destructive torrents and explosions” — 
then, their coincidence in that butchered landscape abruptly recon-
1 Val McDermid, The Skeleton Road, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2014.
2 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Donald Nicholson-Smith (trans), Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991. For an elaboration of these claims, see Derek Gregory, Geographical 
Imaginations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, 382-95.
3 Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space, Oxford: 


































figured the human sensorium.4 The conventional boundaries between 
‘culture’ and ‘nature’ were persistently breached and, when Erich Re-
marque wrote that on the Western Front “our hands are earth, our 
bodies clay and our eyes pools of rain,” he foreshadowed similarly 
transgressive experiences elsewhere.5 As much as they struggled to 
detach and distance themselves from what increasingly seemed to 
be a malevolent nature — registered in the multiple versions of the 
claim that ‘nature’ was their real enemy — soldiers were haunted by 
the hallucinatory fear that they were being not only degraded but 
devoured by it: even absorbed into it. The boundaries were ruptured 
from both sides, by the intrusive presence and explosive violence of 
militaries that turned Edmund Blunden’s verdant valley into “Nature’s 
slimy wound with spikes of blackened bone,” and by the obdurate 
and resistant forces of an inhuman nature — the deadly ‘liveliness’ of 
rain and mud and microbes — to produce a commingled, entangled 
and militarized nature.6 This explains why the soldiers’ senses were 
thrown out of place, why they registered the taste of mud, the smell 
of flesh, the touch of sound. The Enlightenment had disciplined the 
senses, and established what it was permissible to see, to hear, to 
touch, to taste or to smell and what it was possible to know from their 
apprehensions, but these divisions were unbuttoned and their epis-
temologies undone by the intensities of the battlefield.
 
It is that epistemological sense that I seek to sharpen here. The of-
fensives of the First World War were planned within a cartographic 
imaginary. For military violence to be unleashed on such a scale, how 
could it have been otherwise? The war was, as Paul K. Saint-Amour 
reminds us, an intensely optical war that relied, above all, on aerial 
reconnaissance as the source of geospatial intelligence. Observa-
tions and photographs were projected onto the geometric order of 
the map, which was animated by the mechanical cadence of the 
military timetable.7 The result was a remarkably abstract space in ex-
actly Lefebvre’s sense of the term, and yet for the infantry its contours 
had to be known and navigated through a different, complementary 
and even confounding imaginary that I call a corpography. This was 
war made flesh, a way of apprehending the battle space through 
the body as an acutely physical field in which the senses of sound, 
smell and touch were increasingly privileged in the construction of a 
profoundly haptic or somatic geography.8 
4 Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller: Observations on the Works of Nikolai Leskov,” in 
Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, Hannah Arendt (ed), New York: Schocken, 2007, 
83-109, 84.
5 Erich Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front, New York: Random House, 2013, 209.
6 Edmund Blunden, Undertones of War, London: Penguin, 2010, 107.
7 Paul Saint-Amour, “Modernist Reconnaissance,” Modernism/Modernity 10:2, 2003, 
349-80.
8 Derek Gregory, “Gabriel’s Map: Cartography and corpography in Modern War,” in Peter 
Meusburger and Derek Gregory (eds), Geographies of Knowledge and Power, New YorkL 
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Put like that, the observation is hardly original; you can find intimations 
of all this in classics like Eric Leed’s No Man’s Land, and once you 
start digging into the accounts left by soldiers you find supporting evi-
dence on page after page.9 But I emphasize the epistemological be-
cause this constituted more than a different way of experiencing war: it 
was also a different way of knowing, ordering and navigating the space 
of military violence. These knowledges were situated and embodied 
— ‘local,’ even — but they were also transmissable and mobile. On 
the Western Front, corpographies were an instinctive, jarring, visceral 
response to military violence. As one stretcher-bearer put it:
When sound is translated into a blow on the nape of the neck, and 
light into a flash so bright that it actually scorches the skin, when feel-
ing is lost in one disintegrating jar of every nerve and fibre [...] the 
mind, at such moments, is like a compass when the needle has been 
jolted from its pivot.10
 
Corpographies were also improvisational, learned accommodations 
to military violence. This was not so much a re-setting of the compass, 
as the stretcher-bearer put it, as the formation of a different bodily 
instrument altogether. Alex Volmar provides a helpful gloss: 
New arrivals to the front had not only had to leave behind their home 
and daily life, but also the practices of perception and orientation 
to which they were accustomed. With entry into the danger zone of 
battle, the auditory perception of peacetime yields to a […] radical-
ized psychological experience — a shift that the Gestalt psychologist, 
Kurt Lewin, attempted to articulate with the term “warscape”: for the 
psychological subject, objects lost most of their peacetime character-
istics during wartime because they were henceforth evaluated from a 
Springer, 2015. I thought I’d made the word up, but Joseph Pugliese’s State Violence and 
the Execution of Law (New York: Routledge, 2013, 86) uses “geocorpographies” to desig-
nate “the violent enmeshment of the flesh and blood of the body within the geopolitics of 
war and empire,” which obviously complements my own project. I have since discovered 
that the term has a longer history and multiple meanings that intersect, in various ways, 
with what I am trying to work out. Perhaps not surprisingly, it also serves as a medical 
term: “cranio-corpography” is a procedure devised by Claus-Frenzen Claussen in 1968 
to capture in a visual trace the longitudinal and lateral movements of a patient’s body 
inorder to detect and calibrate disorders of the “equilibrium function.” More recently, cor-
pography has also been used by dance theorists and practitioners, including Francesca 
Cataldi and Sebastian Prantl to describe a critical, creative practice: a “dance of things,” 
in which the body is thoroughly immersed as a “land.body.scape,” as Prantl puts it. 
Meanwhile, Allan Parsons has proposed a “psycho- corpography” — explicitly not a psy-
chogeography — as a way of “tracing the experience of living-a-body.” Elsewhere, Alex 
Chase attends to specific bodies-in-the-world, those of cultural ‘figures’ (Artaud, Bataille, 
Foucault, Genet, Jarman and Mishima among them), that resist normalization — hence 
emphatically ‘queer’ bodies — and which figure bodies as events. “I hope to develop 
a methodology of ‘ corpography,’” he says, “which would write between biography and 
textual analysis, material lived bodies and fictional work, life and representation, in order 
to work through other queer concepts such as temporality, space, and ethics.”
9 Eric Leed, No Man’s Land: Combat and Identity in World War I, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979.
10 “A Corporal,” Field Ambulance Sketches, London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 
1919, 21. 
40
perspective of extreme pragmatism and exclusively in terms of their 
fitness for war. [...]
 
In place of day-to-day auditory perception, which tended to be pas-
sive and unconscious, active listening techniques came to the fore: 
practices of sound analysis, which might be described as an “auscul-
tation” of the acoustic warscape — the method physicians use to lis-
ten to their patients by the help of a stethoscope. In these processes, 
the question was no longer how the noises as such were structured 
(i.e. what they sounded like), but rather what they meant, and what 
consequences they would bring with them for the listeners in the 
trenches. The training of the ear was based on radically increased 
attentiveness. The subject thrust to the front thus comprised the focal 
point of an auditory space in which locating and diagnostic listening 
practices became vital to survival.11 
 
To render this in even more vivid terms, here is “Ex-Private X,” A.M. 
Burrage:
 
We know by the singing of a shell when it is going to drop near us, 
when it is politic to duck and when one may treat the sound with con-
tempt. We are becoming soldiers. We know the calibres of the shells 
which are sent over in search of us. The brute that explodes with a 
crash like that of much crockery being broken, and afterwards makes 
a ‘cheering’ noise like the distant echoes of a football match, is a 
five-point-nine.The very sudden brute that you don’t hear until it has 
passed you, and rushes with the hiss of escaping steam, is a whizz-
bang... The funny little chap who goes tonk-phew-bong is a little high-
velocity shell which doesn’t do much harm... The thing which, without 
warning, suddenly utters a hissing sneeze behind us is one of our 
own trench-mortars. The dull bump which follows, and comes from 
the middle distance out in front, tells us that the ammunition is “dud.” 
The German shell which arrives with the sound of a woman with a 
hare-lip trying to whistle, and makes very little sound when it bursts, 
almost certainly contains gas.
 
We know when to ignore machine-gun and rifle bullets and when to 
take an interest in them. A steady phew-phew-phew means that they 
are not dangerously near. When on the other hand we get a sensation 
of whips being slashed in our ears we know that it is time to seek the 
embrace of Mother Earth.12
 
As Burrage’s last sentence shows, corpographies were at once re-
cognitions of a devastated landscape — even an “anti-landscape” 
that seemed to deny all sense — and reaffirmations of an intimate, 
intensely sensible bond with the earth13: 
11 Axel Volmar, “‘In Storms of Steel’: the Soundscape of World War I,” in Daniel Marat 
(ed), Sounds of Modern History: Auditory Cultures in 19th and 20th-Century Europe, Ox-
ford: Berghahn, 2014, 227-255. See also Kurt Lewin’s topological phenomenology of the 
battlefield, “Kriegslandschaft” (1917), translated by Jonathan Blower as “Landscape of 
War,” in Art in Translation 1:2, 2009, 199-209. 
12 A.M. Burrage, War Is War, London: Pen and Sword, 2010, 78.
13 Becca Weir, “‘Degrees in Nothingness’: Battlefield Topography in the First World War,” 
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To no man does the earth mean so much as to the soldier. When he 
presses himself down upon her, long and powerfully, when he buries 
his face and his limbs deep in her from the fear of death by shell-fire, 
then she is his only friend, his brother, his mother; he stifles his terror 
and his cries in her silence and her security.14 
 
And corpographies were not only a means through which militarized 
subjects accommodated themselves to the warscape — providing 
a repertoire of survival of sorts — but also a way of resisting at least 
some its impositions and affirming, in the midst of what so many of 
them insisted was “murder not war,” there was nevertheless what 
Santanu Das calls a “tactile tenderness” between men:
 
This must be seen as a celebration of life, of young men huddled 
against long winter nights, rotting corpses, and falling shells. [...] 
Physical contact was a transmission of the wonderful assurance of 
being alive, and more sex-specific eroticism, though concomitant, 
was subsidiary. In a world of visual squalor, little gestures closing a 
dead comrade’s eyes, wiping his brow, or holding him in one’s arms 
were felt as acts of supreme beauty that made life worth living.15 
A hundred years later, I have no doubt that much the same is true in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. “To understand Afghanistan,” 
one Bundeswehr officer insisted, “you have to see, hear, smell and 
taste it.”16 My interest in corpography is therefore part of my refusal 
to acquiesce to the thoroughly disingenuous de-corporealization of 
today’s “virtuous war,” which, all too often, is made to seem distant 
and digital: a hyper-optical war waged on screens rather than in ru-
ined towns and ravaged fields.17
In fleshing out these ideas I have been indebted to a stream of work 
on the body in human geography. Most of it has been remarkably 
silent about war, even though Kirsten Simonsen once wrote about 
“the body as battlefield,” but it is now difficult for me to read her el-
egant essay without peopling it with bodies in khaki, blue or field grey 
tramping towards the front-line trenches, clambering over the top, 
or crawling from shell-hole to shell-hole in No Man’s Land.18 That is 
Critical Quarterly 49:4, 2007, 40-55.
14 Erich Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front, 43.
15 Santanu Das, Touch and Intimacy in First World War Literature, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, 118.
16 Marion Naeser-Lather, “‘Smelling Fire’: Sensory Experiences of German Soldiers in 
Afghanistan,” paper presented to the conference “Sensing War,” London, June 2014.
17 The classic critique is James Der Derian’s Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industri-
al-Media-Entertainment Network, London: Routledge, 2001. Der Derian attributes thega-
votte between the virtual and the virtuous to the rise of the M-I-M-E network, but I some-
times think it might be more accurate to think of a “military-academic-industrial-media” 
network whose acronym is equally telling. See also Christopher Coker, The Future of War: 
The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004.
18 Kirsten Simonsen, “In Quest of a New Humanism: Embodiment, Experience and Phe-
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partly down to the suggestiveness of her prose, but it’s also the result 
of my debt to the work of Das, Ken MacLeish and Kevin McSorley, 
which directly addresses the corporeality of military violence.19 
 
Like these three authors, I have treated corpographies in relation to 
the soldier’s body, but as the (in)distinctions between combatant and 
civilian multiply and as I begin to work on medical evacuation from 
war zones I have started to think about the knowledges that sustain 
civilians caught up in military and paramilitary violence too. Some of 
them are undoubtedly cartographic — formal and informal maps of 
shelters, camps, checkpoints and roadblocks — and some of them 
rely on visual markers of territory: barriers and wires, posters and 
graffiti. Today much of this information is shared by social media (as 
the battle space has become both digital and physical), but it re-
mains within a broadly cartography imaginary. It may seem abstract 
as representation, but once mapping is understood as a performa-
tive practice, then this too can become intensely corporeal.20
 
Indeed, much of this knowledge is also, as it has always been, cor-
pographic. Peter Adey once wrote about what he called “the private 
life of an air raid,” drawing on the files of Mass Observation during the 
Second World War to sketch a geography of “stillness” even as the 
urban landscape was being violently “un-made”21: 
Stillness in this sense denotes apprehending and anticipating 
spaces and events in ways that sees the body enveloped within the 
movement of the environment around it; bobbing along intensities 
that course their way through it; positioned towards pasts and futures 
that make themselves felt, and becoming capable of intense forms of 
experience and thought.
 
This was a corpo-reality, and one in which — as he emphasised — 
sound played a vital role: “Waves of sound disrupted fragile tempers 
as they passed through the waiting bodies in the physical language 
of tensed muscles and gritted teeth.”22 
 
But, as he also concedes, this was also a “not-so private” life — there 
was also a social life under the bombs — and we need to think about 
nomenology as Critical Geography,” Progress in Human Geography 37:1, 2013,10-26.
19 Santanu Das, Touch and Intimacy in First World War Literature, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008; Ken MacLeish, Making War at Fort Hood: Life and Uncertainty 
in a Military Community, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013; Kevin McSorley 
(ed), War and the Body: Militarisation, Practice and Experience, London: Routledge, 2013.
20 Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge, “Rethinking Maps,” Progress in Human Geography 
31, 2007, 331-344.
21 Peter Adey, “Holding Still: the Private Life of an Air Raid,” M/C Journal 12:1, 2009, and 
“The Private Life of an Air Raid: Mobility, Stillness, Affect,” in David Bissell and Gillian 
Fuller (eds), Stillness in a Mobile World, London: Routledge, 2011, 127-138. 
22 Ibid.
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how these experiences were shared by and with other bodies. These 
apprehensions of military violence, then as now, were not only mo-
dalities of being but also modes of knowing: as Elizabeth Dauphinée 
suggests, in a different but closely related context, “pain is not an 
invisible interior geography,” but rather “a mode of knowing [in] the 
world — of knowing and making known.23” During an air raid these 
knowledges could be shared by talking with others — the common 
currency of comfort and despair, advice and rumor — but they also 
arose from making cognitive sense of physical sensations: the hiss-
ing and roaring of the bombs, the suction and compression from the 
blast, the stench of ruptured gas mains or sewage pipes. 
Those who inhabited the marchlands between the military and civil-
ian, like air raid wardens, developed an intricate understanding of 
the choreography of an air raid in which they became attuned to the 
interplay between light signatures and what John Strachey called the 
“individual notes” of the anti-aircraft batteries: 
First came the flash from behind the slightly bombed mass of Coo-
per’s Garage buildings. Then five or six seconds later the quick wink 
of the shell bursts, well up into the sky. These sights were followed, 
in order, by their appropriate sounds. First the roll of the gun dis-
charges, the up-whistle of the shells, and then the light crack, crack 
of the shell bursts. Flash, wink, boom, whistle, crack in that order, 
over an dover again.24 
 
But for those crouched in cellars and shelters, Steven Connor argued 
that air raids involved a “grotesquely widened bifurcation of visual-
ity and hearing,” in which the optical visual production of a target 
contrasts with “the absolute deprivation of sight for the victims of the 
air raid on the ground, compelled as they are to rely on hearing to 
give them information about the incoming bombs.” Those crouch-
ing beneath the bombs have “to learn new skills of orientating them-
selves in this deadly auditory field without clear coordinates or dimen-
sions but in which the tiniest variation in pitch and timbre can mean 
obliteration.”25 What then can you know — and how can you know 
— when your world contracts to a room, a cellar, the space under the 
bed? When you can’t go near a window in case it shatters and your 
body is sliced by the splinters? When all you have to go on, all you 
can trust, are your ears parsing the noise or your fingers scrabbling 
at the rubble? 
23 Elizabeth Dauphinée, “The Politics of the Body in Pain,” in Security Dialogue 38:2, 
2007, 139-55.
24 John Strachey, Digging for Mrs Miller: Some Experiences of an Air-Raid Warden in 
London: New York: Random House, 1941, 45.
25 Steven Connor, “The Modern Auditory,” in Roy Porter (ed), Rewriting the Self: Histo-
ries from the Renaissance to the Present, London: Routledge, 1996, 210. On the visual 
economy of targeting see Derek Gregory, “Doors into Nowhere: Dead Cities and the 
Natural History of Destruction,” in Peter Meusburger, Michael Heffernan and Edgar Wun-
der (eds), Cultural Memories, Heidelberg: Springer, 2011, 249-286.
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Here too none of this is confined to the past, and so I start to think 
about the “thanatosonics” of Israel’s air strikes on Gaza.26 Sound 
continues to function as sensory assault; here is Mohammed Omer 
earlier this year:
 
At just 3 months old, my son Omar cries, swaddled in his crib. It’s 
dark. The electricity and water are out. My wife frantically tries to 
comfort him, shield him and assure him as tears stream down her 
face. This night Omar’s lullaby is Israel’s rendition of Wagner’s Ride 
of the Valkyries, with F-16s forming the ground-pounding percus-
sion, Hellfire missiles leading the winds and drones representing the 
string section. All around us crashing bombs from Israeli gunships 
and ground-based mortars complete the symphony, their sound as 
distinct as the infamous Wagner tubas. [...] Above, the ever-present 
thwup-thwup of hovering Apache helicopters rock Omar’s cradle 
through vibration. Warning sirens pierce the night — another incom-
ing missile from an Israeli warship.27 
 
And yet, as before, sound can also be a source of knowledge. Here 
is Wasseem el Sarraj, writing during Israel’s previous assault on 
Gaza in November 2012: 
 
In our house we have become military experts, specializing in the 
sounds of Israeli and Palestinian weapons. We can distinguish with 
ease the sound of Apaches, F-16 missiles, drones, and the Fajr rock-
ets used by Hamas. When Israeli ships shell the coast, it’s a dis-
tinct and repetitive thud, marked by a one-second delay between 
the launch and the impact. The F-16s swoop in like they are tearing 
open the sky, lock onto their target and with devastating precision 
destroy entire apartment blocks. Drones: in Gaza, they are called 
zananas, meaning a bee’s buzz. They are the incessant, irritating 
creatures. They are not always the harbingers of destruction; instead 
they remain omnipresent, like patrolling prison guards. Fajr rockets 
are absolutely terrifying because they sound like incoming rockets. 
You hear them rarely in Gaza City and thus we often confuse them for 
low-flying F-16s. It all creates a terrifying soundscape, and at night 
we lie in our beds hoping that the bombs do not drop on our houses, 
that glass does not shatter onto our children’s beds. Sometimes, we 
move from room to room in an attempt to feel some sense of safety. 
The reality is that there is no escape, neither inside the house nor 
from the confines of Gaza.28 
The last haunting sentences are a stark reminder that knowledge, 
cartographic or corpographic, is no guarantee of safety. Military vio-
lence is always more than a mark on a map or a trace on a screen, 
26 The term is J. Martin Daughtry’s. See his “Thanatosonics: Ontologies of Acoustic 
Violence,” Social Text 32:2, 2014, 25-51, where he develops the concept in relation to 
the Iraq war. 
27 Mohammed Omer, “Report from Gaza: When My Son Screams,” The Nation (July 
15, 2014).
28 Wasseem el Sarraj. “The Sounds in Gaza City,” The New Yorker (November 19, 2012).
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and the ability to re-cognise its more-than-optical dimensions can be 
a vital means of navigating the wastelands of war. As in the past, so 
today rescue from the rubble often involves a heightened sense of 
sound and smell, and survival is often immeasurably enhanced by 
the reassuring touch of another’s body. And these fleshy affordances 
— which you can find in accounts of air raids from Guernica to Gaza 
— are also a powerful locus for critique. For if we are to ‘make sense’ 
of war we need to recover the multiple bodily senses through which 
the brutalities and erasures of military violence are registered.








This brief article discusses Grégoire Chamayou’s Manhunts, a pow-
erful account of human inhumanity, the tracking down and killing of 
other humans. As he says in his second paragraph:
To write the history of manhunts is to write one fragment of a long his-
tory of violence on the part of the dominant. It is also to write a history 
of the technologies of predation indispensable for the establishment 
and reproduction of relationships of domination.1
Chamayou is insistent that his focus is not on a metaphor, but 
on “concrete historical phenomena in which human beings were 
tracked down, captured, or killed in accord with the forms of the 
hunt.”2
The main problem has to do with the fact that the hunter and the 
hunted do not belong to different species. Since the distinction be-
tween the predator and his prey is not inscribed in nature, the hunt-
ing relationship is always susceptible to a reversal of positions. Prey 
sometimes band together to become hunters in their turn. The his-
tory of a power is also the history of the struggles to overthrow it.3
His examples are wide-ranging, from Ancient Greece to the Bible, 
from exile to slavery to colonialism, and to zombies. The book is 
strikingly illustrated and has plenty of powerful examples. It pro-
ceeds in a non-systematic manner, and is suggestive rather than 
comprehensive in its cases and references. Nonetheless it is a strik-
ing and original analysis.
1 Grégoire Chamayou, Manhunts: A Philosophical History, Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2012, 1. On Manhunts, see also Jean Bérard, “Predatory Power,” Books and 
Ideas (3 June 2011), and on Chamayou’s work generally, Kieran Aarons, “Cartographies 
of Capture,” Theory & Event, 16:2, 2013.


























































Chamayou is inspired by some of Foucault’s claims, especially the 
contrast Foucault draws between mechanisms of exile and exclu-
sion and incarceration and inclusion. As Chamayou notes, Foucault 
describes this in History of Madness as “the great confinement,” (le 
grand renfermement), but it also figures in his contrasting analyses of 
medicine.4 In lectures delivered in 1974 in Rio Foucault contrasts the 
exile of the leper and the partitioning and quarantine of the plague 
town — a comparison he would reuse in his Collège de France lecture 
course The Abnormals and in the “Panopticism” chapter of Discipline 
and Punish.5 However Chamayou also distances himself from ele-
ments of Foucault’s work. One striking example is when he suggests 
that Foucault’s notion of pastoral power, the power of the shepherd 
over his flock, should be seen as working in opposition to another 
figure, the hunter of men.6 If Abraham is the iconic figure of pasto-
ral power, Nimrod is the parallel for what he calls “cynegetic pow-
er.7” Nimrod was Noah’s great-grandson and acclaimed as a mighty 
hunter. He was also, in some traditions, King of Babylon and thus the 
ruler of Babel.
In Chamayou’s summary, Foucault’s pastoral power is “exercised 
over a multiplicity in movement (a flock); it is fundamentally beneficent 
(caring for the flock), and it individualizes its subjects (knowing each 
member of the flock individually).” It is thus “a mobile, beneficent, and 
individualising power.”8 Chamayou suggests that “cynegetic power 
is opposed term for term by this triple characterization.9” Instead of 
leading the flock, the hunter follows to seize; it is a territorial power, but 
one that fluctuates between the fixed space of the city and the exte-
rior, a power that is “not limited in its predatory extent by any external 
boundary. It is exercised, from a territory of accumulation, on the re-
sources of an indefinite exteriority.”10 Chamayou therefore distinguish-
es between territory, which he understands as fixed, bordered and to 
an extent immobile, from a wider “space of capture.” This leads him 
to the first contrast: “Thus, whereas pastoral power guides and ac-
companies a multiplicity in movement, cynegetic power extends itself, 
on the basis of a territory of accumulation, over a space of capture.”11
4 Ibid., 80. See Michel Foucault, History of Madness, Jean Khalfa (ed), Jonathan Murphy 
and Jean Khalfa (trans), London: Routledge, 2006.
5 Michel Foucault, “The Birth of Social Medicine,” in James D. Faubion (ed), Power: 
Essential Work Volume 3, London: Penguin, 2001, 134-156; Abnormal: Lectures at the 
Collège de France 1974-75, Valerio Marchetti and Antenello Salomini (eds), Graham 
Burchell (trans), New York: Picador, 2003; Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
Alan Sheridan (trans), London: Penguin, 1979.
6 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-
78, London: Palgrave, 2009.




11 Ibid., 16. 
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Chamayou sees modern developments to have caused “a rupture 
with respect to the old principle of territorial sovereignty that maintains 
that everything that is on the territory belongs to the territory, given that 
residing on the territory no longer suffices to be completely subject, 
de facto, to the law that applies to it.”12 But this “old principle of territo-
rial sovereignty” is not, actually, all that old. While elements of its can 
be traced back through the history of political thought, the bringing 
together of these different elements as a notion of “territorial sover-
eignty” is really only as old as the seventeenth century. The idea that 
the king was an emperor in his kingdom, i.e. that he has no superior 
in temporal power, is late medieval; but that the boundaries of that 
kingdom were known and fixed is much later. Indeed, attempts to fix 
boundaries of states was one of the major international projects of the 
first half of the twentieth century; really only being enshrined in legal 
order in the Charter of the United Nations in the principle of territorial 
integrity. In a note Chamayou suggests that
The medieval principle of territorial sovereignty was expressed in the 
formula quidquid est in territorio est de territorio. This maxim meant 
that the sovereign reigned over the whole territory and over everything 
in it. The principle was then interpreted freely, making it the principle 
of protecting refugees: “Qui est in territorio est de territorio. The for-
eigner being subject to the laws of the country where he resides, he 
must also enjoy the protection and advantages of these same laws.” 
Ivan Golovin, Esprit de l’économie politique (Paris: Didot, 1843), p. 
382. See also Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 280.13
The reference is frustrating, because Golovin’s book ends on page 
368 in the copy of the 1843 edition I have seen; but the reference to 
Arendt certainly reinforces Chamayou’s point. Arendt is discussing 
the right of asylum being abolished.
Its long and sacred history dates back to the very beginnings of 
regulated political life. Since ancient times it has protected both the 
refugee and the land of refuge from situations in which people were 
forced to become outlaws through circumstances beyond their con-
trol. It was the only modern remnant of the medieval principle that 
quidquid est in territorio est de territorio, for in all other cases the mod-
ern state tended to protect its citizens beyond its own borders and 
to make sure, by means of reciprocal treaties, that they remained 
subject to the laws of their own country.14
The principle does seem to suggest that whoever is within the terri-
tory is subject to the territory, though the question of whether those 
rights extend outside the territory — and, necessarily today, into other 
territories — is of course open to question. However, Arendt is wrong 
to date this to the medieval period; and Chamayou is wrong to follow 
12 Ibid., 138.
13 Ibid., 180-181, footnote 13.
14 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, San Diego: Harvest, 1968, 280.
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her. That the principle is expressed in Latin does not make it medieval, 
much less Roman. Indeed, the classical Roman thinkers very rarely 
used the word territorium, which tended to apply to agricultural lands 
surrounding a city; and those that did — land surveyors and lawyers 
— saw the territorium as land of quite small extent, part of the overall 
imperium, rather than defining its spatial extent. There was certainly 
not the exclusive relation between territory and sovereignty that we 
have today. Only in the reappropriation of Roman law in the later part 
of the fourteenth century did territorium and jurisdiction become tied 
together; and this had little impact on political theory until seventeenth 
century debates in the Holy Roman Empire about the distinction be-
tween majesty and sovereignty. The best discussion of the (modern) 
principle I have found is in Jennings and Watts’s volume on peace in 
Oppenheim’s International Law:
According to the maxim quidquid est in territorio est etiam de ter-
ritorio, all individuals and all property within the territory of a state are 
under its dominion and sway, and foreign individuals and property 
fall at once under the territorial authority of a state when they cross 
its frontiers.15
This comes in a discussion of “the territorial authority of a state over 
everything within its territory … ;” suggesting that sovereignty needs 
to be understood “as comprising the power of a state to exercise 
supreme authority over all persons and things within its territory, 
[thus] sovereignty involves territorial authority (dominium, territorial 
sovereignty).”16 Yet while this is certainly the case in the late modern 
period, earlier times did not hold to these rigid, bounded definitions. I 
have discussed these historical lineages at length in The Birth of Ter-
ritory.17  The implications for Chamayou’s argument are not profound, 
in that they do not invalidate his claim that something significant is 
changing. But they do suggest that the situation being unravelled was 
never as secure or long-standing as might be implied.
The second and third contrast is easier to grasp: “pastoral power 
is fundamentally beneficent, cynegetic power is essentially preda-
tory;” and while pastoral power is individualising, “cynegetic power, 
although it proceeds by division, does so with a view to accumula-
tion … Cynegetic power accumulates; it does not individualise.”18 The 
third, though, becomes more complicated when we bring it into rela-
tion with the first.
What emerges with the story of Nimrod is a forgotten continent of 
Western political thought. If Foucault could say that beginning with 
15 Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law Volume 
1 Peace. Introduction and Part 1, London: Longman, 1996, 384.
16 Ibid., 382-384.
17 Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013.
18 Chamayou, Manhunts, 16-17.
51
the rise of Hebrew, and then Christian, pastoralism, politics has been 
largely considered a matter of the sheepfold, we can add that it was 
also, though in accord with a parallel and opposed genealogy, a mat-
ter of hunting.19
Chamayou’s book provides a sketch-map of this “forgotten conti-
nent,” a chart that others can use to explore more fully. In that way it 
works like Giorgio Agamben’s writings, or, indeed, those of Foucault 
himself in the governmentality lectures from which Chamayou takes 
the notion of pastoral power.20
In a 2011 commentary for Radical Philosophy, Chamayou connected 
the arguments he had made in that book with contemporary poli-
tics in a much more explicit way.21 He suggests that the doctrine of 
the manhunt is a break with previous ways of conventional warfare, 
“which rests on the concept of fronts, linear battles, and face-to-face 
opposition.”22 We might challenge that description of conventional 
warfare, which is long out-dated and has not accurately described 
US military policy for several decades, but Chamayou’s point is 
worth pursuing. Chamayou contrasts the new developments with 
Clausewitz’s classic understandings (he is a French translator of 
Clausewitz).23 The point is that in conventional war both sides want 
to achieve the same thing — victory. In cynegetic war one side wants 
to locate, capture and kill; the other to evade, to hide, to escape. The 
hunter cannot respect sovereign boundaries, as these are “among 
the greatest allies” of a fugitive.24 Accordingly, “the hunter’s power 
has no regard for borders. It allows itself the right of universal tres-
passing, in defiance of territorial integrity of sovereign states.”25 In a 
nod to Daniel Heller-Roazen’s genealogy of piracy, Chamayou sug-
gests that to do this fully would require a resuscitation of “the archaic 
19 Ibid. 18.
20 Such as Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Daniel Hell-
er-Roazen (trans), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, and The Kingdom and the 
Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government, Lorenzo Chiesa and 
Matteo Mandarini (trans), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. This is one of the 
ways I have engaged with Foucault’s governmentality lectures, suggesting that while 
what Foucault says explicitly on territory is misleading, he is nonetheless extremely help-
ful in thinking about territory. See Stuart Elden, “How Should We Do the History of Terri-
tory?” Territory, Politics, Governance, 1:1, 2013, 5-20; and “Governmentality, Calculation, 
Territory,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 25:3, 2007, 562-80.
21 Grégoire Chamayou, “The Manhunt Doctrine,” Radical Philosophy 169, 2011, 2-6.
22 Ibid., 2.
23 Carl von Clausewitz, Principes fondamentaux de stratégie militaire, Grégoire Chamay-
ou (trans), Paris: Mille et Une Nuits, 2006. He has also translated some of Marx’s histori-
cal writings.
24 Chamayou, “The Manhunt Doctrine,” 3, citing Steven Marks, Thomas Meer and Mat-
thew Nilson, Manhunting: A Methodology for Finding Persons of National Interest, thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, June 2005, 28.
25 Chamayou, “The Manhunt Doctrine,” 3.
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category of common enemies of humanity.”26 Accordingly, much of 
the ‘war on terror’ is “more like a vast campaign of extrajudicial execu-
tions: a strategy of targeted assassinations, of lethal manhunts, which 
make up the ‘rogue’ and unilateral counterpart to the manhunts car-
ried out under the aegis of international criminal justice.”27
Again, we might want to challenge the idea of conventional war being 
about both sides achieving the same thing. In the modern era, for ex-
ample, some wars are fought to gain territory, with the other side seek-
ing to preserve it. Victory may be the aim for both, but it might mean 
different things — gaining versus not losing, accumulating versus 
preserving. But the opposition between locating, capturing and killing 
and evading, hiding, escaping may still be helpful. It is clear what the 
analysis is leading towards. For Chamayou, “the drone is the emblem 
of contemporary cynegetic war. It is the mechanical, flying and robotic 
heir of the dog of war. It creates to perfection the ideal of asymmetry: 
to be able to kill without being able to be killed; to be able to see 
without being seen. To become absolutely invulnerable while the other 
is placed in a state of absolute vulnerability. Predator, Global Hawk, 
Reaper — birds of prey and angels of death, drones bear their names 
well. Only death can kill without ever dying itself. Facing such an en-
emy, there is no way out.28 These arguments are considerably devel-
oped in his 2013 study Théorie du drone.29 In that book, Chamayou 
provides a “genealogy of the predator” as part of his overall analysis.30 
In general terms I am most interested in the background to his study:
I will begin with this question: where does the drone come from? 
What is its tactical and technological genealogy? What are, following 
from this, its fundamental characteristics?31
But politically, this analysis is especially interesting in terms of linking 
the argument made about political space and territory in Manhunts.
Chamayou’s framework makes sense of some of the issues I have 
been trying to think about in terms of territory, or more specifically, the 
fracturing on the legal notion of territorial integrity. Territorial integrity 
is mentioned by Chamayou when he suggests the hunter has “no 
regard for borders,” and claims “the right of universal trespassing, in 
defiance of territorial integrity of sovereign states.”32 What is interest-
26 Ibid., 3; Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations, Zone 
Books, New York, 2009.
27 Chamayou, “The Manhunt Doctrine,” 3.
28 Ibid., 4.
29 Grégoire Chamayou, Théorie du drone, Paris: La fabrique éditions, 2013. On Théorie 
du drone, it is well worth reading Derek Gregory’s excellent series of posts at his blog 
geographicalimaginations.com
30 Chamayou, Manhunts, 30.
31 Ibid., 18.
32 Chamayou, “The Manhunt Doctrine,” 3.
53
ing about Chamayou’s use of the term here is that he detaches it 
from changing the borders of states, changing the territory, but links 
it to the temporary violation of those borders or territorial sovereignty. 
Territorial integrity crucially comprises at least these two, distinct, ele-
ments: that a state is sovereign within its territory, within clearly demar-
cated borders — territorial sovereignty; and that those borders, that 
territory, is fixed — territorial preservation. These two elements have 
distinct historical lineages, which come together in the twentieth cen-
tury. When territorial integrity is invoked today it is often used simply 
to refer to territorial preservation. Tony Blair, for example, frequently 
made an explicit point of invoking the importance of preserving the 
territorial integrity of states he was about to bomb or invade. He could 
only have meant this in the sense of preserving the existing territorial 
settlement; hardly in the sense of respecting territorial sovereignty.
This is part of a wider pattern, in that today, there is a concerted at-
tempt by dominant states and the United Nations to preserve existing 
territorial settlements as much as possible — the breakup of empires 
along lines of existing borders, such as the application of the principle 
of uti possidetis in the African continent; the fracturing of Yugoslavia 
and the USSR along the lines, broadly, of their constituent republics; 
and so on. South Sudan and Kosovo are the two most recent excep-
tions, but they are in a short list of breaks from the general principle 
since the end of the Second World War. 
The occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, long after the Taliban or 
Saddam Hussein were deposed, were, at least in part, to try to prevent 
a fracturing of the territory of these states. Yet, at the same time, and 
often in the very same places, the sovereignty of states within their 
borders has come increasingly under pressure. This can be for treat-
ment of civilian populations, pursuit of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ 
or harbouring terrorist groups. The extension of the arguments made 
for the first — so-called humanitarian intervention — to the second 
and third characterised the US-led “war on terror,” even though other 
dominant states have appropriated the logic and language. I tried to 
make sense of these questions in my 2009 book Terror and Territory, 
and to trace the historical lineages in The Birth of Territory. Chamay-
ou’s argument — along with that of Derek Gregory in his forthcoming 
The Everywhere War — helps to make sense of how the US claims 
this right to intervene, by force, drone or ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
in places all over the world, while at the same time trying to preserve 
existing territorial settlements, and, of course, rigidly reinforcing its 
own borders and territorial sovereignty.33
/// Published on January 18, 2014
33 Stuart Elden, Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty, Minneapolis: Uni-




AS AFFECTIVE WEAPON 
BY GASTÓN GORDILLO
One of Adolf Hitler’s most cherished dreams was to build the largest 
monument ever created. With the guidance of “the chief architect of 
the Reich,” Albert Speer, he planned to remake Berlin around what 
he saw as the future core of the Germanic empire: the People’s Hall 
(Volkshalle), a dome that was to be 290 meters (950 feet) high and 
able to accommodate 180,000 people. Hitler was so “obsessed” with 
his gigantic dome, Speer wrote, that he was “deeply irked” when he 
learned that the Soviet Union had begun constructing an even larger 
building in Moscow: the Palace of the Soviets. This palace was to 
be 495 meters (1,624 feet) high and was to be crowned with a huge 
statue of Lenin. Hitler was furious, for he felt “cheated of the glory of 
building the tallest monumental structure in the world.” When Hitler 
ordered the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Speer realized that 
“Moscow’s rival building” had preyed on Hitler’s mind “more than he 
had been willing to admit.” As the German armies advanced toward 
Moscow, Hitler said: “Now this will be the end of their building once 
and for all.”1
Speer’s memoir Inside the Third Reich, published in 1969 after he 
served a twenty-year sentence for his role in the Nazi hierarchy, of-
ten reads like a self-critical, melancholic confession haunted by 
guilt. This self-criticism is politically shallow, for Speer is notably si-
lent about the genocide of the European Jews (which he claimed he 
was unaware of at his trial in Nuremberg) and about his own use of 
slave labor as Minister of Armaments (a topic he touches upon only 
in passing). The text is nonetheless an extraordinary document about 
the core of the Nazi machinery and about Hitler’s bodily, spatial, and 
architectural sensibilities. The book reveals, in particular, that Hitler 
viewed in monumental architecture a way of creating in the body a 
disarming state of awe. He was convinced that monumental build-
ings were powerful weapons, and assumed that political supremacy 
depended, as his desire to crush the Palace of the Soviets illustrates, 
on erecting structures that would dazzle and intimidate multitudes, 





























inhibiting their bodily disposition to act critically and assertively. Ef-
forts to cultivate reverence through monumental buildings have cer-
tainly existed for millennia. But Speer’s account reveals the political 
intricacies of the affective dimensions of monumentality, and the fact 
that these live in one of the most distinctive affective weapons of 
capitalism: skyscrapers.
Speer shows that architecture was central to the Nazi project. Fur-
thermore, he demonstrates that architecture was Hitler’s one true 
passion in life, the only topic that made him joyful, cheerful, and exu-
berant. Hitler would regularly exclaim, “How much I would have loved 
to be an architect!” Hitler’s architectural projects went back to the 
1920s, when he drew sketches of the Berlin he would rebuild as the 
capital of a Germanic empire so powerful that its monuments would 
eclipse in size and splendor those of Rome. In Mein Kampf, he in fact 
complained that the architecture of German cities lacked monumen-
tality and grandeur. When Hitler met Speer, he was dazzled by how 
the latter proposed to give material form to his spatial megalomania. 
The son of a respected architect, Speer became not only “the chief 
architect” of the Reich but also one of the most trusted members of 
Hitler’s inner circle, and eventually the Minister of Armaments of the 
Reich until the fall of Berlin. Hitler expressed a quasi-religious devo-
tion for Speer, whom he admired as the most brilliant architect who 
had ever lived. As an aide to Hitler once told Speer, “Do you know 
who you are? You’re Hitler’s unrequited love!”2
For Hitler and Speer, architecture was not simply the art of giving 
form to space; it was the art of creating power through monumental 
spatial forms. Critical architects such as Eyal Weizman and Léopold 
Lambert have shown how the manipulation of spatial forms has pro-
found political implications in the control of mobility and visibility and 
in the deployment of violence.3 The “Wall of Separation” and the myri-
ad checkpoints built by Israel on Palestinian land (brilliantly examined 
by Weizman and Lambert) are primary examples of this militarization 
of architecture. This is why Lambert argues that these are weapon-
ized forms of architecture. Walls and other architectural striations 
are nonetheless weaponized in a distinctive way, as apparatuses 
of kinetic capture: that is, as material assemblages that control and 
channel the movement of bodies in space. The control of mobility 
via the architectural capture of mobility was certainly central to the 
spatiality of Nazi Germany, as the confinement of the European Jews 
within walled ghettos and death camps illustrates. Hitler and Speer, 
however, were intellectually disinterested in this type of weaponized 
architecture, which they relegated to lesser functionaries. They were 
2 Ibid., 133.
3 See Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation, London: Verso, 
2007, and Léopold Lambert, Weaponized Architecture: The Impossibility of Innocence, 
Barcelona: Dpr-Barcelona, 2012.
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interested, rather, in an architecture weaponized as an apparatus 
of ‘affective’ capture designed to create what geographer Ben An-
derson calls affective atmospheres: spatial environments that exert 
pre-discursive, not-fully conscious pressures on the body.4 All archi-
tectural forms create affective atmospheres in addition to organiz-
ing movement and my distinction between apparatuses of kinetic 
and affective capture is purely heuristic, and not meant to create 
a dichotomy or typology. Yet what Speer reveals in Inside the Third 
Reich is that the main purpose of Hitler’s monumental architecture 
was to inculcate affective intensities on the bodies contemplating it, 
capturing their gaze and attention.
The key principle of this affective atmosphere was sheer size. Under 
the motto “always the biggest,” Hitler wanted to build at a scale pre-
viously unseen in the history of empires. As Hitler put it to Speer’s 
wife, “Your husband is going to erect buildings for me such as have 
not been created for four thousand years.”5. Speer admitted that 
this challenge of messianic proportions “intoxicated” him. In 1936, 
he published a piece entitled The Führer’s Buildings in which he 
hailed Hitler’s “brilliance” for conceiving buildings of such a scale 
that they would last “for eternity.” Taking this principle to heart, Speer 
engaged on a race to surpass the monumental architecture of pri-
or and rival empires. “I found Hitler’s excitement rising whenever I 
could show him that at least in size we had ‘beaten’ the other great 
buildings of history.”6
For Hitler and Speer, Nazi Germany’s main architectonic competitors 
were the Roman, French, and U.S. empires. The People’s Hall (“the 
greatest assembly hall in the world ever conceived up to that time” 
and defined by “dimensions of an inflationary sort”) was intended to 
surpass not only the Roman Pantheon (its inspiration) but also the 
capitol in Washington DC, which “would have been contained many 
times in such a mass.” The Nuremberg stadium was to surpass the 
Circus Maximus in Rome and be able to accommodate 400,000 
spectators.7 In Hamburg, a massive skyscraper would compete with 
the Empire State Building in New York. The new railroad station of 
Berlin was designed to surpass New York’s Grand Central Station 
and Berlin’s Arch of Triumph would have been much bigger than the 
one commissioned by Napoleon in Paris. Berlin’s main boulevard 
was to be longer and grander than the Parisian boulevards. Speer 
explains that “the idea” behind his architecture was straightforward: 
that people “would be overwhelmed, or rather stunned, by the urban 
4 Ben Anderson, “Affective Atmospheres,” Emotion, Space and Society 2, 2009, 77-81.




scene and thus the power of the Reich.”8 The idea, in short, was to 
inculcate in the body what Spinoza called negative affects: that is, 
affects that decrease the body’s capacity for action by overwhelming 
it, stunning it, numbing it, making it malleable and, in short, politically 
passive.
This principle was embodied in one of Speer’s first major projects: 
the Nuremberg parade grounds built for the 1934 Nazi Party Con-
gress, immortalized by Leni Riefenstahl’s propaganda film Triumph 
of the Will. The monumentality of the classicist architecture of the 
stadium designed by Speer was inseparable from the militarized dis-
cipline of the thousands of troops and Nazi cadres portrayed in the 
film, forming a solid, geometrical bodily assemblage united in its al-
legiance to The Fuhrer. If there’s a political ontology inculcated by the 
affective atmosphere of this architectonic setting it is that of Being-
as-One: one people, one nation, one Reich, which Hitler highlighted 
in his speech in that place, appealing to the “unity” and “obedience” 
of the German people.
Hitler’s and Speer’s attempt to reach transcendence through monu-
mentality reached such levels that they sought to numb the body 
even if those buildings were in ruins. The ruins of the Roman empire, 
which Hitler admired as “imperishable symbols of power,” became 
the inspiration of what Speer articulated as his “theory of ruins.” His 
“theory” was that the buildings of the new Berlin should be made of 
stone and brick (rather than steel and concrete) so that “in a thou-
sand years” their ruins would look imposing, like those of Rome. Hit-
ler, in particular, assumed that Nazi power would endure in those 
ruins because of their fetish power to continue being an apparatus of 
affective capture. “Hitler liked to say that the purpose of his building 
was to transmit its time and its spirit to posterity. Ultimately, all that 
remained to remind men of the great epochs of history was their 
monumental architecture, he would philosophize.”9
These architectonic fantasies had a notable spatial core: a thirty-me-
ter long, three-dimensional model of the new, monumentalized Berlin 
that was represented in extreme detail and was dominated by The 
People’s Hall, the boulevard, and the Arch of Triumph. This miniature 
“model city” was “Hitler’s favorite project.” Hitler would spend hours 
observing the details of the model from many different angles, bow-
ing down “to take measure of the different effect.” He wanted to feel 
how those buildings would affect, for instance, “a traveler emerging 
from the south station.” He was trying to feel in his own body, in sum, 
the affective atmosphere that would be created by his architecture 
once it was built. “These were the rare times when he relinquished 




spontaneous, so relaxed.”10 Obsessed with architecture as an affec-
tive weapon, Hitler was oblivious to urban spatiality. “His passion for 
building for eternity left him without a spark of interest in traffic ar-
rangement, residential areas, and parks.”11 Speer was also blind to 
living spaces, he admitted in retrospect, and noted that his designs 
were “lifeless and regimented” and lacked “a sense of proportion.”12 
When he showed the model city to his father, he was taken aback 
when the latter (also an architect) simply said, “You’ve all gone com-
pletely crazy.”13
The works for the radical refashioning of Berlin began in 1937 but 
were halted when the war began in September 1939. When in June 
1940 Nazi Germany defeated France, Hitler and Speer promptly vis-
ited Paris, which together with Rome was the other city they sought 
to surpass. Hitler admired Haussmann and his aggressive remaking 
of Paris in the mid-1800s, which had created the city as a bourgeois 
spectacle (“He regarded Haussmann as the greatest city planner in 
history, but hoped that I would surpass him”).14 They stayed in Paris 
for only three hours, but visited most of its famous monuments. Hit-
ler wanted to immerse himself in the atmosphere created by Paris’ 
architecture, and he said, visibly moved, “It was the dream of my life 
to be permitted to see Paris. I cannot say how happy I am to have 
that dream fulfilled today.” Paris affected Hitler at a deeper level; it 
reawakened his passion for a monumentalized Berlin. The same eve-
ning he told Speer, “Draw up a decree in my name ordering full-scale 
resumption of work on the Berlin buildings. […] Wasn’t Paris beauti-
ful? But Berlin must be made far more beautiful.” His order was to 
proceed with the construction plans “with maximum urgency.”15
Speer was perplexed by the order, given its huge cost amid an ongo-
ing war on multiple fronts. Hitler dismissed these concerns; he was 
only worried about the potentially negative impact on German public 
opinion, so the decree was to be kept secret and the works were to 
be “camouflaged” under other rubrics. Why Hitler’s “urgency”? The 
way he worded the decree is revealing. Hitler wrote: “I regard the 
accomplishment of these supremely vital constructive tasks for the 
Reich as the greatest step in the preservation of our victory.” Accord-
ingly, the decree was officially named: “Decree for the preservation 
of our victory.”16 For Hitler, in other words, the main way to ‘safeguard’ 









imposing buildings. Monumental architecture was for him the most 
powerful and decisive of all weapons, supremely vital, in fact, to mili-
tary victory. This is also why Hitler sought to destroy the monumen-
tal architecture of his enemies: not only the Palace of the Soviets in 
Moscow but also the skyscrapers of New York City. As Speer reveals 
in his second memoires, Spandau: The Secret Diaries (1976), Hitler 
ordered the development of long-range bombers that could reach 
New York and destroy its famed skyscrapers, which he saw as key 
to the global power and prestige of the United States. The program 
to build these bombers was eventually cancelled, but Speer noted 
that Hitler fantasized about turning the skyscrapers of New York “into 
gigantic, burning torches.”17
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin inter-
rupted the construction of the Palace of the Soviets and ordered that 
its steel frames were used to build fortifications and other defenses 
(construction never resumed). Hitler, in contrast, insisted on continu-
ing with the works in Berlin, which by then employed 35,000 work-
ers. In July 1941, a month into the Russian campaign, Speer failed 
to convince Hitler to stop construction. “He would not hear of any 
restrictions and refused to divert the material and labor for his pri-
vate buildings to war industries anymore.” In September 1941, when 
the advance in Russia was stalling, “Hitler ordered sizable increases 
in our contracts for granite purchases from Sweden, Norway, and 
Finland for my big Berlin and Nuremberg buildings.” On November 
29, 1941, Hitler dismissed once again Speer’s concerns, and said 
bluntly, “I am not going to let the war keep me from accomplishing 
my plans.” 
By early December, the German army was facing a catastrophe in 
Russia due to the winter weather and the destruction of railroad lines. 
Speer told Hitler that most of the workers employed in Berlin should 
be urgently assigned to repair railroads in Russia. “Incredibly, it was 
two weeks before Hitler could bring himself to authorize this. On De-
cember 27, 1941, he at last issued the order.”18 Hitler’s prolonged 
refusal to divert manpower and resources from the massive buildings 
in Berlin confirms that he indeed saw them as the powerful fetishes 
that would “preserve” his early victories. Ironically, this obsession un-
dermined German military might in the early months of the Russian 
campaign and may have contributed to its long-term defeat. If there 
was a body enthralled by the atmospheres created by monumental 
architecture it was that of Hitler himself. By May 1945, Berlin and Nazi 
Germany had been reduced to rubble.
The affective weaponization of monumental architecture by Nazi Ger-
many is an extreme example of a spatial paradigm that is as old as 
17 Albert Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, Tokyo: Ishi Press, 2010, 87.
18 Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 185.
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empires. Speer’s and Hitler’s monumentality certainly has historically 
specific and distinctively fascist elements, such as its imitation of Ro-
man and Greek classicism, its explicit celebration of state power, and 
its particularly delusional, fetishized megalomania. Yet many of its 
core architectural and affective principles live on in the present. This 
surfaces in one notable passage in which Speer sought to white-
wash Nazi monumentality by referring to the monumentality of the 
present. After admitting the “chronic megalomania” of his architec-
ture, he wrote that his designs “are not so excessive by present-day 
standards” when skyscrapers and public buildings all over the world 
have reached ‘similar proportions.’ Perhaps it was less their size than 
the way they violated the human scale that made them abnormal.”19 
Speer appealed to a western audience’s familiarity with skyscrapers 
as normalized features of the modern world to retroactively present 
fascist megalomania as “not so excessive.” But in doing so, he actu-
ally brought to light that fascist megalomania is comparable to cor-
porate forms of monumentality, and that both can be seen as equally 
“excessive” apparatuses of affective capture. When Speer argued 
that the “abnormality” of Nazi architecture was not its “size” but the 
way it “violated the human scale,” one can easily turn his play of 
words around and show that current monumentality is equally “ab-
normal” in its “violation” of “the human scale.” Isn’t the defining goal 
of monumentality to dwarf “the human scale” and present the body 
as ‘miniscule?’ Haven’t skyscrapers surpassed in scale and “excess” 
anything Speer ever dreamed of?
Speer admits that Nazi monumentality was a “nouveau rich architec-
ture of prestige” based on “pure spectacle” and “the urge to dem-
onstrate one’s strength.”20 He could as well be referring to the sky-
scrapers that currently define the skyline of New York, Shanghai, or 
Dubai. Hitler’s obsession to build “bigger” than other empires is easy 
to pathologize as the delusions of a “madman.” But the competitive 
zeal to build “bigger” has become a planetary phenomenon. That the 
tallest skyscrapers in the world are currently in the Persian Gulf and 
Asia simply replicates what the United States did in the early 1900s 
when it emerged as an imperial power: “the urge to demonstrate 
one’s strength.” The architectural face of the authoritarian capitalism 
of the twenty-first century is embodied in skyscrapers like the Burj 
Khalifa in Dubai, which at 830 meters (2,722 feet) high seeks to daz-
zle the bodies contemplating it from the ground while, at the same 
time, erasing that its phallic structure was built by a quasi-enslaved 
labor force.
Bruno Latour and other object-oriented ontologists would probably 
explain the power of monumental buildings to affect the body as re-
sulting from their existence as huge objects (or, in Latour’s words, 
19 Ibid., 138 (my emphasis).
20 Ibid., 136-69.
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as actants with agency).21 But affective atmospheres are not the out-
come of objects alone; they are also a function of the disposition 
of bodies to be affected by them in a particular way. Not all human 
bodies, needless to say, are dazzled by monumental architecture 
and affectively captured by its presence. Huge buildings are cer-
tainly more readily noticed, but throughout history many people have 
disregarded the mandate to be intimidated by their scale. Hitler’s 
veneration of Roman ruins as transcendental emblems of power, for 
instance, overlooked that for over a thousand years people in Rome 
disregarded those ruins as unimpressive piles of rubble, to be readily 
recycled as construction materials or used as pasture fields.
A notable example of the subversion of the awe-inducing atmo-
sphere cultivated by monumentality took place in the Paris World Fair 
of 1937. It was there that the monumental architecture of Nazi Ger-
many and the Soviet Union competed with each other at close range, 
for their pavilions faced each other. The Soviet design consisted of 
two huge human figures standing on a pedestal and charging ahead, 
as if about to overran the Nazi building. Speer designed the German 
pavilion, and wrote that he was able to see in Paris a secret sketch 
of the Soviet monument “striding triumphantly toward the German 
pavilion.” He decided to erect an enormous counter-monument: a 
solid, cubic mass “which seemed to be checking this onslaught.” 
The monument was crowned with an eagle with a swastika in its 
claws looking on the Soviet sculpture from above, therefore assert-
ing its superiority. Both buildings won the fair’s “gold medal.”22 This 
“tie” symbolized that Nazi and Soviet architects were committed to 
similar forms of monumentality, designed to impress. The fact that 
the bourgeois monumentality of the Eiffel Tower stood a few hun-
dred meters behind, as an equally assertive emblem of power, also 
reveals that despite their ideological differences all these different 
monuments were designed as affective weapons intended to create 
a bodily state of respect.
This is why the true spatial confrontation at the Paris World Fair lay 
elsewhere, opposing these monuments to the small pavilion of the 
Spanish Republic, which was then going through a dramatic revolu-
tion and civil war. The Spanish pavilion was made up of a modest, 
two-story building that housed a painting whose affective power was 
to outlive that of the German and Soviet monuments: the Guernica 
by Pablo Picasso, which was commissioned for the fair. Capturing 
the bombing of the Basque town of Guernica by German warplanes 
fighting for Franco against the Spanish Republic, Picasso’s paint-
ing drew multitudes as an emblem of the destruction and suffering 
created by war and fascism. The atmosphere of fragmentation, mul-
21 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
22 Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 81.
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tiplicity, bodily rupture, and negativity created by Picasso stood in 
opposition to the fantasy of wholeness and totality embodied by the 
Nazi and Soviet monuments. Whereas the German and Soviet pa-
vilions exuded transcendence, the pavilion of the Spanish Republic 
exuded the immanence of rubble.
As I argue in Rubble, those who cherish monumentality are inherently 
hostile to rubble, for they are terrified of rubble’s voiding of positive 
space.23 Hitler’s and Speer’s celebration of grand “ruins,” it is worth 
noting, made them feel contempt for (and fear of) “mere rubble.” 
If monumental architecture stands for Being-as-One (The People’s 
Hall, The Palace of the Soviets, The Empire State Building, the Burj 
Khalifa), rubble stands for the opposite: the pure multiplicity of being 
and therefore, following Badiou’s ontology, the figure of the void. The 
Guernica’s affective power during the 1937 World Fair was its capac-
ity to immerse the observer in a visual void that was as unsettling 
as it was generative. Its generative negativity revealed that the huge 
structures standing nearby were modern-day totems, monuments to 
hubris built to deflect the destruction that was constitutive of their ma-
teriality and that the destiny of all buildings, irrespective of their size, 
is to be reduced to the assertive nothingness of rubble.
/// Published on February 2, 2014




BODIES AT SCENE: 
ARCHITECTURE AS FRICTION 
BY PEDRO HERNÁNDEZ MARTÍNEZ
Act I: Dematerialize the Architectural Object ///
One of the ways to understand architecture, usually the first about 
which we hear when we begin to study at the university, is to see it 
as a displayed object. This definition leads to an architecture that is 
equivalent to a habitable sculpture rather than one which aims to re-
alize certain requirements. Le Corbusier’s quote in which he defined 
architecture as “volumes brought together in light” help to clarify and 
exemplify this issue. In this essay, I am not interested in focusing on 
this idea, but instead, I will explain several different ways to dissolve 
the conception of architecture as an object.
One way to overcome this primary condition is to understand archi-
tecture as a second skin or an element that establishes relationships 
between the body and the habitat. Architecture is an apparatus to look 
and build connections with the outside. Therefore, firstly, architecture 
is used to maximize certain links while refusing others. In this case, the 
design acquires a presence over the body of the inhabitant. Architec-
ture surrounds it, limits it and restricts its connection with the environ-
ment; exposing the inseparability of architecture and its violence over 
the body.
Another way of dematerializing architecture would be characterized by 
the conversion of the architecture into an ethereal element, habitat or 
surroundings, subsequently emphasizing the bodies that go through 
it as the main characters of the space. Architecture is dissolved into 
atmospheres or climates in which the users can freely circulate in ev-
ery direction, wandering into the cloud-like space, without lineal re-
strictions from a building which neither strangles nor narrows one’s 
perception to the established limits, enabling one to get lost and relate 
to other bodies. At this point, architecture paradoxically achieves a 
holistic presence, completely involving the inhabitant bodies.
For example, the film THX 1138 (1971) by George Lucas, shows a 
place without architecture nor form, where bodies float in a white and 
























negative and we finally discover that the space limits the bodies from 
liberating themselves from the infinite interior. They inhabit a prison. 
Violence and subjugation over the body become present again. Any 
architecture, despite its invisibility or blurring, is no different than a 
prison once it becomes repressive of bodies.
The last point relative to dematerializing the object is thinking architec-
ture as another body with which we can interact. In that case, the rela-
tionship with architecture is established through friction, the shock and 
the encounter. Perec said that to live was “to pass from one space to 
another, while doing your very best not to bump into yourself.”1 Howev-
er, I think that to live is the opposite. Life is friction with the other bodies. 
And these bodies can be persons, furniture or buildings; it does not 
matter. Architecture could represent this idea of life, and as such would 
be defined by the friction, by the action of the body in front of and in re-
lation to another body. This dyad action-body (inseparable elements) 
would build and give meaning to the space. This architecture defined 
by action and friction makes up an inevitable crash between two parts. 
It generates a constant rubbing between the body (people) and the 
architectural space. As stated by Bernard Tschumi: “What must be first 
determined is whether this relation between action and space is sym-
metrical — opposing two camps (people versus space) that affect one 
another in a comparable way — or asymmetrical, a relation in which 
one camp, whether space or people, clearly dominates the other.2” 
The architect, or someone who works with architecture, could follow 
the philosophy explained by Léopold Lambert and be a funambulist 
who walks on the line between parts, or (s)he could choose and posi-
tion themselves within one of them.
Act II: Architecture as Violence: 
           5+1 Actions over the Architectural Body ///
At this point, the transition from the architecture of the object to the 
action-body generates a tension between the parts and, by extension, 
makes violence appear. In the rest of this essay I won’t undertake a 
balancing act, and instead I will explore the possibility that one domi-
nates over another one.
Architecture is aggressive against the territory, against the material, 
which it violates, handles, strengthens, twists; it is violent against exist-
ing forms, against existing types and modes. All foundational architec-
ture is based on violence and has inside not so much construction but 
also inseparably destruction. There is a way of understanding architec-
ture […] as a vehicle of peace, as a vehicle of mediation, when in fact 
the whole architectonic operation is an imposition or a settlement that 
involves violence.3
1 Georges Perec, Species of Spaces and Other Pieces, New York: Penguin, 2008.
2 Bernard Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.
3 Igansi De Solà-Morales in the TV Show Soy Cámara, El programa del CCCB : La ciu-
dad desde el balcón by RTVE.
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These words by Ignasi de Solà-Morales show us how even the most 
basic production of architecture is based on violence. I would like to 
focus my attention on two concepts described in the text. The quote 
demonstrates how this production could be described in terms of ac-
tion and friction over matter, ground, landscape, territory, environment 
or people. Action/friction strengths and twists them. Another concept 
is that architecture is an imposition or a settlement. Both ideas are 
related with what I described before: Architecture can dominate the 
body, surrounding it and making it prisoner (with different levels of free-
dom). Architecture subjugates its inhabitant and their mobility, mak-
ing possible certain connections and denying others, which it can do 
using visible or invisible matter. Thus, architecture forces the body to 
submit to its authority. In fact, architecture has been used to control the 
body throughout history. Prisons, hospitals, asylums, schools, etc. are 
just some examples of standardizing and regulating bodies. The same 
operation can be observed in geopolitical borders or how circulation is 
directed in airports or shopping centers. Architectural design encloses 
a specific ideology that guarantees the control of space and the body 
and limits, and curiously, any unwanted friction.
But, what happens when the body dominates the architecture? If the 
previous examples avoid friction, now we have violence and friction 
over the (architectonic) matter; two bodies which crash head on. Re-
sponding to this question, my final project while studying at the Uni-
versity of Alicante two years ago has proved useful. To think about the 
violence of bodies over architecture I didn’t use any references to the 
architectural world. Instead of this I used several artistic practices de-
veloped in the second half of the 20th century which have a lot in com-
mon with architecture, such as the works of Lara Almarcegui, Robert 
Smithson, Gordon Matta-Clark, Rachel Whiteread and Pilar Quinteros. 
These practices call attention to the opportunities and virulence of 
some material transformation processes that work without the design 
of forms and their political control of the actions that take place in their 
built environments. All these artists rethink and reformulate the original 
object’s design by acting directly upon it. They create new relations 
between the body and the building. Thus, they show us how the violent 
act of the body on architecture becomes a legitimate and immediate 
act to face up to the initial impositions generated by the architecture 
through frictional actions that alter and rebuild it. It generates new re-
lations and connections, negating the conception of architecture as 
something finished. As a result of this previous investigation, I deter-
mined five different operative capacities with which we can face the 
architectural body. I will now explain them according to the different 
degrees of conservation in which the acts leave the original architec-
tural body. Thus, the extremes range from complete protection of the 
building to its erasure and replacement. In between, we have three 
other actions that build an architecture that is no longer, but whose 




These actions aim for the maximum conservation of the original body, 
restoring their deterioration over time. They are usuallydelicate. We 
could think them as if we were taking care of someone who is sick. 
This conservation is not only to preserve materials and structures but 
also memories. Everything changes so that everything continues to 
be the same.
TRANSPLANTATION:
A new body is within the original architectural body. Essentially, this 
type of action involves an estrangement. It creates an unexpected 
landscape within the architecture that should not be there. These ac-
tions produce a new materiality and spatiality, as well as modify their 
previous function to adapt to new necessities.
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EXTIRPATION:
When we open an incision, a cut, hollow or remove a wall, we gener-
ate a new relationship within the space. It is a simple act, but it causes 
new readings. With these actions, the classic dichotomies “in-out” or 
“yours-mine” can be perverted and redefined. A direct and violent 
action, seemingly simple, challenges the closed condition of archi-
tecture.
TRANSFIGURATION:
The architecture, from the tectonic standpoint is made of materials 
that are modified, assembled and manipulated to create the interven-
tion. It could happen to the architecture (as a body) in this state of 
destruction that does not allow for its continued use, but, can some 
materials be reused and reassembled to have a second life?
MOLTING:
The imposition of a new dynamic economic, social, landscape denies 
the architecture’s preexistence to the point that it is seen as a negative 
aspect that should be removed and destroyed in its entirety. This is 
therefore the most violent action since such a form of disintegration 
means the complete erasure of the previous presence.
From these five points, it is necessary to add one more that we have 
not yet previously considered. They are actions that have been de-
nominated “injuries,” or “death,” associated with a terrorist act that 
aims, above all, for the total destruction of the architecture with the 
maximum infliction of pain. They are destructive actions that solely 
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intend to destabilize the environment by using strategic violence. This 
action, which is originally a timely destruction, opens the possibility of 
other matters to enter as shockwaves: the appearance of fear (which 
as a topic should be explored and theoretically dealt with in other 
more extensive forms).
Act III: Architectural Intervention as Political Protest ///
If architectural design lacks neutrality, neither can these actions be 
defined as impartial. All of the actions described are ways of imposing 
in space (or on space), as evident in situations of geopolitical conflict. 
Photographs by Miki Kratsman of the Israeli-Palestine conflict are ex-
emplary in this regard, as they show how the exercise of demolishing 
Palestinian houses creates a state of ruin which forbids adequately 
living in the place. Paradoxically, the large mechanical excavators 
have been left in the places they destroyed to become an agent for 
re-construction, bringing us back again to the new site as was estab-
lished by Solá-Morales above. Another distinct case that can be seen 
is the (lack of) legislation on the coast of Spain, explained by Daniel 
Fernández Pascual’s Funambulist Paper.4 The conflict there shows 
two basic postures: those who want to preserve their property on the 
coast, and the State which seeks to recuperate the public ground for 
the enjoyment of all. The owners of the houses, by employing strate-
gies of Curing, try to return dignity to their houses that have suffered 
wear by the hard environmental conditions. On the other hand, the 
State tries to demolish the houses that are built on the occupied ter-
rain. These actions, which are apparently straightforward, reflect the 
reality of two totally distinct ways of exercising politics, which in certain 
urban areas occurs on both private and public ground in the search 
for a total submission of nature.
Action, as the production of friction, seeks to establish a specific poli-
tics on the architectural object — the reconfiguration of edifices to 
adapt them to another political reality, which, by directly colliding with 
others, often results in the increase of conflict and the making-visible 
of this inherent friction. In this regard, to live is not to avoid collision 
and conflict, which architecture seems to claim, but to potentiate and 
develop the questioning of the models we are accustomed to and to 
bring them to their limit. Between an architecture which intends to es-
tablish order and an action that acts politically upon that architecture 
itself the ground is prepared for making new forms of life possible.
Action constitutes itself as a friction and with this affords the potential 
for disagreement, and in this way, design is a tool to rethink the politi-
cal. For that, friction is necessary.
/// Published on November 15, 2013
4 Daniel Fernández Pascual, “The Clear-Blurry Line,” The Funambulist Papers: Volume 1, 




AND THE FEAR OF SHIPS 
BY TINGS CHAK
Monday, August 12, 2013
Toronto
It was during rush hour when two hundred white-identified individu-
als in a forty-foot wood-framed boat descended onto the streets of 
Toronto. The people were dressed in white t-shirts and the boat was 
wrapped in canvas painted red and blue. Together they crossed 
Queen Street West and occupied four lanes of traffic in one of the 
busiest commercial districts of the city. The ship ‘docked’ outside of 
the flagship store of the Hudson Bay Company — a former fur-trading 
corporation that was once the de facto colonial ruler of the region.1 
Unlike any other mass action I had been to, the crowd seemed to 
take over the intersection effortlessly. During the fifteen minutes that 
they held the site, there was no police intimidation, no harassment 
from onlookers, and only mild frustration from the ebbing crowds.
This street occupation was called Mass Arrival, an art intervention 
staged by a collective of migrant women of color, of which I was 
privileged to be a part. As the name might suggest, this project was 
a critical response to the “mass arrival” of migrants aboard ships 
in Canada and an examination of the national fear induced by their 
arrival. The intervention, moreover, aimed to interrogate the myth of 
Whiteness in the construction of Canadian identity, and how that 
myth gets disrupted and unsettled by the arrival of ships, specifi-
cally those carrying migrants of color.2 Perhaps because Canada’s 
mostly uninhabited and unguarded landmass is bordered by three 
oceans, the image of the ship holds particular weight in the national 
social imaginary. Here are some of my reflections, through unpack-
ing the experiences of this intervention, on the notion of Whiteness 
in national belonging, the imagined body of the Canadian state, and 
1 Hudson Bay Company remains one of the only companies that has operated continu-
ously into the present.
2 I have chosen to capitalize White, Black, and Brown to highlight the fact that racializa-
tion is a process by which difference is constructed (categorized into “races”) to justify 



























public space as sites of border production used to control, regulate, 
and police migrant bodies of color.
Mass Arrival was held on the third anniversary of the arrival of the MV 
Sun Sea on the coast of British Columbia. Denied entry into Canada, 
the 492 Tamil passengers on board were immediately incarcerated 
— men, women, and children included. They were called terrorists, 
human smugglers, queue jumpers, illegals, and bogus refugees. 
They were greeted with signs that read, “Tigers don’t unpack, send 
them back!” A flurry of racist hysteria enveloped the country, reminis-
cent of a century earlier when the Komagata Maru steamship carrying 
376 migrants from Indian Punjab was denied entry into British Co-
lumbia. After being held incommunicado for two months aboard the 
Komagata Maru, the migrants were forcibly deported on the basis of 
the exclusionary “continuous journey” laws.3 Many of the passengers 
were sent back to imprisonment and some to their deaths.
Boats arriving on the shores of Canada (colonized Turtle Island) is 
not a new phenomenon. Historically, every non-Indigenous person 
on these lands has (or their ancestors have) arrived as a migrant 
on a boat. This includes all White settlers whose long history of ar-
riving by sea dates back from the first colonial ships to the Great 
Migration of the 19th century.4 Likewise, White refugees have been 
celebrated as heroes and brave survivors in Canadian history books, 
entrenching the idea of Canada as the generous land of immigrants. 
A case in point is the SS Walnut, which arrived in Nova Scotia in 1948 
with 347 Estonian refugees on board. Immigration officials welcomed 
them without hesitation, saying, “You came to a good country. There 
is room for you here.” Therefore, the fear of the “mass arrival” that 
threatens the integrity of state borders and national identity is not so 
much a fear of migrants or ships but is the fear of ships carrying the 
wrong kinds of migrants.
Just as the SS Walnut was welcomed onto Canadian shores, the 
Mass Arrival ship carrying the hundreds of White participants was 
welcomed on the streets of Toronto — it did not disrupt, offend, nor 
cross the accepted thresholds of how and by whom our public space 
gets used. This “occupation” revealed to me the fact that ownership 
over one’s own body in public space is a privilege, not a right. At the 
most basic level, the White (cisgender male) body is the frame of 
3 Under the continuous journey laws, migrants arriving by boat were only be admitted if 
they travelled directly from their country of origin to Canada. These laws were the basis 
for refusing entry to the Komagata Maru, which set sail from Hong Kong rather than 
directly from India. The “Safe Third Country Agreement” introduced in 2004 is alarmingly 
reminiscent of these archaic, racist laws.
4 Contrary to popular belief that we are presently experiencing unprecedented immigra-
tion to the global North, the largest wave of immigration was during the second half of 
the 19th century, carrying boatloads of European settlers who were welcomed with “free” 
(stolen) land.
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reference for public space that regulates the appropriate shape, size, 
skin tone, and movement of the bodies that inhabit it. This is further 
reinforced by social, cultural, and physical constraints; from the scale 
of the doorways and the height of steps to popular representations 
of what civic life ought to look like. It comes as no surprise then that 
while 200 White people participating in a public art project is permit-
ted and even celebrated, a gathering of a few dozen people of color 
may be cause for suspicion. And this is because Whiteness is not 
marked and does not need to be feared. Whiteness has a place in 
our public spaces and on our streets. Whiteness belongs here.
- 1492: Columbus “discovers” the New World aboard the Santa Clara.
- 492: The number of Tamil migrants aboard the MV Sun Sea, denied 
entry and detained.
More than a coincidence of numbers, these two intersecting events 
— one we revere and one we revile — form the basis of Canada’s 
national creation story as a place founded by and for White Europe-
an settlers. This national myth has been produced and reproduced, 
from the Chinese Head Tax and the Exclusion Act, which barred Chi-
nese immigration once the labor of the railway workers had been 
fully exploited, to today’s Temporary Foreign Worker Programs, which 
ensure that while migrants of color are good enough to work here 
they are not good enough to stay.5 And though the bones of our an-
cestors may lay scattered across the land as a result of generations 
of stolen labor, people of color remain othered, always arriving and 
never belonging. The MV Sun Sea is but one testament to the myth 
of the White body — the body-politic of the state — that forever fears 
the penetration and contamination by Black and Brown bodies.
The body of the state is perceived to be a vulnerable one — its ex-
tremities are unprotected and its skin is soft and porous. The neces-
sary fortification of its borders means that, at the same time, borders 
become imprinted onto the bodies of people of color. The exclusion 
and fear associated with migrants — inscribed into our very skin — 
become habituated and reinforced to ensure that migrants remain 
marginalized; bounded, bordered, and safely out of sight. If bodies 
are the objects of state regulation, then public space is a key tool. 
Beyond externalized ports of entry, borders are internalized through 
the policing of each other and of ourselves. Urban checkpoints are 
not abstract spaces but are found in every public space — the li-
brary, the school, the public square, the streets. Each of these sites 
determines where, how, and on whose bodies enforcement rituals 
5 The Chinese Immigration Act, now known as the Chinese Exclusion Act, first took the 
form of a Head Tax, a $50 levy on all Chinese migrants entering Canada after 1895, when 
the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed and the thousands of migrant workers were 
no longer needed. This was increased to $500 by 1903, followed by a subsequent ban 
of virtually all Chinese migration in 1923. Families were separated for two decades until 
the Act was repealed in 1947.
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are performed on a daily basis, through state policing, profiling, ha-
rassment, and the distribution of services, healthy food, affordable 
housing, and so on. The Mass Arrival street intervention was one at-
tempt to highlight the privilege of Whiteness in our public spaces and 
the ways in which racialized bodies act as sites of bordering. Beyond 
this action, these racialized rituals are met with everyday resistance. 
There are always ways to slip through each checkpoint and there 
are seams at every border. Every time a non-status woman tries to 
enroll her child at a school and every time an undocumented man 
accesses a food bank, it is a challenge to immigration regimes. Sim-
ply inhabiting public space as migrants can be an act of resistance 
against state borders.
On February 21, 2013, the City of Toronto became Canada’s first 
“Sanctuary City,” which means that all residents, regardless of immi-
gration status, can access municipal services without fear of deten-
tion and deportation. This movement was built from the ground up 
through decades of organizing work involving different campaigns, 
direct actions, case support, mass mobilization, and popular educa-
tion among migrant communities and social service providers. Led 
by migrants directly affected, the strategy was to take back public 
spaces and build “sanctuary” (or solidarity) zones in our communi-
ties, beginning with schools, food banks, shelters, and health clinics. 
Creating solidarity zones at service sites is one step towards disman-
tling state imposed borders, improving the material realities of mi-
grants living undocumented, and unravelling the myth of Whiteness 
in belonging. In claiming public spaces in our communities we are 
slowly unravelling this national birthing story that forces hyphenated 
identities onto people of color, whose subjectivity is always brack-
eted, never considered whole. In supporting land defense struggles, 
and with every blockade, we are dismantling the myth that invisibiliz-
es the history of genocide and ongoing dispossession of Indigenous 
peoples on Turtle Island. In demanding status for all, we are chal-
lenging the myth that justifies the commodification and exploitation 
of human labor, illegalizes migrants, and marks people of color as 
displaceable, detainable, and deportable.
It is said that prior to their departure, many of the Komagata Maru 
passengers were held in sanctuary in a Sikh Gurdwara in Hong 
Kong, the place where I was born. There, they prayed together be-
fore setting sail on their seven-week journey across the Pacific. For 
me, discovering this historical footnote speaks to how intertwined 
the struggles against colonization, displacement, and borders are. 
One hundred years after the migrants aboard the Komagata Maru 
were barred from entering a White-only Canada, I take inspiration 
from its legacy in the struggle against an exclusionary, exploitative, 
and racist immigration system. Resistance looks different and takes 
on myriad forms, from demanding access to a library to crossing a 
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border and to occupying the streets in forty-foot boat. Through hon-
oring migrants and celebrating our bodies, we continue to challenge 
the integrity of borders imposed by the Canadian state and resist the 
myth of Whiteness upon which it was built. Whatever happens, our 
bodies are not to blame. The myth is unravelling because it has to for 
our very survival.
Mother tiptoes through the days,
guarding everything she holds dear,
to evade detection, to remain unseen,
to relinquish her political body,
for a provisional place in this world.
As she says,
“If there’s one thing we are good at, it’s mimicry.”
A way to eat, move, and sleep,
a way to revere, destroy, and dream.
I ask her if we are getting any closer.
Racialized geographies, are not just lines in the sands
but are daily performances her body does not forget.
They are sites, they take shape,
they speak the where and how,
and on whose bodies violence is felt.
She is the sexualized, denied and detained.
Her body is not hers,
no bleach nor shrouds to shun the sun
can fulfill the desire of her body to be unmarked.
She is not getting any closer.
She no longer spits on the ground,
shouts to be heard, squats when she’s tired
even if her body knows best.
She no longer talks when she’s eating,
eats when she’s talking, or eats from the earth.
She no longer pees in the park, sleeps in the park,
intuits and walks undisciplined in the park.
Out of place, and in her place,
she performs these enforcement rituals,
she knows that she is not any closer.
What is taken can never be returned whole,
a way to feel the sting of a pinch,
to bare our arms and welcome the sun,
to find wholeness on this land.
Let us undo, unravel, unlearn, and untame,
take refuge in and through and with all living bodies,
sully this body in order to love our own.
Then we might know a world in which she no longer
tiptoes through her days.
/// Published on April 2, 2014
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URBAN SPACE AND THE 
PRODUCTION OF GENDER 
IN MODERN IRAN
BY ALEX SHAMS
What does an Islamic urban space look like? This question has 
dogged intellectuals and authorities in Muslim-majority lands for 
centuries, but in recent decades has acquired a renewed sense of 
urgency amid the emergence of modernizing Islamist political move-
ments. These groups have not only articulated new visions of the pub-
lic sphere, mass politics, and economy, they have also increasingly 
found themselves in positions of authority to shape the cities, regions, 
and lands in which they work. As these groups have found themselves 
in control, the revolutionary mandate (and widespread protest slogan) 
to imagine a politics “neither East nor West, but Islamic” has taken 
on new meanings, forcing leaders long focused narrowly on legal or 
constitutional change to recognize the more diffuse and institutional 
nature of power, and how much the production of space is a part of it.
This process has, of course, not been universal nor necessarily paral-
lel among Islamist political movements, and it is just as nonsensical 
today to speak of a unified approached to Islamic urban planning as 
it is to speak of a unified Islamic politics. But, at the same time, ap-
proaches to urban planning are developing whose features highlight 
the often-contradictory assumptions and understandings of citizen-
ship that prevail among Islamist actors. Particularly in countries where 
modernizing Islamic movements have become institutionalized and 
bureaucratic, ideological logics have coalesced — as in any other 
bureaucratic apparatus of control — and tendencies have asserted 
themselves. 
No case provides a better example of this than Iran, where explicitly 
revolutionary, modernizing approaches to producing Islamic space 
have emerged in the four decades since the Revolution. In this short 
essay, I will discuss some of the changes that have occurred in Ira-
nian urban space in the 20th century with a particular focus on their 
gendered implications, before briefly introducing two dominant ap-
































The Iranian Revolution of 1978-9 is often imagined in terms of a bi-
nary secular/religious distinction, positioning that which came before 
(secularism) against that which came after (religious fervor) in order 
to explain the rise of Khomeini and the ensuing establishment of the 
Islamic Republic. This explanation, proffered both by supporters of 
the Revolution as well as its detractors, obscures however far more 
than it explains. One of the key arenas in which we see the complex 
legacies of both the “secular” Pahlavi regime and the “religious” Is-
lamic Republic is gender politics and the public sphere. 
Since the Revolution, Iranian urban fabric has been reshaped to both 
reflect and produce ideals of modern Islamic citizenship as under-
stood by various political actors including the central government, 
the municipality, and other authorities. These changes can be seen 
most markedly in the capital, Tehran, a metropolitan area of around 
14 million that has emerged as a laboratory for the rest of the coun-
try in urban planning. The city has been marked by a wholesale 
reconstitution and realignment of the public space along a gender 
binary model, such that many public institutions are segregated in 
some way and the morality police regulate spaces that lack a physi-
cal architecture of gender dichotomization (like parks and streets). 
Paradoxically, this realignment of space has actually facilitated the 
movement of women in the city, particularly those from religious 
backgrounds who previously hesitated or were prevented from en-
tering the secular, mixed public sphere. 
Prior to the Revolution, the creation and institutionalization of an 
explicitly secular modern public sphere under the Pahlavi dynasty 
in many ways reinforced traditional limitations on women’s access 
to the public sphere while simultaneously constricting the private 
sphere. The average urban household in 1900 was a large, extended 
family living together in a communal dwelling in the densely-populat-
ed neighborhoods of winding streets that characterized Iranian cities 
historically. In this context, women traditionally spent much of their 
time together or in the alleys between homes that were a kind of 
semi-private space.1 But urban reforms beginning in the 1870s, mod-
eled to a great extent on Haussmanian reforms in Paris, introduced 
long, broad boulevards and set the stage for the development of 
Iranian cities until the present.2
These reforms were followed by a series of culturally Westernizing 
regulations in the 1930s, including clothing restrictions that banned 
the veil and imposed Western dress on men. There are many sto-
1 Leila Soltani, et al., “The quarter: An effective pattern for satisfying women’s sense of 
place in the city of Isfahan,” Cities 30, 2013, 161-174. Pamela Karimi, “Women, Gender, 
and Urban Built Environments in Iran,” in Suad Joseph (ed), Encyclopedia of Women and 
Islamic Cultures Volume IV, Leiden: Brill, 2006, 28-29. 
2 Ali Madanipour, Tehran: The Making of a Metropolis, Chichester: Wiley, 1998.
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ries, for example, of women who were banned by their families from 
leaving the home after the hijab ban in the 1930s (as well as the 
100,000s of Iranians who emigrated), while anecdotal evidence sug-
gests many women also stopped leaving the home of their own will 
in order to avoid being stripped in the streets, as police had been 
ordered to do to offenders. Although the hijab ban was eventually re-
versed, it continued to be enforced in more subtle ways for decades 
— through dress codes and informal discrimination, for example.3 
The ban also set a precedent of government authority over clothing 
and specifically over women’s bodies, irrespective of the women’s 
own wishes or those of her family. 
Spatially, during this period Iranian women increasingly found them-
selves living in smaller and smaller apartments without extended fam-
ily networks. While for some a wholesale acceptance of the Shah’s 
idealized form of modern gender norms by themselves and/or their 
communities allowed access to education, work, and opportunities 
more broadly, for the vast majority of conservative Iranian families, 
the imposition of the secular public sphere created a world beyond 
the door (or beyond the alleyway) that was scarcely recognizable.4 
Unsurprisingly, then, while a small number of Iranian women man-
aged to benefit from the changes supposedly enacted in their favor, 
for the vast majority these reforms were hardly liberatory.5
The imposition of gender segregation and the “Islamization” of the 
Iranian public sphere more widely, however, dramatically overturned 
the trends of the century prior. First and foremost, as a popular revo-
lution, the leaders that came to power in 1979-80 had a widespread 
public mandate that was validated through the mass support from 
both genders manifested during the Revolution. New leaders — prin-
cipally Imam Khomeini — looked favorably upon women’s participa-
tion in the struggle, particularly during the heady days of the revolt 
when every protester counted.6
The physical presence of women’s bodies in the streets translated 
into a growing recognition of women’s integral right to take part in 
the political process. As Iranian historian Minoo Moallem has noted, 
while the ideal woman of the Pahlavi era was defined as secular and 
modern by her visual availability to the male eye, Revolutionary fem-
3 Masserat Amirebrahimi, “Conquering Enclosed Public Spaces,” Cities 23:6, 2006, 55-
61.
4 Janet Afary, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009.
5 For a more extensive discussion of gender politics in Iran in the 19th century, see Minoo 
Moallem, Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister: Islamic Fundamentalism and the 
Politics of Patriarchy in Iran, Berkeley: University of California, 2005.
6 Roksana Bahramitash, “Revolution, Islamization, and Women’s Employment in Iran,” in 
Brown Journal of World Affairs IX:2, 2003, 229-241.
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inity defined itself as veiled and publicly homosocial.7 This inversion 
of the Pahlavi narrative of unidirectional Western modernity as em-
bodied by women’s dress was often articulated through the donning 
of the hijab as sign of protest, including by many women who did not 
otherwise cover their hair.
Despite initial hesitations, leaders began to articulate a vision of 
Islamic governance that institutionalized women’s rights, and tra-
ditional patriarchal restrictions within the family — often articulated 
in Islamic idiom — began losing their potency. As women who had 
taken part in the revolution began asserting their rights within an Is-
lamic framework to protest, study, and work with government sup-
port — including an important literacy campaign targeting women 
across the country — massive changes and shifts in power ensued 
within the family structure.8 For conservative families, the imposition 
of gender segregation in particular was a reassurance that it many 
ways opened the doors to millions of women to education and work 
opportunities, and produced a dramatically novel understanding of 
women’s relationship to public space that was far more expansive. 
Whereas in 1979, less than 1 percent of women finished university 
and around 12 percent were in the workplace — around one-third 
of whom were underage child carpet weavers — less than 40 years 
later about 55 percent finished university, a rate higher than in the 
United States. Statistics suggest that the percentage of women in 
the workplace, meanwhile, has increased significantly, and possibly 
tripled.9
This is not to suggest that work and school are absolute indicators of 
some idealized notion of “liberation;” as Roksana Bahramitash has 
noted, a least part of the rise in women’s employment can be directly 
tied to the imposition of neoliberalizing reforms in the 1990s.10 But 
at the same time, the incredibly rapid “normalization” of women’s 
presence in the public sphere can hardly be ignored, nor can it be 
separated from the ideological and spatial transformations of the 
Revolutionary period. 
The Islamization of public space in Iran can be understood as a col-
lapsing of the public and private spheres. The enforcement of rules 
of morality in public space, for example, was a virtual extension of the 
7 Moallem, Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister, 77.
8 Golnar Mehran, “Social Implications of Literacy in Iran” in Comparative Education Re-
view 36:2, 1992, 207.
9 Jennifer Olmsted, “Gender and Globalization,” in Roksana Bahramitash and Hadi Sale-
hi (eds), Islamism and the Political Economy of Women’s Employment in Iran, Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2011.
10 Roksana Bahramitash, “Market Fundamentalism versus Religious Fundamentalism: 
Women’s Employment in Iran,” in Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 13:1, 2004, 
33-46.
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family’s control of individuals’ bodies in the public sphere. It follows 
that if families feel that the public sphere maintains such control over 
individuals, however, objections to women’s presence and participa-
tion in that sphere lack merit. Indeed, during a series of about two 
dozen interviews I conducted in Tehran in 2011-2012 with women 
who were the first women in their family to attend university and did 
so in the 1980s and early 1990s, I found that more than half cited 
such changes as being among the main reasons they felt they had 
been able to receive educations compared to prior generations of 
women in their families. 
The enforcement of hijab in public space was linked to the introduc-
tion of an Islamic concept, the mahram/namahram distinction — in 
regulation. This distinction delineates a gendered line between wom-
en as well male members of the immediate family on one hand, and 
unknown men on the other. Thus women were legally mandated to 
cover their hair and bodies, and men their bodies but not their hair, in 
public in order to ensure this distinction, while in the private sphere 
it did not apply unless namahram were present. This distinction not 
only applied to clothing/visiblity but also to relationships themselves, 
as unrelated women and men interacting in the public sphere be-
came liable to questioning and fines. This physical delineation of ho-
mosociality in the public sphere is predicated on a heterosexualizing 
gaze, whereby the state’s enforcers see all heterosocial relations as 
already fraught with the potential for heterosexuality. It is this fear — 
of heterosocial temptation, of desire, and of adultery — that inspires 
the police’s zeal for maintain public homosociality as normative, i.e., 
that relationships in public take place primarily between members of 
the same gender.
It is important to note that the urban component of the Islamization 
policies in Iran was extremely brutal as well, particular for those who 
did not fit into normative understandings of proper binary gender 
and sexuality roles. The sex work district of Tehran was one of the 
first to be targeted and was burned down by committees early on in 
the Revolution, while the thriving cruising culture that dominated the 
streets around the neighborhood — which were famously host to a 
large number of young male sex workers as well as cabarets catering 
to all forms of pleasures — was shut down as well.11 The compulsory 
enforcement of the hijab, meanwhile, was and is an obvious violation 
of the rights of millions of women who chose not to wear hijab, many 
of whom have vigorously contested the ban. Although in this piece 
I have not focused on these aspects of the Islamization of public 
11 Minoo Moallem, Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister: Islamic Fundamentalism 
and the Politics of Patriarchy in Iran, Berkeley: University of California, 2005, 74-75. Af-
saneh Najmabadi, “Reading Transsexuality in “Gay” Tehran (around 1979),” in Susan 
Stryker and Aren Aizura (eds), The Transgender Studies Reader Volume 2, New York: 
Routledge, 2013.
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space, I discuss them here briefly in order to assure the reader that I 
recognize them. But it is the other story of Iran’s Islamization process 
in the early 1980s — the millions of women who for the first time in 
history managed to secure access to the public sphere — that is 
rarely discussed, and thus the one I have dwelled on here.
Thus far, I have discussed those changes in the urban structure which 
occurred during the Revolution and immediately following in order to 
highlight the relationship of ideology to urban space and reflect upon 
their consequences, the majority of which were quite unforeseen and 
unpredictable, even by those carrying them out. Since that time, how-
ever, distinct understandings of urban space have emerged amid 
the institutionalization and the bureaucratization of the Revolution. I 
briefly explore two primary approaches that have developed, as well 
as the tensions that characterize their relationship.
The period directly following the Revolution is often considered the 
moment of Revolutionary excess, when the private sphere not only 
took over the public sphere in terms of moral and bodily regulation by 
the state, but also when this conceptualization of the private sphere 
invaded the sacred space of the home as well. Home raids on par-
ties, for example, became commonplace, amid a widespread belief 
that the Islamization of space and of self needed to occur in all sec-
tors of society. At the same time, it is impossible to separate this ap-
proach to urban space from the overall wartime era. 
The fervor of the Revolution was interrupted only a year after it began 
by the Iraqi invasion of Iran’s southwest, bringing eight years of war, 
chaos, and misery to citizens of both states. Thousands of refugees 
flocked to Iran’s major cities, and completely unchecked urban ex-
pansion — fed by illusory promises of free housing to all migrants – 
brought Tehran’s population in 1991 to 7 million, one million of whom 
had come in the last five years alone.12 The construction and repair 
of urban spaces, like parks and other public institutions, nearly col-
lapsed during this period, primarily for lack of resources but also jus-
tified ideologically in terms of the necessity of a somber atmosphere 
during war time. The changes to urban space I described above, 
particularly in terms of Islamization as well as gender segregation, 
continued throughout the 1980s, although by the end of the decade 
and the beginning of the 1990s they began to definitively lose their 
monopoly.
In the 1990s, however, a different vision of Iranian space emerged, 
along with the process of reconstruction that began after the war 
came to a close in 1988. This vision was most exemplified by the poli-
cies of Tehran’s mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi.13 His approach to 
12 Ali Madanipour, Tehran: The Making of a Metropolis, Chichester: Wiley, 1998, 89.
13 Fariba Adelkhah, Being Modern in Iran, New York: Columbia University Press in as-
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urban planning shifted focus to the nurturing of a public sphere that 
was at once Islamic but also institutionalized the growing presence of 
women in public space. Although his reforms did not explicitly target 
women, their effects were deeply gendered. He is primarily noted for 
the mass greening of Tehran that began under his rule, as authorities 
began taking over vacant lots across the city and building parks, no 
matter how big or small, in every neighborhood of the city. 
These parks became the launching pad for the creation of a wide 
variety of public spaces, such as cultural centers, libraries, and other 
educational institutions that increasingly began to serve as “third 
places” for women, who found themselves actively participating in 
public life but still informally restricted from traditionally male sites 
of leisure like cafes (although mixed-gender cafes catering to the 
middle class exploded during this period, equivalents for the working 
class did not). A survey in the mid-2000s, for example, found that 
65 percent of users of Tehran cultural centers were women, while 
informal surveys of parks show high rates of female usage as well.14 
Pocket parks helped recreate the communal spaces of shared dwell-
ings that most Iranians lived in before the almost hegemonic spread 
of apartments geared toward nuclear families, thus domesticating 
local public spaces. The rapid growth of the Tehran metro as well 
as the development of Bus Rapid Transit lines, meanwhile, fostered 
transit-oriented development and also improved access for those 
without access to automobiles, who were again more likely to be 
women and/or working class.
Karbaschi’s approach imagined citizens of the Islamic Republic as 
an ungendered composite, and he saw his role as fostering partici-
pation and access to public space. This was quite different from the 
dominant approach to planning in the 1980s, which saw Iranians 
through the lens of the gender binary and imagined mixed public 
space to be fraught with the potential for heterosexual interaction. 
This focus on the fear and threat of heterosexuality had the effect of 
encouraging homosociality (relationships between members of the 
same gender) as normative, while also promoting the extended fam-
ily as the ideal site of leisure. Today, these approaches exist in a state 
of recurring tension in Iran, as the Karbaschi approach to planning 
has become dominant within the bureaucracy of Iranian cities while 
the morality police — who are under the control of the Ministry of 
Culture and Islamic Guidance — continue to police public space in 
accordance with the approach developed in the 1980s.
To close, I will end with an anecdote from a park that highlights the 
uneasy coexistence of these two approaches. The local municipali-
ties within Tehran regularly organize concerts and other gatherings in 
sociation with the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales, 2000.
14 Kaveh Ehsani, “Municipal Matters: The Urbanization of Consciousness and Political 
Change in Tehran,” in Middle East Report 212 (Fall 1999), 22-27.
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local public parks (built during the Karbaschi era), particularly during 
the summer. Attending one such gathering on a summer evening a 
few years ago, I saw a crowd of around 100 people composed pri-
marily of families sitting on plastic chairs as children danced in front 
of them beside the stage, where a singer used an electronic key-
board to play “folk music” from different regions of Iran. Dozens of 
spectators gathered around the area to watch, while further afield sat 
mixed groups of young people sitting in the grass, crowds of elderly 
resting on benches, and occasional groups of Afghan workers in the 
furthest corners of the park. 
The spectators standing began occasionally swaying, many in an 
effort to entice their children to join those dancing around in front, 
and the male singer leading the display walked a fine line between 
happily enjoining children to come to the front while occasionally and 
quickly reminding parents that they should be seated. The specter 
of mixed-gender dancing, particularly given the groups of teenagers 
about, haunted the performance. Members of the crowd recognized 
the fine line between a municipality-sponsored performance that cel-
ebrated “national culture” and sought not to recognize any gendered 
divisions in the crowd and the very real existence of morality police, 
who in the whole spectacle saw the potential for cruising, mixing, and 
heterosexuality more broadly. 
That day no morality police decided to wander the park to take a look. 
A few nights later, however, while I was sitting with a female cousin 
at a later hour, they stopped by. This time they checked IDs, asking 
questions, and scared the mixed groups of teenagers and the male 
Afghan workers from the corners of the park, where a few needles 
also lay scattered. The tensions between these differently gendered 
approaches to crafting Islamic public space — to say nothing of the 
class and national anxieties shared by the morality policy and middle 
class Iranians vis-a-vis the presence of Afghan workers in the park — 
play out every day and every night in Tehran parks.
/// Published on January 9, 2015
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NORM, MEASURE OF 
ALL THINGS 
BY SOFIA LEMOS
Architectural practice and theoretical discourse has considered 
Ernst Neufert’s canonical Architects’ Data (1936) as a product of 
the search for an optimal built environment based on accounts of 
a single normative body. In light of the increasing pervasiveness of 
bespoke biometric solutions and its applications in architecture and 
design, this essay seeks to offer a different genealogy of the en-
tanglement between architecture standards and statistical methods 
of measuring the social body. This essay draws a speculative history 
from the point when modern architecture ceases to account for, to 
become accountable for normalizing that body.
Norms, have long inhabited the architect’s toolset. Pertaining to the 
carpenter’s square or rule norma is first codified in the early nine-
teenth century as ‘standard, pattern, model’ as evidence of its com-
mon usage. Whereas the vernacular use of the noun ‘norm’ had to 
do with geometry, with ‘right angles’ and perpendicular lines, its ad-
jectival derivation ‘normal’ is defined in 1828 in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as ‘constituting, conforming to, not deviating or differ from, 
the common type or standard.’ The emergence of the adjectival form 
of the noun is the first historical clue that suggests a symbolic shift 
that happened throughout the eighteenth century from the language 
of geometry to that of biological matter. 
Clinical medicine and its codification of the physical body stand as 
the pivotal discipline that takes a set practices and discourses that 
rendered issues of nationality, gender, race, etc. as operable themes 
towards sovereign ends. ‘Normal’ as we understand it today, i.e. a 
healthy being not impaired in any way, is reflective of this period and 
its attendant discourse about the body. Normality or the condition of 
being normal, at ‘right angles,’ surfaces in 1849 in close coincidence 
with its etymological counterparts; ‘abnormal’ and ‘abnormality’ first 
enter the Oxford English Dictionary under the definition of ‘deviating 
from the rule,’ in 1835 and 1854, respectively. Throughout the second 
half of the 1800s the antonyms placidly transitioned from its disciplin-

























































sciousness. Notoriously, in France, where the morphological trajec-
tory from medical jargon to the public forum is older and most clear, 
scholars in comparative literature have noted that three generations 
of French novelists Balzac, Flaubert, and Proust problematized ‘nor-
mality’ to epitomize what they believed was the inherent morality of 
a disintegrating society in which the deviation was subsumed within 
the norm.1
From the language of geometry and, thus, of declarative statements, 
norms became relevant to medical discourse as prescriptions. This 
ontological shift in what norms are in the 1800s can be thought as 
the product of the concurrence of two distinct historical forces: on the 
one hand, the synthesis between the disciplines of anatomy and clin-
ical medicine that was brought about by the advent of new diagnos-
tic techniques; and, on the other hand, the adoption of Pierre-Simon 
Laplace’s (1749-1827) probabilistic study of random errors by statis-
tics alongside other sciences of measurement. The entanglement of 
medical and statistical discourse defined the architect’s toolset by 
concurrently rendering the norm as instrument of all-encompassing 
action and unfaltering inquiry. 
From Nature’s Caprice to Taxonomy ///
The emergence of modern clinical medicine, and of the anatomico-
pathological model of medical episteme upon which it was predi-
cated, was a particular product of the French medical practice in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, as Michel Foucault 
demonstrated in Birth of the Clinic.2 The birth of the clinic heralded 
the transformation of the hospital as a site of ‘hospitality’ for those in 
need of shelter to a complex space of production: research, training 
and treatment became part of the same enterprise designed to cater 
to increasingly large numbers of patients. Concurrently, this shift is 
accompanied by the emergence of a ‘clinical gaze’ that abstracts 
individual patients into mere objects of study, and coincides with the 
substitution of classical scientific determinism with the science of 
probabilities and variation. 
Previous to the nineteenth century, physicians classified diseases 
based on the observation of the pre-conditional symptoms known 
at the time. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, technologi-
cal advances enabled the reconfiguration of disease knowledge, 
which effectively transformed the existing approaches to anatomy. 
Auscultation, an ancient technology of relying on sound to trace inner 
changes in the body was modernized and refined by René Laennec 
(1781-1826) who connected the sounds of the internal organs to 
1 Harry Levin, Contexts of Criticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957, 110-130.
2 Michel Foucault, Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, A.M. Sheri-
dan Smith (trans), New York: Pantheon Books, 1973.
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specific pathological states and changes in the thorax. The advent 
of a new instrument of diagnosis, the stethoscope (1816) signified 
the potentiality of a more accurate analysis prior to the failure of the 
organism and consequent dissection. Laennec’s name figures in the 
historical monographs of the time as having transformed the nomen-
clature of disease from a subjective description of symptoms to be 
associated with anatomical terminology. 
As ailments became identified as anatomical correlations, dissec-
tions and anatomy classes became progressively more essential 
to the physicians’ training in order to investigate the ‘how’ of cor-
poreality.3 Notably, prior to the dissemination of the stethoscope, 
physicians practiced what in medical history is termed ‘bedside 
medicine,’ whereas anatomists would regularly be exposed to raw 
flesh and often go to great lengths to source corpses for study.4 Sur-
geons and anatomists began formulating their disciplinary body of 
knowledge around the 1500s by codifying abnormalities found in 
cadavers through their dissection. The invention of the first anatomi-
3 For a discussion of the influence of diagnostic techniques on anatomical knowledge 
refer to Jacalyn Duffin, History Of Medicine: A Scandalously Short Introduction, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1999, 75-79, 198-200.
4 Annet Mooij demonstrates that the scholarly background of physicians was often con-
trasted with the more humble background of surgeons and anatomists, relating class 
to the kind of operations each performed. See “The pathologization of dissection,” in 
Laurens de Rooy, Han van den Bogaard, Simon Knepper, Johan Kortenray, and Antoon 
Moorman (eds), Forces Of Form, Amsterdam: Vossiuspers UvA, 2009, 36. For a histori-
cal discussion on the relationship between anatomists and body snatchers see Alan W. 
Bates, “Indecent And Demoralising Representations: Public Anatomy Museums In Mid-
Victorian England,” Medical History 52:1, 2008, 1-22; Alan W. Bates, “Dr Kahn’s Museum: 
Obscene Anatomy In Victorian London,” Journal Of The Royal Society Of Medicine 99:12, 
2006, 618-624; and Simon Chaplin, “Nature Dissected, Or Dissection Naturalized? The 
Case Of John Hunter’S Museum,” Museum Soc 6:2, 2008, 135-51.
Tables Of Human Development by Adolphe Quetelet (1870) 
New York Academy of Medicine Library
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cal organizational systems was largely associated with coarseness, 
impropriety and, in earlier days even profanity, and was cultivated 
by surgeons and anatomists who would regularly perform the tasks 
that physicians felt were beneath them. Diagrams and illustrations 
constituted a set of visual and discursive practices crucial to develop 
the profession and laid ground for medicine’s will to know. The epis-
temological grounds for the constitution of the healthy and normal 
body were then set through gaze and correlation.
Kinship and Correlation /// 
Best known as Normal distribution, Laplace’s principle of errors is 
graphically represented by the ‘bell-shaped curve’ and is also known 
as Gaussian distribution or density function. Invented within the con-
text of the study of probabilities, the Normal distribution was taken up 
and used by the Belgium astronomer Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874) 
to predicate the concept of l’homme moyen or the ‘average man,’ 
characterized by the mean values of the measured variables that fol-
low a distribution. This concept first appeared in the influential Sur 
l’homme et le développement de ses facultés ou essai de physique 
sociale, published in 1835, and translated in English as A Treatise on 
Man.5 In this work the astronomer suggests that the distribution of 
human features such as weight, height and life expectancy can be 
measured against a statistical mean. Considered by many the father 
of quantitative social sciences, he originally claimed that Laplace’s 
law of errors could be applied to the distribution of all social phe-
nomena. Quetelet’s main thesis argues that the history of evolution is 
aimed at a fixed point of development but contains in itself a certain 
frequency of errors. Inspired by the Aristotelean ‘Golden Mean,’ de-
veloped in the second volume of the Nichomachean Ethics whereby 
virtue is the desirable mean between deficiency and excess, this fixed 
point of evolution becomes a major concern to the contemporary 
debates in the life sciences. As Lennard J. Davies argues, the so-
cial implications of this concept were pivotal for a century consumed 
by thoughts of progress and industrialization. According to Davies, 
Quetelet provided an empirical basis of les classes moyennes and 
justification to ossify social stratification: “with bourgeois hegemony 
comes scientific justification for moderation and middle-class ideol-
ogy. The average man, the body of the man in the middle, becomes 
the exemplar of the middle way of life.”6 Underpinning these discus-
5 M.A. Quetelet, A Treatise on Man and the Development of his Faculties, Edinburgh: 
William and Robert Chambers, 1842. Note that this is the first edition of the English trans-
lation of Sur l’homme et le développement de ses facultés ou essai de physique sociale 
and was digitized and made available online by Google Books. On a further note, this 
edition was part of a series “People’s Edition” and was widely distributed in the UK for 
the price of three shillings. 
6 Lennard J. Davies, “Constructing Normalcy: The Bell Curve, the Novel and the Inven-
tion of the Disabled Body in The Nineteenth Century,” in The Disability Studies Reader, 
London: Routledge, 2006, 5.
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sions was the belief that the materiality of the body, one’s physical 
features were a catalogue of signs to be interpreted not only for the 
sake one’s own body, as was the case for bedside medicine, but 
rather and mainly for the body politic. Control and perpetuation of the 
Nation’s health was to be carried out by statistical measurement as a 
mode of scientific and social investigation. In the writings of Quetelet:
This determination of the average man is not merely a matter of 
speculative curiosity; it may be of the most important service to the 
science of man the social system. It ought necessarily to precede 
every other inquiry into social physics, since it is, as it were, the basis. 
The average man, indeed, is in a nation what the center of gravity is 
in a body; it is by having that central point in view that we arrive at 
the apprehension of all the phenomena of equilibrium and motion.7 
Importantly, Quetelet did not intend to calculate the average of the 
human species as a whole; rather, he sought to codify the character-
istic of a nation and its people as a racial type. L’homme type, as Ian 
Hacking suggests, is a sum of the physical and moral qualities of the 
man of that race.8 This move towards codification signals that, on the 
one hand, it might be possible to preserve the average qualities of a 
particular national body, and as such, that it might also be possible 
to alter them. By laying the grounds for the science (and politics) 
of eugenics, Queletet’s means enabled the scientific and juridical 
community to come together in shaping the evolution of the modern 
Nation-State. Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911) a Victorian polymath 
whose legacy expands from crucial contributions in geography and 
meteorology to inventing fingerprint identification was, most impor-
tantly, recognized for being a pioneer of statistical correlation and 
regression, proto-geneticist, and the main advocate of eugenics. The 
half-cousin of Charles Darwin gave the fullest expression of the new 
scientific discipline in Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Develop-
ment (1883): 
My general object has been to take note of the varied hereditary fac-
ulties of different men, and of the great differences in different fami-
lies and races, to learn how far history may have shown the practi-
cability of supplanting inefficient human stock by better strains, and 
to consider whether it might not be our duty to do so by such efforts 
as may be reasonable, thus exerting ourselves to further the ends of 
evolution more rapidly and with less distress than if events were left 
to their own course.9 
The unique body represented at the tail ends of the Bell shaped 
curve served to legitimize and naturalize a particular sociopolitical 
7 Quetelet, A Treatise on Man and the Development of his Faculties, 96 (my emphasis).
8 Ian Hacking, The Taming Of Chance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
9 Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development, London: J.M. Dent 
& Co, 1907, 1.
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order. Aberrant anatomies were previously identified as monstrosi-
ties by visceral experience and operated primarily within a theologi-
cal discourse rather than within scientific reasoning. It was only in 
the late eighteenth century with Diderot and D’Alembert’s publica-
tion of the Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des Sciences des 
Arts et des Métiers (1751-1772) that monstrosity was translated into 
scientific discourse, prepping the grounds for the norm. As a part 
of the Encyclopedia’s Supplément, Jean La Fosse (1742-1775), a 
Professor of Anatomy and Physiology in Montpelier, wrote a series 
of articles on the anatomy of the monster in which monstrosity is, for 
the first time, systematically divested of divine causes and instead 
founded in malfunctions of the normal.
According to the disability studies pioneer Rosemarie Garland Thom-
son, the aberrant body “framed and choreographed bodily differenc-
es that we now call ‘race,’ ‘ethnicity,’ and ‘disability’ in a ritual that 
enacted the social process of making cultural otherness from the 
raw materials of human physical variation.”10 This naturalization of 
‘variation’ concerns what Foucault called the process of ‘normaliza-
tion’ in a series of lectures at the Collège de France between 1974 
and 1975. In Abnormal, ‘normalization’ partakes in the model of the 
modern medico-juridical biopower and aims at the integration and 
inclusion of the abnormal and pathological into the normal through 
a series of interactions between different institutions.11 Rather than 
acting through a model of exclusion or opposition, ‘normalization’ 
assimilates the ‘abnormal’ as part of the ‘normal’ state and its proper 
function, turning the body into an object of strict control and under 
constant surveillance.
Georges Canguilhem alike confronts the reality of the type and the 
relation of particular individuals to the power of the norm. In asking, 
“is the pathological the same concept as abnormal? Is it the contrary 
to or the contradictory of normal? Is normal the same as healthy? Is 
anomaly the same thing as abnormality?” the philosopher and phy-
sician raises questions related to the consensual nature of scien-
tific knowledge.12 In his view, the ‘normal’ is the state that institutes 
the ‘norm,’ and the ‘normative’ as such is a prototypical condition. 
An anomaly is thus a mere difference in degree for which the norm 
will serve as metric. Concerning the aberrant body he writes: “Once 
monstrosity has become a biological concept, once monstrosities 
have been divided into classes based on invariable relations, once 
10 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1997, 60.
11 Michel Foucault, Abnormal : Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975, Valerio 
Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni (eds), Graham Burchell (trans), London: Verso, 2003, 
26.
12 Georges Canguilhem, Knowledge Of Life, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 
121.
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one prides oneself on being able to bring them about experimentally, 
the monster is naturalized, the irregular is brought back to the rule 
and the prodigy to predictability.”13 
The locus where the aberrant could be brought back to the rule was 
the ‘Anthropometric Laboratory,’ which Galton, like Quetelet, opened 
in London as to further his statistical enquiries with larger sample 
sizes.14 Both had invariably distinct approaches to the Bell shaped 
curve and their legacies differ greatly. As a brief illustration, Galton 
was the inventor of the Intelligence Quotient (IQ) and Quetelet that 
of the Body Mass Index (BMI), two corporeal metrics with distinct 
teleologies still in present use. Whereas Quetelet with the BMI sought 
a society in which the average is ideal, Galton with the IQ sought a 
society in which the ideal corresponds to the optimal. However, to 
our present purposes, the idea that a population can be normalized 
and therefore have deviations from the mean diminished is the direct 
product of Quetelet’s social physics. Statistics was a mere technol-
ogy that enabled the empirical presentation of the normal type as 
a matter of maximized value to the utilitarian political agenda. For 
the astronomer, the deviant body was an abstract topographic docu-
ment upon which the symbolic codes of egalitarian democracy were 
institutionalized. The interchangeable use of anatomy and statistics 
developed a sovereign political discourse that codified how and what 
to ‘know’ in order to ascertain its functions and operations. These 
scientific ‘normalizing’ systems of knowledge based on seeing and 
measuring corporeal difference effectively established representa-
tional strategies for the difference-enabling taxonomy-of-otherness 
popularized by the standard design methods of Ernst Neufert.  
The Geometric Man Under Conditions of Law and Sentiment ///
If we were to consider readings of history prior to the period examined 
in this essay, we could recall that the man was once posited as the 
measure of all things. Throughout history man used his own body as 
metric for the instruments of service to him and his built forms. With 
the introduction of the metric system in post-revolutionary France, le 
mètre substituted the man and was established by continental scien-
tific consensus as the new decimal unit of length. The gamut of nine-
teenth century’s conception of progress was unavoidably connected 
13 Ibid., 140.
14 The Galton Laboratory emerged of the Anthropometric Laboratory part of the London 
International Health Exhibition of 1885. Visitors to the Exhibition were tested with instru-
ments Galton had devised and paid a fee for a copy of their measurements and other 
data. Following its success at the Exhibition, once it closed Galton established a second 
Anthropometric Laboratory in the Science Galleries at the South Kensington Museum in 
London, which corresponds today to the Victoria & Albert Museum. Over 9000 people 
contributed to his measurement exercises, although the data gathered was not properly 
analyzed until 1920-1930s when the Lab was transferred to University College of London 
(UCL) and renamed The Eugenics Records Office (later designated The Galton Labora-
tory), a predecessor to the Department of Applied Statistics at this University. 
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with the industrial momentum that would increasingly operate under 
the demand for standardization. 
Foucault referred to the ‘clinical gaze’ as conductive of the epistemo-
logical rupture that permeates the disciplinary boundaries of bedside 
medicine and anatomy. After the French Revolution, this new form of 
‘seeing’ afforded physicians and anatomists a more accurate per-
ception and experience of body’s variation allowing them an unparal-
leled proximity to the ‘truth.’ The science of variation like the clinical 
gaze was believed to unearth all sides of truth and was therefore ef-
fectively applied as a form of industrial management in order to cope 
with population growth. 
Ernst Neufert (1900-1986) author of Architect’s Data (originally pub-
lished as Bauentwurfslehre) accomplished the most complete illus-
trative encyclopedia of modern design.15 Although published almost 
a century after Quetelet’s first inquiries into his social physics, Archi-
15 Ernst Neufert, Architect’s Data, London: Lockwood, 1970.
Octametric Bricks and Standard Format by Ernst Neufert (1943)
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tect’s Data reflected a realist political view of society, one that at the 
time was impregnated with historical affinities to Social Darwinism, 
a direct contribution from the anthropometric studies that enshrined 
Quetelet and Galton in History.
The social physics of Neufert’s buildings was one that strived towards 
the ideal of the average. Presently in its fortieth German edition, Ar-
chitect’s Data has been translated in over twenty languages and 
remains the most important compendia on architectural standards 
ever written. Explained in a nutshell, the architect sought to create 
guidelines that could accelerate the process of design and build-
ing for which he undertook an exhaustive study of the relationship 
between the sizes of human limbs and the space that surrounds the 
human body. First published in 1936, his oeuvre remains the canon 
of spatial planning and site requirements for most designers who rely 
on the metric system for introducing the standard dimensions of the 
spaces we inhabit today. 
Both a predicament of its time and an omen of the post-war, Neufert’s 
standards act as textual evidences of the requirements, specifica-
tions and guidelines that ensure that industrial processes consis-
tently meet public demand.  My proposal investigates the possibility 
of standardization not as it is translated from the German normun (or 
normierung) but as technology of normalization of the body as Fou-
cault and Canguilhem scrutinized.
Conceptually, Neufert’s intentions to ‘normalize’ all objects in space 
to a system of interchangeable units, from the “Octametric Brick with 
Standard Brick Thickness” to human bodies, simplifies the produc-
tion of otherness. In the words of Nader Vossoughian concerning 
Neufert’s standardized products:
Binary categories are used to organize rooms – they are implicitly 
designated as either public or private, wet or dry, female or male, 
domestic or professional, work-related or recreational, consumption 
based or production-oriented – which simplifies the task of program-
ming spaces.16
 
According to the historiography Nader Vossoughian draws upon, 
Neufert arrived at his efforts inspired by the experiments of a Munich 
based institute Die Brücke – Internationales Institut zur Organisierung 
der geistigen Arbeit (in English, International Institute to Organize In-
tellectual Work) from whom Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932) remark-
ably influenced his thoughts. Nobel Prize winner in Chemistry in 
1909— the same year Francis Galton was knighted by Her Majesty 
of England—Ostwald believed that the development of standards for 
16 Nader Vossoughian, “Standardization Reconsidered: Normierung In And After Ernst 
Neufert’s Bauentwurfslehre (1936),” Grey Room 54, 2014, 44.
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the production and consumption of knowledge, such as disciplinary 
manuals would foster processes of socialization (i.e. the reification 
of norms). The idea for the standardization of paper dimensions was 
Die Brücke Institute’s most successful undertaking which, following 
its bankruptcy, was taken over by the Deutsches Institut für Normung 
(in English, German Institute for Standardization) that in 1922 pre-
sented the DIN paper format which remains the standard metric for 
paper in most countries where the metric system prevails. Although 
this account does not follow prescribed historical records, it is pos-
sible through a forensic reading of texts and events to imagine that 
Quetelet’s calculations of the average man resonated with Wilhelm 
Ostwald, who in turn laid ground for Neufert’s will to disseminate his 
homogenized proportional systems. For Neufert, centralizing disci-
plinary knowledge in one single source allowed for its contents to be 
circulated faster and disseminated to a wider public, and thus, by 
consequence, normalize the production of society.
Appointed in 1938 as Albert Speer’s Standardization Officer for the 
rationalization of housing in Berlin, Neufert continued to develop 
throughout his trajectory quantitative methods aimed at the efficient 
acceleration of the building process based on the average men. Ad-
ditionally, as revolutionary winds were actively blowing throughout 
Europe and, colonial power in need of reassertion in ultramarine ter-
ritories, standardization appeared to scientists an efficient mode of 
guaranteeing stability and control over the National population at an 
absolute dimension. In practical terms, the use of Neufert’s design 
processes and products in the metropolis and its National colonies 
was again a method of asserting power by means of industry and 
conforming the production of the city to directives of utilitarian poli-
tics. 
Foucault and Canguilhem carefully differentiated philosophical con-
ventions that tend to trace a clear demarcation between ‘normative’ 
Blueprint From Bauordnungslehre by Albert Speer and Ernst Neufert (1943)
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or prescriptive statements (i.e. what ought to be) and declarative 
statements (i.e. what is). Quetelet and Neufert, the former through 
statistics and the latter through architecture, relied on normative 
statements to signify and design expected scenarios of social behav-
ior. Quetelet’s social physics was to inaugurate the momentum from 
which Neufert’s architectural data could be read as empirical, and 
Neufert was to codify the ‘average man’ by ‘normalizing’ the subject 
of architecture. For both men, the mean was not merely a descriptive 
tool rather was a statement of the ideal. L’homme moyen provided 
the “right angles” by which modern architecture would be designed. 
/// Published on July 15, 2014
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57/
PATTERNS OF LIFE: 
A VERY SHORT HISTORY OF 
SCHEMATIC BODIES 
BY GRÉGOIRE CHAMAYOU
1/// In his 1956’s Theory of the Dérive, Guy Debord described a Paris 
map drawn up by an urban sociologist depicting “all the movements 
made in the space of one year by a student living in the 16th Ar-
rondissement”. “Her itinerary,” he remarked, “forms a small triangle 
with no significant deviations, the three apexes of which are the 
School of Political Sciences, her residence and that of her piano 
teacher.”1
The cartographic objectivation of a life form was taken as a starting 
point for a poetical and political critique of daily life. This was a cri-
tique of its narrowness, of its routines, of the reduction of the lifeworld 
these routine articulate. Debord concluded: “Such data — examples 
of a modern poetry capable of provoking sharp emotional reactions 
(in this particular case, outrage at the fact that anyone’s life can be so 
pathetically limited) […] will undoubtedly prove useful in developing 
dérives (drifts).”2
1 Guy Debord, “Theory of the dérive,” in Ken Knabb (ed), The Situationist International 
Anthology, Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets, 1981, 50.
2 Ibid.
Routes taken during one year by a female student living in the 



































2/// Today, San Francisco designers offer to sell strange jewels. They 
are small geometric medallions that look like spider webs or crystal-
line structures. Their patterns are actually those of your routes. Me-
shu, a new type of small silversmith business, uses the geolocation 
data collected by your smartphone in order to extract the schematic 
map of your peregrinations. The visualization of your chronospatial 
data generates a graph that may then serve as a model to carve out 
your personalized pendant in metal or wood.
The spatialized history of your travels therefore becomes a cryptic 
sign that you can wear as ornament. It is also a personalized em-
blem, the expression of a new art of portraiture.
3/// As cultural objects, these graphs may be compared to one of 
their precursors: the “silhouette portrait” developed at the end of the 
18th century. With Johann Kaspar Lavater’s invention of a “sure and 
convenient machine for drawing silhouette,” such portraits became 
popular objects, a trend that carried new aesthetic codes for the pre-
sentation of oneself, but also new supports for an anthropological 
knowledge that claimed to decipher personalities by the study of the 
contours of one’s head.
The chronospatial profile has in common with the old skiagraphic 
profile the multiplicity of its usages.3 The difference is, of course, that 
the trace turns away from the body’s morphological contour to focus 
instead on the imaginary lines of its movements. The profile must 
henceforth be understood in a metaphorical sense: it no longer refers 
3 Skiagraphic is the Greek term for the art of shadow drawing/writing.
The route map of an individual in San Francisco converted into a pendant by Meshu
Lavater’s silhouette portrait (1806)
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to the static shape of a body, but to the dynamic form of its trajec-
tories.  This is the kind of schematic body that forms the topic of my 
investigation
4 /// Since the 19th century, paleontologists have drawn an enlight-
ening distinction between body fossils and trace fossils: “when we 
mentioned prints, molds, counter-prints,” writes Alcide d’Orbigny in 
1849, “we spoke only of organic trace fossils of solid parts of animals 
buried in the strata; but there are other fossils left by living bodies 
on not-yet-consolidated sediments, and those have less to do with 
these solid parts of bodies than with their vital and physiological hab-
its. They are prints of animal steps, furrows, fluting, rolls left by the 
moving organs of walking and swimming animals.”4 Edward Hitch-
cock named such fossils “ichnites.” In German they are also called 
Lebenspurren: traces of life or “fossil vestiges of life.”
While the molding of a dead body, prisoner of the clay, provides the 
replica of a solid with its volumes and its textures, a series of footprints 
found on the ground only provides an account of its movements. In 
the latter case, the print has not been simultaneous but successive. 
The trace of an activity is a precipitation of successive events in the 
simultaneity of a space, its durable solidification on the plane of an 
inscribing surface. It is the image of a spatialized duration.
5/// In 1790, Kant wrote: “Every form of the objects of sense […] is 
either figure or play. In the latter case it is either play of figures (in 
space, viz. pantomime and dancing), or the mere play of sensations 
(in time).”5 The form of a dance, or more generally of a perceived 
movement is not that of a thing, with its fixed contours (the shape of 
a vase). It is a “play of figures” that can only authentically appear in a 
double difference of space and time. 
4 Alcide d’Orbigny, Cours élémentaire de paléontologie et de géologie stratigraphiques, 
Premier volume, Paris: Masson, 1849, 27.
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, Werner S. Pluhar (trans), Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1987.
Fossil footprints found in Gill, Massachussetts in the 19th century
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During the same era, choreographic notation systems were invented. 
In corresponding treatises, a dance took the aspect of undulated 
sentences written in a weird symbolic language. Within the space 
of the sheet, these sentences evolved under the chronological hori-
zontal axis of the musical score. The layout of the play of forms was 
no longer a mere account, it had become a script, which was only 
transcribing the activity so as to better conduct it in practice.
6/// In the 1910s, two disciples of Taylor, Lilian and Frank B. Gilbreth 
developed an apparatus they called “chronocyclegraph.” After hav-
ing affixed small electrical bulbs on a worker’s hand, they would take 
long exposure photographs of him as he executed his task. Thus did 
they obtain the image of a “continuous path of a cycle of motions” 
appearing in white lines on the photographic emulsion.
“I believe”, explained an enthusiastic young engineer, “a good meth-
od of illustrating how a motion model helps one to visualize is to 
compare it with the wake left by an ocean liner.”6 What the various 
techniques I am describing have in common is that each presents 
us with a means of capturing trails, or else of adding more or less 
long-lasting trail-effects to activities that do not necessarily generate 
them spontaneously.7 
In this specific case, the task of extracting the trajectory is accom-
plished by photographic means, or more precisely by a chrono-
photography: by treating the light source as a “spatiotemporal ink,” 
chronophotographic processes “constitute trails, as Didi-Huberman 
would say, by allowing the mobile’s movement to appear by an ex-
6 Frank B. Gilbreth and Lilian Gilbreth, “Motion Efficiency Study,” in Walter Hines Page 
and Arthur W. Page (eds), World’s Work, New York: Doubleday, 1916, 321.
7 See Georges Didi-Huberman, Phalènes, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2013.
Two sheets illustrating dance step notations in the 18th century
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tended presence in various points of the image, which thus take on 
the appearance of simultaneity.”8 The invisible is thus made visible. 
It is, however, equally true that this process of visualization achieves 
a concomitant operation of invisibilization or erasure. On the photo-
graph, the worker’s body is blurred into a kind of halo in the back-
ground. The body literally disappears behind the lines of its gesture. 
From the evanescent body, only the bright fossil of its past movement 
remains. 
Michel Foucault has shown that the discipline of the 18th and 19th 
centuries was mobilizing “a sort of anatomo-chronological schema 
of behavior.”9 But this is no longer exactly the case here. If the sche-
ma is still in a sense chronological (and even chronospatial), it is no 
longer anatomical. From the living body of the worker, there remains 
“merely the orbit of the motion.”10 Orbit is an instructive metaphor: 
a shift, so to speak, from an anatomy to a micro-astronomy of the 
productive gesture, where the glow of the small light bulbs would 
have replaced the brightness of the stars, although for a quite differ-
ent study.
8 Caroline Chik, L’image paradoxale, Fixité et mouvement, Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses 
Universitaires du Septentrion, 2011, 90.
9 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Alan Sheridan (trans), 
New York: Vintage Books, 1995.
10 Frank B. Gilbreth and Lilian Gilbreth, “Motion Efficiency Study,” 321. 
Motion Efficiency Study by Lilian and Frank Gilbreth (1914)
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These orbits must not only be visualized but also modeled, in or-
der to better be transformed. If one analyzes the trajectories of the 
gestures, it is in order to simplify them, to rid them of their useless 
detours: it is the principle of “waste elimination.”11 Modelization is 
a prelude to standardization: “through a comparison of graphs or 
models showing the paths of different operators doing the same kind 
of work, it is possible to deduce the most efficient method and to 
make this a standard.”12 The method, etymologically, is the path to 
follow. The standard is the shortest path, the one most economical.
The Gilbreths also sculpt these movement models in three dimen-
sions with wire and use it “to teach the path of the motion” to opera-
tors. The worker’s gesture, reconstructed in a laboratory, re-enters 
the workshop in a modified form, this time as a conducting thread to 
which productive bodies must conform their dance.
7 /// In the mid-1960s, a member of the USSR Academy of sciences, 
Alfred Yarbus, published a book that deeply renewed the study of 
sight.13 For his experiments, he used a sophisticated machine, a bit 
like the device on which one puts his/her chin in an ophthalmologic 
office except, in this case, equipped with cameras. Having recorded 
the micro-movements of the eyes, he could retrace the fast course 
that a subject’s eyes unconsciously follow when looking at a paint-
ing. These drawings, with their jolts and their fixed points, look a lot 
like Gilbreth’s photographs. They are also maps of gestures, but of 
ocular gestures, where the object of visualization is nothing other 
than the very action of seeing.14 
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Alfred Yarbus, Eye Movements and Vision, New York: Plenum Press, 1967.
14 See the work of the artist Julien Prévieux, “Esthétique des statistiques,” in Isabelle 
Bruno, Emmanuel Didier, and Julien Prévieux (eds), Statactivisme: Comment lutter avec 
des nombres, Paris: Zones/La Découverte, 2014.
Eye movement traces of a subject looking at a picture by Alfred Yarbus (1967)
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Nowadays, eye-tracking technologies are mobilized by marketing 
research. In the age of the “attention economy,” the user’s vision 
is methodically scrutinized in order to better capture it. Eye tracking 
heat maps are produced to conduct “usability tests” and to choose 
the most efficient “design route” for a given graphic design project.
This method of analysis applies to web page design, product pack-
aging, but also to the very architecture of retail spaces. Nowadays, 
some stores couple the video feed of their surveillance camera to the 
phone signals picked up by their wifi network in order to retrace their 
clients’ movement.  Within the physical space of the store the client is 
an eye, but an eye with legs. Thanks to the collected behavioral data, 
the space can then be reorganized in order to optimize the capture 
of attention. 
This method of analysis applies to web page design, product pack-
aging, but also to the very architecture of retail spaces. Nowadays, 
some stores couple the video feed of their surveillance camera to the 
phone signals picked up by their wifi network in order to retrace their 
Eye tracking heat map analysis of the gaze of a subject on a webpage
Screenshot of a customer tracking apparatus in a store
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clients’ movement.15 Within the physical space of the store the client 
is an eye, but an eye with legs. Thanks to the collected behavioral 
data, the space can then be reorganized in order to optimize the 
capture of attention. 
Despite the similarity between these graphs and Gilbreth’s, the rela-
tion of normativity here is not the same. The wage relationship is 
structured by a relation of constraint that fundamentally gives to 
the norm the aspect of a command (even if it is also implemented 
through other means). In the mercantile sphere, it is at once through 
more lateral measures that an activity scheme is prescribed to bod-
ies. In that case, the strategy consists in redrawing the space of vis-
ibility in order to orient and magnetize the ocular and corporeal mo-
bility according to pre-established navigation routes. This normativity 
proceeds according to tactics of capture through design. 
8/// In the beginning of the 1960s, American ethologists began to use 
new radio transmitters in order to study the movements of wild ani-
mals. These devices, fixed on bodies of cotton-tail rabbits or white-
tailed deers, allowed their positions to be known and their itineraries 
to be retraceable.16 To address the mass of data rapidly produced 
by such radio-tracking systems, the scientists designed a program 
capable of automatically converting this data into maps. 
15 See Stephanie Clifford, Quentin Hardy, “Big Data Hits Real Life,” The New York Times 
(July 14, 2013).
16 See John R. Tester, Dwain W. Warner and William W. Cochran, “A Radio-Tracking Sys-
tem for Studying Movements of Deer,” The Journal of Wildlife Management 28:1 (January 
1964), 42-45.
Map of the movements of “Hare 201” between May 3 and 5 1964
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The rise of telemetric technologies also inspired other disciplines. 
In 1964, at Harvard, two behavioral psychologists, Ralph Schwit-
zgebel, and his twin brother, Robert, developed a “behavioral su-
pervision system with a wrist-carried transceiver.” This device, tested 
on “young delinquents,” foreshadowed the electronic bracelet later 
adopted by the penal system. It was their dream to replace the old 
techniques of incarceration by new control technologies operating in 
an open milieu. To this end, they imagined a small wearable device 
able to record and to transmit various behavioral data wirelessly, in-
cluding the geographic position of the subject, as well as “his pulse, 
brain waves, consumption of alcohol, or other physiological facts.”17 
If this electronic snitch sensor detected a risky behavior, the indi-
vidual could be located and, if necessary, subjected to a preemptive 
intervention.
But what also deeply motivated this invention had to do with a libido 
sciendi. Through the automated remote collection of behavioral data, 
the electronic bracelet would allow behavioral sciences to continu-
ously access a mass of detailed information about daily life. Could 
not the psychologist imitate the ethologist, and have his own network 
of transponder necklaces placed on the bodies of human animals? 
This art of remote measurement of human behaviors was named an-
thropotelemetry.
The task of collecting behavioral data that was to be entrusted to 
special sensors is nowadays largely accomplished by individuals 
themselves, who self-document their own activity in a context of gen-
eralized traceability. Tom MacWright is a geographic information sys-
tems engineer. He is also an amateur runner. He recently created an 
application that allows him to visualize his running routes in the city, 
as well as his heartbeat fluctuations during his efforts.
17 Ralph Schwitzgebel, “Anthropotelemetry: Dr. Schwitzgebel’s Machine,” in Harvard Law 
Review 80:2 (December 1966), 403-421.
Data visualization of the running routes and the heart rate of Tom MacWright
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This map illustrates an important principle: data fusion refers to data 
collected from heterogeneous sources that are fused to the same 
chronospatial schematic body. The only condition is that this infor-
mation must have been referenced in advance according to spatio-
temporal coordinates.
9/// Still in the 1960s, an innovative movement in human geography 
undertook to revolutionize its discipline: it was the project of chrono-
geography, or time-geography. The fundamental idea was that one 
could give an account of human lives by treating them as paths with-
in space-time. This implied, among other things, the invention of new 
kinds of maps, which would articulate time to space. Torsten Häger-
strand, one of the founding fathers of this methodology, summed 
up its postulate as follows: “In time-space the individual describes a 
path [...] the concept of life path (or path of it such as the day path, 
the week path, etc) can easily be shown graphically if we agree to 
collapse a three-dimensional space into a two-dimensional plain [...], 
and use a perpendicular direction to represent time.”18 
The following illustration is a first instance of this kind of representa-
tion, still in a rudimentary state. A thread is wound around vertical 
sticks that have been hammered into a three-dimensional map rep-
resenting the itinerary of an individual during a given period:
Nowadays, this kind of cartographic representation has been inte-
grated into powerful geographical data systems used for geovisual 
analytics research:
18 Torsten Hägerstrand, “What about People in Regional Science?,” in Papers of the 
Regional Science Association 24:1, 1970, 6-21.
Time-Geographic Simulation Model of Individual Activity Programs
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As Mark Monmonier points out, this kind of object is fundamentally 
“mapping, rather than maps, because cartography is not limited to 
static maps printed on paper or displayed on computer screens. In 
the new cartographies of surveillance, the maps one looks at are less 
important than the spatial data systems that store and integrate facts 
about where we live and work.”19
The tools of chronogeography, conceived in the 1960s, had been 
mostly conceived as tools of urban and social planners, usually 
associated with reformist political agendas. Nowadays, much less 
benevolent functions are being increasingly assigned to them. The 
fundamental postulate of time-geography, according to which indi-
vidual biographies can be tracked as “life paths in time-space” is in 
the process of becoming the epistemological basis of other sorts of 
practices of power. 
10/// In 2010, the highest authorities in the U.S. Intelligence commu-
nity laid down the principles of a new paradigm. It was the “Activity 
Based Intelligence” (ABI) doctrine, elaborated under the auspices of 
the NSA’s less famous sibling bureaucracy the National Geospatial 
Intelligence Agency (NGA). Theoreticians of intelligence describe this 
shift as the conversion to a new philosophy, a new method of knowl-
edge. 
Derek Gregory describes it insightfully as “a sort of militarized rhyth-
manalysis, even a weaponized time-geography” based on the use 
of programs “that fuse and visualize geospatial, temporal and in-
telligence data from multiple sources (‘combining the where, the 
when and the who’) as a three-dimensional array that replicates the 
19 Mark Monmonier, Spying with Maps: Surveillance Technologies and the Future of Pri-
vacy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004, 1.
Visualizing space-time paths and individual activities with ArcGIS 
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standard time-geography diagrams developed by Swedish geog-
rapher Torsten Hägerstrand in the 1960s and 1970s.”20 As Gregory 
concludes, it consists in “tracking multiple individuals through differ-
ent social networks to establish a ‘pattern of life’ consistent with the 
paradigm of activity-based intelligence that forms the core of con-
temporary counterinsurgency.”21
This methodology is based on, among other things, the use of data 
mining applied to trajectories of movements in order to discover, 
within gigantic assortments of paths, periodic patterns or signatures 
corresponding to characteristic segments of habits. Beyond track-
ing singular itineraries, the goal here is to progressively extract typi-
cal schemas of activity. Regular routes progressively thicken on the 
screen, like paths frequently taken by a flock dig their furrows in the 
grass of a field. 
The following figure is a map produced by an Activity Based Intel-
ligence module conceived by Lockheed Martin engineers and tested 
on cab trips in an American city:
What works with taxi trips can, of course, be applied on other objects, 
as, for example, pedestrian routes in an Iraqi village monitored by the 
camera of a drone :
20 Derek Gregory, “From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War,” Theory, Culture 
and Society 28:6, 2011, 188-215.
21 Derek Gregory, “Lines of descent,” on opendemocracy.net (November 8, 2011).
Neighborhood near Al Mahmudiyah, Iraq, where most transport is on foot.
Simulated walking path were exploited to discover networks
Network links and detected nodes and in a cab track dataset
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11/// Originally, chronogeography was born out of a refusal of the 
predominance of statistical methods in social sciences. If we de-
scribe social reality mainly through aggregates of large numbers, 
such as those given by a census, “we regard the population as made 
up of ‘dividuals’ instead of individuals,” regretted Hägerstrand.22 Sta-
tistic aggregates, such as the GDP or salary groups, do not provide 
us with access to a primary knowledge about individuals, but only, 
through an indirect way, to statistic beings that we reconstructed as 
fractions of a global number. Chronogeography, on the contrary, was 
claiming to represent individuals in how they exist in a continuous 
manner, as physical points affected by spatiotemporal trajectories. 
The conviction was that between the work of the biographer and the 
one of the statistician, “there is a twilight zone to be explored, an 
area where the fundamental notion is that people retain their identity 
over time [...] and where aggregate behavior cannot escape these 
facts.”23 In other words, as Nigel Thrift puts it, chronogeography starts 
from the methodological premise of the “indivisibility of the human 
being.24” What was then proposed to social science was to rebuild 
aggregates of data starting from the undividable granularity of the 
individuals, whose “lived corporeality” could then be schematically 
represented through traceable and measurable paths in space-time. 
It is striking that, in order to express this idea, Hägerstrand used 
the very same vocabulary that Gilles Deleuze would mobilize twenty 
years later to define what he called “societies of control”: “We no lon-
ger find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals 
have become ‘dividuals,’ and masses, samples, data, markets, or 
‘banks’.”25 On the one hand, there were disciplinary societies struc-
tured around a relationship between the individual and the mass; 
on the other hand, societies of control articulated through the dyad 
of “dividuals” and databanks. On the one hand, institutions of con-
finement; on the other hand, processes of control operating in open 
milieus. On the one hand, signatures and administrative numeration 
taken as the landmarks of individuality; on the other hand, codes and 
passwords as conditions of access.
Hägerstrand and Deleuze borrowed this conceptual distinction be-
tween individuality and dividuality from some reflections on form that 
the painter Paul Klee developed during the interwar years. According 
to his view, this pair of notions could be schematized as follows :
22 Hägerstrand, “What about People in Regional Science?,” 9.
23 Ibid, 9.
24 Nigel Thrift, “An Introduction to Time Geography,” in Institute of British Geographers, 
London, 1977, 6.
25 Gilles Deleuze, « Postscript on the Societies of Control, » in October 59 (Winter 1992), 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 3-7.
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The individual is illustrated by a linear figure, a shape of a body in 
motion (figure 2). It is defined negatively as something from which 
nothing can be cut off without destroying the whole, without render-
ing it unrecognizable. In that sense, the individual is first something 
indivisible: to divide it would be to mutilate it, to destroy its constitu-
tive organic unity. The dividual, on the contrary, is defined by its divis-
ibility. Divide or carve up the lines in figure 1, cut off one or some of 
them, and the pattern will still not disappear. It will remain despite its 
partition. This is, in brief, the difference between the pattern of a tap-
estry, whose rhythms are repetitive, and the drawing of the organic 
form of a body.
Beginning in the 1970’s, Hägerstrand made it a prescription of meth-
od that we shift from (1) to (2) — namely to replace, as the basic ele-
ment of knowledge, statistical dividuality by chronospatial individual-
ity. In turn, what Deleuze says at the end of the 1990’s — but this 
time as an historical and political diagnosis — is that we are shifting 
from (2) to (1), i.e., that ancient machineries of power centered on 
individuality were in part being replaced by new ones, whose object 
would be the “dividual.”
For now, our question is the following: what happens to Deleuze’s 
prognostic when the basic postulate of chronogeography — mainly, 
the lashing of an aggregation of data to individually indexed chrono-
spatial paths — becomes so prevalent as to serve as the effective 
operational basis for an entire series of practices of power?  
What we then obtain is, at first glance, something different from the 
dividual; on the contrary, we find chrono-geographical individualities 
considered both as objects of knowledge and of intervention. As Der-
ek Gregory has shown, the contemporary uses of various electronic 
means of identifying, tracking, and locating targets amounts in fact to 
an operation of “technical production of ‘individuals’ as artifacts and 
Dividual (1) and individual (2) according to Klee
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Klee’s grid dance
algorithms.”26 If this surely entails a certain mode of individuation, the 
question would then be to characterize it conceptually. Yet, one of 
the difficulties to do so is that it hardly fits the category of disciplinary 
individualization recalled by Deleuze in his ‘Postscript.’
The technologies in question certainly focus on the search for “sig-
natures” — that is, according to the philosopher, one of the favor-
ite signs in the political semiotics of the discipline — but they also 
spread out today in open milieus like the apparatuses of control. 
They focus on individualities conceived as indivisible chronospatial 
units, but, to constitute them, they also mobilize dividual material, 
aggregated in databases and treated in an algorithmic fashion. This 
double set of traits makes them a poor fit in Deleuze’s framework. 
They correspond neither to the individualization of discipline, nor to 
the “dividualization” of control. In order to grasp what we are dealing 
with here, I think that we could refer to a third figure, also to be found 
in Klee’s work:
Dividual and individual are not necessarily in opposition, they can 
also be combined. This third figure illustrates a case of “dividual-in-
dividual synthesis.”27 Such a synthesis happens when “certain activi-
ties produce very definite structural forms which can observably be-
come individuals,” that is to say, when “the structural characters are 
rhythmically joined into an individual whole.”28 The undulated dividual 
thread, in which has been cut in the linear individual figure that also 
delineates its external contour, then appears as a “dancing grid.”
The corresponding object of power here is neither the individual tak-
en as an element in a mass, nor the dividual appearing with a code 
26 Derek Gregory, “Broundless Informant and the Everyware War,” on geographi-
calimagination.com (October 31, 2013).




in a databank, but something else: a patterned individuality that is 
woven out of statistical dividualities and cut out onto a thread of re-
ticular activities, against which it progressively silhouettes in time as 
a distinctive perceptible unit in the eyes of the machine. The produc-
tion of this form of individuality belongs neither to discipline nor to 
control, but to something else: to targeting in its most contemporary 
procedures, whose formal features are shared today among fields as 
diverse as policing, military reconnaissance and marketing. It might 
well be, for that matter, that we are entering targeted societies.
12/// For the military promoters of these methodologies, the initial 
hope was, according to an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnais-
sance (ISR) methodology inherited from the Cold War, to be able to 
model behavioral “signatures” associated with “terrorist” patterns of 
life. But this ambition faces at least one fundamental epistemological 
problem. In a context marked by “a scarcity of meaningful data and 
a low signal to noise ratio, i.e., [where] the ‘bad’ element look[s] and 
act[s] much the same way as the ‘good’ elements,” one cannot ob-
tain non-ambiguous patterns of life allowing a positive identification.29 
Intelligence specialists are aware of this difficulty. Today, they portray 
the Activity Based Intelligence paradigm as an attempt to overcome 
this obstacle. This methodology, they insist, is “focused on under-
standing entities that don’t have signatures in any single sensor 
phenomenology.”30
In the “discourses on method” that they write, the problem takes 
on almost metaphysical formulations. The mystery is the following: 
how to discover “unknown unknowns?31” An unknown known is an 
individual whose singular identity is unknown, but whose perceptible 
attributes correspond to a known type. An unknown unknown is one 
that slips out of both a singular identification and a generic one: it is 
not known who he is (ignorance of his name or his face), nor what he 
is (his activity profile does not correspond to the inventoried ones). 
The solution envisioned then is, in a certain way, already contained in 
the terms of the question: in order to spot unknown forms, one has 
logically to already possess an inventory of known forms. The idea is 
thus to identify the typical in order to spot the atypical. One has to de-
velop “patterns of life to identify which activities are normal and which 
are abnormal.”32 Within such a model, by “accumulat[ing] tracks over 
29 On this theme, see Jeff Jonas and Jim Harper, “Effective Counterterrorism and the 
Limited Role of Predictive Data Mining, Policy Analysis,” at Cato Institute (December 11, 
2006), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa584.pdf.
30 Mark Phillips, “A Brief Overview of ABI and Human Domain Analytics,” Trajectory Maga-
zine, 2012, http://trajectorymagazine.com/civil/item/1369-human-domain-analytics.html.
31 Ibid.
32 “From Data to Decisions III,” IBM Center for the Business of Government (November 
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time,” one can, for example, “model the movement patterns of pe-
destrians and detect anomalies from learned behavioral trends.”33 
For example, once the “normal” itineraries of someone carrying a 
meal tray in a canteen have been identified, one can by contrast see 
the emergence of a certain amount of aberrant trajectories.
Beyond those kinds of test studies conducted in closed space, the 
goal is to deploy these methodologies of behavioral sorting within 
“large-scale anomaly detection” programs. The rationality that orders 
such a detection work relies on a normative divide, a certain concep-
tion of what is normality. But, from a philosophical standpoint, one 
has to note that the notion of normal patterns or forms of life is not 
based here — unlike for instance in the discourse of transcendent 
morals — on any particular “must be” or normative imperative. These 
are, in a sense, normativities without norm. Their notion of the normal 
is, in fact, strictly empirical: it is learned by the machine on the basis 
of an analysis of frequencies and repetitions in given sets of activi-
ties. It is then a discrepancy with such patterns of regularities — an 
anomaly, rather than an abnormality — that will trigger the red-orange 
alert on the analyst’s screen.
But one of the classical issues with such a conception of normality 
is that, as Georges Canguilhem explained, “we would necessarily 
have to treat as abnormal (that is to say, we believe, pathological) ev-
ery anomal individual, every carrier of anomalies — every individual 
2013), 32.
33 Kevin Streib, Matt Nedrich, Karthik Sankaranarayanan, and James W. Davis, “Interac-
tive Visualization and Behavior Analysis for Video Surveillance,” conference paper for 
SIAM Data Mining International Conference on Datamining, Columbus, Ohio, 2010.
Modeling normal paths and detecting abnormal behaviors in a canteen
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aberrant in relation to a specific, statistically defined type.”34 While a 
singular discrepancy can be interpreted in various ways, for instance 
“as a failure or as an attempt, as a fault or as an adventure,”35 a 
paranoid apparatus immediately tends to flag it as potential threat: 
“ALERT.”
In a rather ironic way, it is within the very societies whose dominant 
ideology held sacred the individual freedom to follow one’s own way 
of life that the singularity of such a route soon ends up being auto-
matically signaled as suspicious. It should be noted, however, that 
this is not due, in this case, to the predominance of a logic of stan-
dardization or uniformization. By using these chronospatial patterns 
to filter behaviors, these devices have no particular model trajectory 
they seek to impose on the various lives they monitor. Their normativ-
ity without norm is animated by another goal, another kind of devour-
ing appetite: to spot discrepancies in order to “acquire targets,” and 
this in a mode of thought where, targets being unknown, it is the 
unknown that becomes targeted. Another way to put it is that, in such 
regimes of knowledge and power, a potential target appears funda-
mentally as a drift [une dérive]. 
/// Published on December 4, 2014
34 Georges Canguilhem, Knowledge of Life, Stefanos Geroulanos and Daniela Ginsburg 
(trans), New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, 127.
35 Ibid., 125.
Anomaly detection through behavior signatures
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In the past year, newspapers in the United Kingdom have reported 
new exigencies emerging from commercial and public responses to 
the global decline in honeybees. To offset the devastating effects of 
colony collapse disorder (CCD), many British residents have turned 
to beekeeping as a national, global, and environmental responsibility. 
Despite good intentions, the “boom in bee keeping,” writes the Daily 
Mail, “may be doing our countryside more harm than good.” A “surge 
in the number of bumblebee hives means thousands of colonies are 
being imported” from elsewhere in Europe, and “many of these are 
riddled with parasites that pose a threat to native species.”1 A study of 
48 colonies brought to the UK from European suppliers has revealed 
high rates of contamination: 77% were infected by parasites harmful 
to indigenous bee species in the region. Given recent warnings of the 
long-term effects of CCD, particularly on agriculture and global food 
production, the government has been listening attentively. Effective 
January 1, 2015, non-native bee species will only be used “as an 
emergency measure if native beces cannot be found.”2 In the coming 
year, “foreign worker bees will be banned from getting jobs pollinat-
ing crops when there are millions of redundant British workers.”3 This 
law is the most recent addition to a series of UK security regulations 
— including specified “Border Inspection Points” and required health 
certificates — aimed at restricting the entry of foreign bees.4
It is tempting to read “foreign worker bees” and their “threat to native 
species” as allegories for global racial politics, clearly manifested in 
1 Fiona Macrae, “The Foreign Bees Posing a Deadly Threat to our Hives,” on dailymail.
co.uk (July 18, 2013).
2 “Foreign Worker Bees set to Face Ban in the UK,” Western Daily Press (November 27, 
2014).
3 Ibid.























historical and contemporary forms of settler colonialism and most 
vividly in the geopolitics of migration. Fears of foreigners as diseased 
bodies and concerns over white labor have a long and well-docu-
mented history. Since the later decades of the nineteenth century, 
both have justified the exclusion of Asian migrants to Canada, the 
US, and Australia.5 More recently, the militarization of land and sea, 
intensifying regimes of state violence directed at detainees and de-
portees, and the detention and death of migrants in the border zones 
of Canada, the US, Australia, the UK, and elsewhere make it difficult 
to resist anthropomorphizing “foreign bees.” Like for humans, the 
foreignness ascribed to bees, we might say, is always racial: the in-
clusion of some and the expulsion, exclusion, and death of others. 
As compelling as such readings are in highlighting racial and cross-
species border control, this essay seeks to offer a different reading. 
Concerns over foreign bees in the UK reflect the urgent global ne-
cessity of the bee as worker.6 Bees have acquired a reputation as 
“model ‘modern’ industrial workers.”7 They are industrious, coop-
erative, attentive to the hive’s division of labor, and acquiescent of 
their place within it. However, as pollinators, wartime companions, 
and architects, bees no longer serve as models of human behavior 
alone. They now perform a variety of jobs vital to national and global 
economies, as evidenced in food production, national security, and 
technology. Indeed, the “busy bee,” despite its decline, has become 
integral to the future of human life as we know it. 
The bee worker — as individual and aggregate - has received con-
siderable attention in literature and philosophy. The bee’s productiv-
ity, the cooperative and collective properties of bee labor, and the 
reticular organization of the hive have long been a source of inspira-
tion and admiration. “For so work the honey-bees, creatures that by 
a rule in nature teach the act of order to a peopled kingdom,” wrote 
Shakespeare.8 The bee has been idealized as an aspiration for hu-
man labor, sociality, and politics. Yet, it is only with the projected crisis 
of colony collapse disorder — its threats to bees and bee products, 
to commercial profits and human diets — that we have come to no-
tice bees as workers. Only recently has the bee’s significance to hu-
man life and death become palpable. 
5 For a discussion of these dynamics along Canada’s west coast, see Renisa Mawani, 
Colonial Proximities: Crossracial Encounters and Juridical Truths in British Columbia, 
1871-1921, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009.
6 There is a complex division of labor among honeybees that I cannot address here. For 
now, I use the term workers in a generic sense.
7 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, “Empowering Nature, or: Some Gleanings in Bee Culture,” 
in Sylvia Yanagisako and Carol Delaney (eds), Naturalizing Power: Essays in Feminist 
Cultural Analysis, New York: Routledge, 1995, 123.
8 William Shakespeare, Henry V, London: Penguin Books, 2010, Act I, Scene II, Line 16.
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In this essay, I begin with the bee as worker to ask two related ques-
tions: First, what does it mean to think and write from the body of the 
bee? Second, what does the bee’s body — as a laboring body — tell 
us about the mutability and adaptability of capitalism’s destructive 
forces? The interdependence of bee and human life and death, I con-
tend, may have much to say on the expanding horizons of contem-
porary capitalism. However, these entanglements demand a different 
set of analytic tools.9 One strategy, as I suggest below, includes a 
(re)turn to Marx and Engels, a (re)reading that turns from historical 
materialism to the materiality and interrelationality of human-nature 
exchange. 
Bee Power ///
One need only read the New York Times, Nature, or other popular 
periodicals to note that bees have become highly newsworthy. Not-
withstanding their projected vulnerability (or perhaps, because of 
it), bees regularly appear at the forefront of human advancement, 
particularly in the fields of technology and security.10 Recent head-
lines in Popular Science refer to “European bee sperm bank[s],” 
“bee-inspired algorithms,” bees as “bio-detectives,” and bees that 
can “solve hard computer problems faster than supercomputers.”11 
Bees, we might say, are the (endangered) future. 
Since 2006, scientists, entomologists and beekeepers have reported 
a mysterious decline in bee populations. The causes remain dis-
puted. Whereas some have attributed bee deaths to changing envi-
ronmental conditions, pathogens and parasites, others have argued 
that declining bee populations can be traced directly to neonicoti-
noids, a chemical insecticide used to kill crop-damaging pests in 
Europe, Canada, the US, and elsewhere. The irony is difficult to miss. 
Chemical agents used to protect crops from insects have the unin-
tended consequence of killing bees that pollinate. Efforts to preserve 
the vitality of certain crops will lead to their eventual demise. The use 
of neonicotinoids, it is predicted, will result in the disappearance of 
crops that depend largely or entirely on bee pollination (almonds, 
apples, blueberries, cranberries). Colony collapse disorder will affect 
the availability of certain foods, which in turn will alter western diets. 
Farmers and governments are especially concerned with the high 
financial costs at stake. Of the “100 crop species which provide 90% 
9 For a fuller discussion on this point, see Renisa Mawani, “Insects, War, Plastic Life,” 
in Brenna Bhandar and Jonathan Goldberg Hiller (eds), Plastic Materialities: Politics, Le-
gality, and Metamorphosis in the Work of Catherine Malabou, Durham: Duke University 
Press, forthcoming.
10 On art and aesthetics see Mary Kosut and Lisa Jean Moore, “Bees Making Art: Insect 
Aesthetics and the Ecological Moment,” Humanimalia 5:2, 2014, 1-2.
11 Popular Science, http://www.popsci.com/tags/honeybees.
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of food worldwide, 71 of these are bee pollinated.”12 In the US alone, 
the value of bee-pollinated crops is estimated to be $15 billion dollars 
per year.13
Although the link between insecticides and bee deaths remains dis-
puted, escalating concerns of global ecological crises have gener-
ated swift juridical responses. New laws have been passed. Whereas 
the UK has prohibited the entry of foreign bees, local governments in 
Canada have passed by-laws to regulate non-commercial beekeep-
ing. Others, including the US, are deliberating whether to prohibit the 
use of chemical insecticides. In 2013, the European Union agreed to 
ban three neonicotinoids for a two-year period. But the life of bees 
is not only what motivates legal action. In Canada, two of Ontario’s 
largest honey producers have filed a class action lawsuit against 
Bayer and Sygenta, companies that manufacture neonicotinoids. 
The lawsuit is concerned with saving bees only insofar as their lon-
gevity protects commercial profits. “Beekeepers have suffered, and 
will continue to suffer devastating economic hardships as a result 
of the continued used of Neonicotinoids,” reads their statement of 
claim.14 Canadian beekeepers are seeking damages of more than 
$400 million dollars.
From the 1960s onwards, employment repertoires for bee workers 
have expanded. Bees, alongside other insects have drawn consider-
able interest and attention from scientists, the United Nations, and 
from American and Israeli military personnel. They have become 
workers, models, and prototypes to advance technologies of war. 
This is not entirely new. Insects, writes Jake Kosek, “have long been 
recruited and bred for military purposes.” Today, the honeybee is 
newly “enlisted in novel modes of material production in war.”15 Easily 
trainable. Sniffing explosives. Protecting soldiers. Defending western 
life. Bees have become central to military futures. The US Military has 
harnessed the long-admired properties of bees — their adaptability, 
industriousness, and cooperation — to assist in the detection of land 
mines and to advance other military projects. Expanding from mili-
tary agendas, bee workers are now infiltrating civilian spaces. A UK 
biotechnology firm is using bees to locate explosives. In German air-
ports, bees are mobilized to test air quality.16 Bees may not yet inhabit 
the frontlines of war, but that future might be nearer than we think. 
12 United Nations Environmental Program, “Global Honey Bee Colony Disorders and 
other Threats to Insect Pollinators,” 2010.
13 Ibid.
14 Sun Parlor Honey Ltd., 1187607 Ontario Ltd. (Munro Honey), Bayer Cropscience Inc., 
Bayer Inc., and Sygenta Canada International. Ontario Superior Court, Court File CV-14-
21208.
15 Jake Kosek, “Ecologies of Empire: On the New Uses of the Honeybee,” Cultural An-
thropology 25:4, 2010, 655.
16 Abby Seif, “Bugging Out on Homeland Security,” Popular Science (March 7, 2007).
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The juxtaposition between colony collapse disorder and the milita-
rization of bees suggests that bee workers are valued as living and 
dying. While their longevity is central to pollination and to the future 
of crop-production, their expendability is what makes them so vital to 
military operations.17 The bee body is one that is clearly valued. Yet, 
it is not an agent comparable to other nonhuman animals. Through 
exploitation and appropriation, the bee has been mobilized to maxi-
mize the potential of human life. Notwithstanding our concerns over 
the death of bees, the bee body remains exploitable, killable, and 
disposable in ways unimaginable for most other life forms. 
To date, US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have relied 
primarily on canines for detection of landmines and explosives, and 
for surveillance. According to recent reports, dogs in the field suffer 
from high rates of posttraumatic stress disorder:
Like humans with the analogous disorder, different dogs show differ-
ent symptoms [of PTSD]. Some become hyper-vigilant. Others avoid 
buildings or work areas that they had previously been comfortable 
in. Some undergo sharp changes in temperament, becoming unusu-
ally aggressive with their handlers, or clingy and timid. Most crucially, 
many stop doing the tasks they were trained to perform.18 
Although the prevalence of PTSD among canines is still being de-
bated, these reports have renewed discussions on the ethics of us-
ing dogs in war. Bees may offer a viable alternative. Their heightened 
sense of smell is easy to train. They are air-bound and will not set off 
explosives. Perhaps most importantly, we cannot relate to bees as we 
can to dogs. The death of bees does not incite the same ethical crisis 
over loss of life. 
Bees have always been pollinators. Insects have been mobilized in 
tactics of war since antiquity.19 What has changed in the contemporary 
global moment is that the future of human life has become increas-
ingly entangled with the maximization of bees as workers. Though 
their future as pollinators remains in question, their life and death is 
indispensable to human vitality and longevity. The death of bees via 
colony collapse disorder will not result in the death of humans. How-
ever, it will affect global food production. Agribusiness revenues and 
western diets are at stake. How are we to make sense of this all? 
Are colony collapse disorder and the death of bees symptomatic of 
17 It is hard to know how many bees die in military training. According to one source, 
bees that are confined for testing experience high rates of mortality after 48 hours. Ste-
phen Ornes, “Using Bees to Detect Bombs,” MIT Technology Review (December 7, 
2006).
18 James Dao, “After Duty, Dogs Suffer like Soldiers,” in The New York Times (December 
1, 2011).
19 Jeffrey A. Lockwood, Six Legged Soldiers: Using Insects as Weapons of War, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010.
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a crisis in capitalism, one that Marx and Engels predicted in the nine-
teenth century?20 Or is the appropriation and instrumentalization of 
bees for agribusiness and military purposes evidence of capitalism’s 
expanding horizons? What might the life and death of bees tell us of 
the changing configurations of global capitalism? To address these 
questions, I turn to the materialism of Marx and Engels.  
Metabolic Interaction ///
The fluctuating and oppositional entanglements between human and 
nonhuman life and death, signaled by the bee’s competing roles as 
pollinator and military agent, demand new analytic tools and inno-
vations. These include modes of reading philosophies, imagining 
ontologies, and practicing politics, all part of a larger project that I 
can only begin to gesture to here. Marx and Engels are central to 
my approach. Both have figured prominently, though inconsistently, in 
recent discussions on climate change and ecological crisis. As nine-
teenth century critics, their relevance to contemporary discussions 
has been contested.21 What I propose below is a materialist (re)turn 
to their writings, one that revolts against conventional readings.22 A 
materialist (re)reading of Marx and Engels foregrounds the interrela-
tionality of human and nature in their work. More importantly, it invites 
reflections on the entanglements between bee and human life and 
death in the global expansion of capitalism. 
Marx and Engels have long been regarded as the progenitors of his-
torical materialism. However, Marx’s materialist understandings of his-
tory, we should recall, was deeply shaped through his early engage-
ments with Epicurus. While some readers have glossed this critical 
influence, others have insisted that Marx’s historical materialism must 
engage with the other materialisms that run through his work.23 The 
relation between history and nature, and the influences of Epicurean 
philosophy, can be traced in many of his sole authored and collabora-
tive writings: “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the 
existence of living human individuals,” he wrote with Engels. “Thus 
the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these 
individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature.”24 
20 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, New York: Penguin, 2002.
21 John Bellamy Foster offers a materialist reading of Marx in Marx’s Ecology: Material-
ism and Nature, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000. See also Brett Clark and John 
Bellamy Foster, “Marx’s Ecology in the 21st Century,” World Review of Political Economy 
1:1 (March 2010), 142-156.
22 In the Preface to The German Ideology, and in response to the Young Hegelians, Marx 
and Engels write: “Let us revolt against this rule of concepts”: Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels, The German Ideology, New York: Prometheus Books, 1998. The historical mate-
rialism of Marx has often been positioned against other materialisms. See Jane Bennett, 
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Durham: Duke University Press, 2010, xvi.
23 Clark and Foster, “Marx’s Ecology in the 21st Century,” 144.
24 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 283.
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It is helpful for my discussion that Marx commented famously, albeit 
briefly, on the bee as worker. In Capital: Volume I, he describes labor 
as “a process between man and nature, a process by which man, 
through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the me-
tabolism between himself and nature. He confronts the materials of 
nature as a force of nature.”25 A few lines later, he writes: 
We presuppose labor in a form in which it is an exclusively human 
characteristic. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of 
the weaver, and a bee would put many a human architect to shame 
by the construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes 
the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds 
the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax.26 
Insect enthusiasts have read this passage in conflicting ways.27 Jake 
Kosek reads Marx as “drawing the line between the human and non-
human on the back of the bee,” which for him, signals the limits of 
historical materialism. In Timothy Mitchell’s account, Marx’s com-
ments point to a more-than-human agency. “For Marx, individual 
capitalists are to be understood not as agents in their own right, 
but as those who personify the power of capital.”28 My own interest 
centers on whether we might (re)read Marx and Engels materially, in 
ways that account for the entangled relations between human and 
bee workers. Is there a more-than-humanness that might be adum-
brated in Marx’s claim: “We presuppose labor in a form in which it is 
an exclusively human characteristic”29? 
To be sure, Marx and Engels could not have foreshadowed the tech-
nological and scientific developments that have rendered distinc-
tions between human and nonhuman life and death to be as insepa-
rable as they are today. But there are suggestive insights in Marx that 
undermine the history-nature divide that has been thought to be so 
central to his work. Let me offer two brief examples. Marx character-
ized labor as a material activity through which humans transformed 
themselves and the natural world: “Labor is, first of all, a process 
between man and nature, a process by which man, through his own 
actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between 
himself and nature.”30 Thus, for Marx, the relationship between hu-
mans and nature existed in an exchange of forces.
25 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume I: A Critique of Political Economy, New York: Penguin, 1976, 
283.
26 Ibid., 283-284.
27 Jake Kosek, “Ecologies of Empire: On the New Uses of the Honeybee,” 669; Timothy 
Mitchell, Rule of Experts, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, 45; Hugh Raffles, 
Insectopedia, New York: Vintage Books, 2011, 409.
28 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, 
30. 
29 Marx, Capital: Volume I: A Critique of Political Economy, 283.
30 Ibid., 283.
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Marx expanded his view on the circulating forces between humans 
and nature in the idea of “metabolic interaction,” a process that was 
not only evident in human labor but also in the natural world. The 
global expansion of capitalism in the nineteenth century generated 
social and ecological conditions that disrupted this exchange. The 
demands of capitalism, Marx argued, produced a higher concen-
tration of workers in cities. This affected historical configurations of 
power and also carried serious ecological effects. The growth of ur-
ban industrial centers, he wrote, “disturbs the metabolic interaction 
between man and the earth, i.e., it prevents the return to the soil of 
its constituent elements consumed by man in the form of food and 
clothing; hence it hinders the operation of the eternal natural condi-
tion for the lasting fertility of the soil.”31
Capitalism’s insatiable appetite disrupted the metabolic interaction 
between humans and nature, increasing strains on both.32
It is in this disjuncture between nature and capitalism that we might 
situate colony collapse disorder. Capitalism’s demands on what we 
have come to call nature have become so acute that they have re-
quired a series of interventions ranging from fertilizers to pesticides. 
Neonicotinoid insecticides, thought to be responsible for CCD, can 
be coated on seeds, poured into the soil, or sprayed on crops. Irre-
spective of application, they return us to the soil. Efforts to enhance 
and/or protect the soil, all in the interests of crop improvement and 
maximization, combined with the ongoing effects of environmental 
damage have produced a series of unintended consequences, in-
cluding the decline of the honeybee. Efforts to counter these destruc-
tive effects — through the importation of foreign bees, for example 
— have only generated additional problems, most notably parasites.
The use of military bees in the detection of landmines also returns us 
to soil. Buried underground, the toxicity of landmines is responsible 
for soil depletion, rendering some regions of the world to be inhos-
pitable to human and non-human life. Though Marx’s observations 
on soil centered on nineteenth century England, what history tells us 
is that colonial capitalism and imperial interventions have produced 
environmental hazards that are not equally distributed. According 
to UNICEF, the short-term and long-term effects of landmines are 
most evident in Africa, where “an estimated 37 million mines” are 
“embedded in the soil of at least 19 countries.33 As the global north 
expresses heightened concerns of colony collapse disorder, foreign 
bees, and western diets, capitalism and war have destroyed the 
31 Ibid., 637.
32 John Bellamy Foster has termed this “metabolic rift.” See Foster, Marx’s Ecology. See 
also Clark and Foster, “Marx’s Ecology in the 21st Century,” 145.
33 UNICEF, “Land-mines: A Deadly Inheritance,” on unicef.org.
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metabolic interaction of human-nature, making parts of the Global 
South uninhabitable for human-nonhuman life forms. 
But what of the bee? The bee as worker — in agricultural and military 
futures — may illuminate the contradictions of capitalism that Marx 
and Engels anticipated in the nineteenth century. At the same time, 
its expanded role in life and death might also signal the proliferation 
and expansion of capitalism’s own metabolic power.
A Crisis of Capitalism? ///
What is at stake in thinking of labor as an interaction between bee 
and human? What might we achieve analytically and politically in 
thinking of the more-than-human not as a passive site of labor but 
as an active participant? The laboring bee is a lively source of la-
bor that is critical to human longevity, as evidenced in agricultural, 
military, and technological futures. The life and death of bees — as 
pollinators, military agents, and biological-mechanical prototypes 
— has become increasingly entangled with human life. To be sure, 
these interrelations demand attention in their own right as a mode 
of rethinking relations between human-nature-politics. But bees, like 
soil, might also be a barometer for the metamorphosis of capitalism, 
its proliferating forces, and its devastating effects on human-nature 
ecologies and exchanges. Threats of colony collapse disorder — 
and more recently of foreign bee workers and their effects on indig-
enous bees — point to a series of cross-species interdependencies 
that are highly asymmetrical. Humans, Marx reminds us, do not exist 
outside or beyond the vitality of nature but in a changing “metabolic 
interaction” that is itself an effect of captialism’s expanding edges.34
/// Published on December 23, 2014
34 Marx, Capital: Volume I: A Critique of Political Economy, 637. 
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41/
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 
BY NICK AXEL
Fear Not the Violent Threat of Power ///
The philosophical discourse of biopolitics has led to a rediscovery 
of political agency inherent to the practice of architecture and the 
production of built form within an urban context. Its assimilation within 
contemporary architectural thought has largely been through its em-
ployment as a critical approach to ideology, colonization or war, rang-
ing from Michel Foucault’s disciplinary institutions to Eyal Weizman’s 
states of control. Most famously polemicized in the first lines of Walter 
Benjamin’s 1921 seminal essay “Critique of Violence,” an ethics of 
life is posited as the dialectical opposite from the violence of power.1
Finding this relation between ethics and violence highly troubled, 
mediated as it is through the actions of power, Benjamin went on 
to infamously propose the concept of divine violence and ultimately 
the awkward confrontation between rationality and religiosity. While 
this type of theological recourse for dialectical overcoming is highly 
problematic in addressing the contemporary global championing of 
capital and its neoliberal subjectivity, particularly in our purportedly 
atheistic age, what I believe to be of supreme value is his metaphysi-
cal dissection of violence that ultimately locates its origin not in the 
political bodies of his (or our) time, but in the institution (as a verb) of 
power itself. It is therefore plausible to see how the dialectic of (eth-
ics | violence) has been transformed over the past century into the 
dialectic of (ethics | institution) or even (ethics | power). Despite the 
fact that what I am taking as my topic for the purpose of this essay 
may not even be a legitimate argument in Latin languages where 
the word power in English can be translated as two separate words 
and concepts, it is my intention to put forth an alternative conception 
of power; one that is not trapped within a negative subordination to 
violence, but which may in fact actually be capable of its subversion.2
1 “For a cause, however effective, becomes violent, in the precise sense of the word, 
only when it bears on moral issues.” Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, Peter Demetz (ed), Berlin: Schocken, 1986, 277.
2 For more about the two Latin translations of power see Léopold Lambert, “Power (Po-
tentia) vs. Power (Potestas): The Story of a Joyful Typhoon,” in The Funambulist Pam-




























Subversion is a concept that, despite its common usage within this 
discursive context, I believe is in need of a basic rearticulation. In 
medical terms, if the patient is sick, subversion seeks to address not 
the symptoms but its cause. If violence is that which we wish to rid 
our world of, we often look towards the body that inflicts it and seek 
to subvert that specific body, in its very life or its weapons. We do so 
under the belief that the body itself, in its agency, is the cause of the 
violence; not an arrest, but the legal body which engenders the event 
is thought of as the object to be subverted, in which the act either 
seeks to disable the right of the legal body to arrest or to destroy 
the legal body itself. This identification between agency and embodi-
ment is highly problematic and ultimately jeopardizes emancipatory 
politics with its own ‘good intentions.’
First of all, bodies are, as modern science has rightly taught us, sur-
prisingly resilient and plastic, which leads us to the conclusion that 
if a legal weapon is abolished, such as the right to arrest, another 
functional instrument of oppressive violence would emerge to take 
its place, in a possibly more diffuse and intense form.3 Secondly, this 
first problematic could easily lead us to locate the problem of power 
(and the threat of violence) in the body itself, for which, taken to a 
logical extreme (from legal embodiments of power to the literal body 
of the Other), would result in the nihilistic will to subvert and destroy 
all life. Subversion is therefore an extremely slippery concept, one 
that has perhaps done more to hurt us than to help us, whose ‘truth’ 
occupies an incredibly narrow territory in between two fallacious in-
terpretations that I believe are a graver threat to the future of subver-
sive ambitions than the forces we are trying to rid ourselves of.
While it would not be difficult to cite historical and contemporary ex-
amples of certain legal or religious bodies that condone violence, 
rather than questioning the legitimacy of the violent event itself (the 
arrest), it may be more fruitful to question why those legal or religious 
bodies are instituted in the first place (order). I furthermore believe it 
would be quite naive to think that these institutions did not historically 
emerge for specific reasons that responded to real social, economic 
and political problematics of their time, and through their evolution, to 
this day continue to operate in social, economic and political modes 
that function positively and, as constituents of our lived reality, should 
not and cannot be ignored. 
Conjecturally, if we were able to archaeologically identify the insti-
tution’s legitimate reasons for being and then supplant these func-
tions, would this not effectively make those embodiments of power 
obsolete? This is not to say, to take the stock market for example, 
if we were able to find a better way to make exorbitant amounts of 
3 Jeffrey T. Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and its Intensifications Since 1984, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
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money for a select few, there would be no need for the stock market, 
but rather: if we could create an economic infrastructure (the stock 
market) that gives a greater existential reason for the existence of 
society (money, pleasure, value) while at the same time sustaining its 
continued existence (the circulation of capital), why would we need 
the stock market? If the market-as-it-is is viewed as the problem, per-
haps the market-as-concept is the most powerful weapon we can 
use against it; fire, if it really is the problem, can, in fact, be fought 
with fire, particularly if what we add consumes oxygen and combus-
tible material faster than the fire we are fighting.
Before moving on any farther, I feel it necessary to summarize my 
argument and its presuppositions up until this point. Violence has be-
come endemic to the contemporary political order. Paradoxically, yet 
as can be witnessed in the contemporary fate of May 1968, a purely 
anti-approach to ethics, seeking either to abolish all violence or its 
embodied cause, is negative and reactionary, ultimately obstructing 
its own intentions with its own form taken to a logical extreme. Even 
though violence that has become endemic to contemporary institu-
tions of power is radically contingent, these bodies of power came 
to be for arbitrary, yet real and (historically) legitimate reasons. But, 
importantly, the fact that power was embodied is not contingent, but 
is itself necessary. Echoing Walter Benjamin’s insight into the legal 
function of nonviolent conflict resolution, we can take insight from the 
political theory of agonism’s basic presupposition, the fundamental 
inerradicability of conflict, and view the essential function of politically 
embodied power as the resolution of conflict and the pacification of 
violence.4 Power is essential to mankind, and if power is the essence 
of what we may be fighting, we should not let ourselves be intimi-
dated or distracted by its threat, and instead focus its contemporary 
manifestations, distinguishing between what is contingent and what 
is necessary.
The Differential Metaphysics of Power ///
At this point, we have reached the rudimentary conclusion that power 
is the only force that may be capable of subverting power, to which 
we should be strongly reminded of Foucault’s preface to Anti-Oe-
4 Benjamin’s theory of nonviolence also has an uncanny formal affinity to divine violence. 
We can read: “[nonviolence] never [applies] directly to the resolution of conflict between 
man and man, but only to matters concerning objects” (Reflections, 289), whereas divine 
violence is only violent insofar as it is “annihilating … with regard to goods, right, life, 
and suchlike, never absolutely, with regard to the soul of the living” (Reflections, 297-
298). The problem with this view, as I doubt any contemporary political institution would 
deny that this is their intention (or at the very least that their intention is opposite), is that 
while our juridical notions of violence have remained within a pre-modern disciplinary 
paradigm, violence and its consequences have become subl(im)ated. What is at stake 
can be approached in two ways: to change the conception of violence, or to change the 
thing that conceives.
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dipus where he states, “do not become enamored of power.”5 It is 
therefore necessary to delve further into the potential ways power 
can be instantiated in order to claim that the weapon of liberation will 
not merely become the new weapon of oppression after the subver-
sive event has taken place. In this regard, we can turn to Benjamin 
once again and the historical development of his conceptual project 
undertaken by Giorgio Agamben in his Homo Sacer series.
While Agamben’s project began from a historical examination of the 
contemporary present and its origin in the trauma of the Holocaust, 
his recent work has dealt largely with premodern religious institu-
tions, concluding in a detailed analysis of the medieval Christian sub-
jectivity and its enigmatic case of Franciscanism. In an attempt to put 
forth a conception of power that transcends the particular historical 
contingencies of today’s neoliberal world order, and as such can po-
tentially be used against it, he uses Benjamin’s aphoristic proposal 
of divine violence as a starting point from which he conducts an ar-
chaeological study of the metaphysics of power as it is subjectively 
constituted by the ontological forms of commandment, which Agam-
ben terms “rule,” and law.6 To roughly paraphrase a profound wealth 
of research, the commandment holds power over the subject as the 
rule itself is recognized as legitimate within the act of transgression, 
whereas law can only hold power over the subject if the subject’s vio-
lation of the law is made transparent to the legal body. Furthermore, 
law has a direct identity with the punishment of its transgression, 
whereas the rule is fundamentally incongruous with any punishment 
that may be inflicted for its transgression.7 Formally speaking, rule 
is more totalizing than law, as its mere enunciation instantiates its 
power, but the rule paradoxically accepts transgression as an inte-
gral part of its contingent constitution, whereas law, to put it crudely, 
intends to eliminate the absolute possibility of its own transgression.8
It can therefore be declared that, despite the essential similarity be-
tween rule and law in how they both create an ethical framework for 
judgment through the institution of power, their metaphysical deploy-
5 Michel Foucault, “Preface,” in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capital-
ism and Schizophrenia, Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (trans), Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986, xi. See also Léopold Lambert, “Do Not Become 
Enamored of Power,” in The Funambulist Pamphlets Volume 02: Foucault, Brooklyn: 
punctum books, 2013, 27-29.
6 For a detailed explanation of the particular meaning and significance of the term “ar-
chaeology,” see Giorgio Agamben “The Form of the Commandment,” lecture at the 
European Graduate School, (January 31, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-
9u0aMbGh8.
7 “[The commandment] exists not as a criterion of judgment, but as a guideline for 
the actions of persons or communities who have to wrestle with it in solitude and, in 
exceptional cases, to take on themselves the responsibility of ignoring it.” Benjamin, 
Reflections, 298.
8 See Giorgio Agamben, The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath, Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2011, 7.
132
ments are radically different, particularly in their association to vio-
lence. To put it succinctly, rule is not itself in any way directly related 
to violence, whereas law is fundamentally based on and constituted 
by violence. It is furthermore possible to invoke Benjamin once more 
at this point, in saying that law is structurally unable to annihilate law, 
but is merely capable of juxtaposing the former with the latter and 
forcing an awkward synthesis between the two, whereas violence 
has the capacity to destroy violence.9 Even though the rule is histori-
cally tied to religious subjectivity, I would propose that it is within the 
metaphysics of the rule that we may be able to make law, and its 
violence, obsolete. Furthermore, it is perhaps exactly in the problems 
that are associated with and inherent in this proposition and its his-
torical affinity to religion that architecture can specifically be used as 
a subversive instrument.
For a variety of reasons, I do not feel like it is unfair to claim that we 
have effectively lost the basic faculty of faith in the religious sense of 
having belief in the legitimacy of a rule and following it as a guiding 
principle and foundation for one’s life; religion has been made obso-
lescent by the law of the modern state and the global logics of capi-
tal. And yet, when we inhabit space and the architecture that struc-
tures it, we do not find ourselves oppressed by laws, but surrounded 
by rules. In response to the discourse of the Funambulist blog that 
regards the wall as a violent instrument, I would like to put forth a very 
elementary example to demonstrate the difference between law and 
rule as it relates to the power of the wall. If we walk up to a house and 
enter its door, we very well could have climbed through the window 
or cut a hole in the wall: there is no law threatening us with violence 
if we climb through the window, and if we were to break through the 
wall, law could be invoked, but only if the property was within the do-
main of a law that stipulated against the act and if the owner were to 
invoked legal apparatuses. If there is a winding path that leads from 
the street to the house, we could follow it, or we could cut across it 
and take the shortest route — even jumping the fence, if need be. 
Architecture therefore must first spatialize rules before it can treated 
legally in terms of property. Moreover, architecture is the spatializa-
tion of rules that law can hold power over.
The question at this point is, if we have found our subversive power 
in the rule, what do we wish to subvert? The first step in answering 
this question is to pose another preliminary one, being, what is there 
that can be effectively subverted by the rule? The logical answer to 
this would be law, but in order to more successfully identify the ob-
ject for subversion, we should look towards the law’s causes and 
effects, more than the law itself. In an effort to avoid merely making 
the law more ‘attuned’ to our contemporary environment, the larger 
9 See Benjamin’s discussion of the correlation between legal and mythic violence in 
Benjamin, Reflections, 295-297.
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philosophical notion of law should be invoked that encompasses the 
total structuring of life, ranging from the way we occupy our time 
throughout the day and the space within our city to the conceptions 
we have of our neighbors and the relations with our friends to what 
we desire and how we are fulfilled. It is important to keep in mind that 
these subversive acts work within the subjective milieu of that which 
is being subverted, and therefore will instinctively be apprehended in 
a cultivated manner as inefficient, slow, weird, ugly, unconvenient, or 
unpleasurable. But these are ultimately what the subversive act acts 
against: they are the dying breath of what we subvert, through which 
we may find that these reactions were concealing a world of other 
potential value, enjoyment, appreciation, care, or desire. It is perhaps 
even possible that if one were intrigued, convinced, or lured to look 
beyond those learned reflexes, one may find the place they are in 
more preferable to where they were before.
/// Published on June 24, 2013
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OF ASSOCIATED MILIEUS 
BY SARAH CHOUKAH
Recently as I was strolling through my neighborhood in Montreal, I 
came across a toy I saw that kids played with in the 1980s: the Cozy 
Coupe car with a bright yellow body and a red foot-powered chas-
sis, a popular toy around that time. I remembered how the car’s 
cockpit allowed interfacing with familiar surroundings while giving a 
first sense of leg-powered, seated motility outside the house.
In a contemporary videogame, by contrast, motility is delegated 
through the interface to avatars. One would be quick to think that 
the issue of delegation or that of the materiality of the interaction 
through the interface has gone from physical, bodily affect (rep-
resented by the 1980s Cozy Coupe, among other toys) to that of 
an increasingly dematerialized network of programmed bodies in 
games. But the transition can’t be so easily reduced to this. For 
example, Ingmar Riedel-Kruse and his team at Stanford University 
have designed a new set of videogames, this time involving the 
use of living microorganisms instead of electronically programmed 
sprites or avatars.1
This shift is also visible if we think of the main lines of industrial 
and research development that Westerners have experienced since 
World War I. The 20th century saw petroleum-based and synthetic 
polymers such as plastics and latex, change the means of transfor-
mation and transportation of goods and people. In contrast, 21st 
century biotechnologies promise to have a similar, if not greater, 
effect. Instead of printing out instructions on paper in the twenti-
eth century, in the twenty-first century printing technologies promise 
the possibility of extruding living cells or entire organs in three di-
mensions. Parts of our bodies would be augmented with modular, 
replaceable sub-systems, a mix of hardware and software devel-
opment techniques. Our homes, instead of depending on external 
sources of energy to sustain us, could start growing themselves into 
self-sustaining organisms of which we would be an integral part.
1 I.H. Riedel-Kruse, A.M. Chung, B. Dura, A.L. Hamilton, and B.C. Lee, “Design, Engi-

















































































In areas such as energy and fuel engineering, health and medicine, 
manufacturing and environmental control, new production para-
digms arise.2 Applications and technologies can be grown and cul-
tivated in addition to being manufactured. By tapping into the way 
energy transfers operate within organisms such as plants or colonies 
such as bacteria, it is hoped that the design of industrial production 
and consumption processes will better integrate with other types of 
life forms. In considering technology from a biological point of view, 
biological life itself is also considered as a kind of technology.
From Associated Milieus to Individual-Milieus Couplings ///
The point where biology and technology intersect, when we come to 
think about it, is hard to define. To better understand how life has be-
come so valuable a means to different ends, we better look not at the 
transition from the non-organic to the organic as preferred building 
materials. Rather, inspired by Simondon, we could see both non-or-
ganic and organic components as different chemical and energetic 
phase transitions belonging in a wider spectrum. I’ll argue that in the 
case of biomaterials just as in the case of silicon-based materials, at 
least two things emerge at once in their production: the material and 
the milieu in which it grows.
To get a better sense of these two terms, I will first turn to Gilbert 
Simondon’s theory of individuation and one of his most well-known 
illustrations (which I refer to as the “brick example,” 2005).3 I’ll then 
expand on the idea that Simondon’s notion of milieu is necessary 
for the development of both physical, living and machine systems. 
Simondon’s philosophy can help mitigate the way we, as consumers, 
often value “finished” products over the processes that tend to their 
making. In doing away with a conception that would have technol-
ogy to stand strictly as a set of means to predefined ends, we can 
be better attentive to the role milieus have in the formation of “end 
products.”
I’ll conclude with a few suggestions, namely that turning to this par-
ticular conception of milieu can help, in return, to better grasp its role 
in the shaping of our contemporary informational and biotechnologi-
cal political economy.
Simondon refers to the example of the making and the molding of a 
clay brick to illustrate how such a technical operation can be used 
to explain individuation. He discusses the preparation of the clay at 
length to make the reader aware of its distinct material properties. 
2 For upcoming applications in these areas, visit the international Genetically Engineered 
Machine competition (iGEM) website, and look through the team projects at igem.org.
3 Gilbert Simondon, L’individu et sa genèse psycho-biologique, Paris: Presses Universi-
taires de France, 1964.
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The mold used to shape the clay is similarly discussed: the mold 
has to be prepared in a specific manner so it can give shape to the 
clay. Thus the molding of a clay brick involves not one but at least 
two distinct series of operations converging together: the abstract 
form of the matter (clay) is involved in its preparation just as the mat-
ter of the form (the mold) is crucial for the operation to succeed. For 
Simondon, what is involved in this kind of technical operation is the 
mediation, or the communication of two initially disparate domains 
of reality.
As matter and form get both in-formed into an invented structure, 
other disparate elements of reality also converge. The natural matter 
the brick maker utilizes and the forms invented in the double pro-
cess I was discussing above also constitute what Simondon calls an 
associated milieu. In his book entitled On the mode of existence of 
technical objects, Simondon specifies pretty early on how technical 
objects undergo a process of individualization that is the “true condi-
tion of technical progress” (my loose translation):
The process of individualization is made possible by the recurrence 
of a cause (or feed-back) in a milieu that the technical being creates 
around himself and that conditions him just as he conditions the mi-
lieu. [...] The associated milieu mediates the relation between fabri-
cated technical elements and the natural elements within which the 
technical being functions. [...] This associated milieu is the invented 
technical object’s condition of existence.4 
The two domains, natural and technical, are very difficult to separate 
from the onset. Technical form is also natural matter; natural matter 
also exhibits technical form to structure itself and function.
Similarly a biologist wishing to grow particular cells will have to order 
the ones appropriate for the kind of experiment he wishes to under-
take. She will have to grow them in a liquid or gel medium, that is 
the broth, in liquid form or gel, which both nurtures and contains the 
growth of colonies of cells, bacteria or yeast for example. Its compo-
sition has to be controlled. This growing in medium will have to be 
done at certain temperatures and will take specific periods of time, 
just to mention a few of the initial conditions one would have to be 
confronted with if one wished to culture bacterial cells of some kind in 
a laboratory setting. In designing her experiments, the biologist has 
to create very specific environments for her cells to grow into and for 
enzymatic reactions to take place. We might say that both the clay 
brick maker and the biologist are never dealing with stable systems, 
but with metastable ones, systems where energy transfers can occur 
and form between two initially incompatible domains.
4 Gilbert Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, Paris: Aubier, 1989, 57.
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At another scale, a communication or mediation can happen be-
tween two initially incompatible domains of reality: what’s outside of 
the culturing medium for the bacteria or the yeast does not matter to 
it, but it does to us. The biological medium itself is essential for this 
organism’s survival, just like clean air (with a certain kind of compo-
sition) is essential for us humans to survive. Through the molecular 
reactions and chain alignments involved in the preparation of clay 
and liquid medium for cells, both the biologist and the brick maker 
get introduced to the reality of the technical and biological objects 
they individuate through their experiments. The clay brick and the 
prepared cells become milieus for further experiments as well: the 
construction of a wall or building of some kind (which involves count-
less other operations), and the completion of an experimental proto-
col in molecular biology for instance. We can say that technological 
as well as biotechnological domains of reality constantly involve not 
one but many milieus and technical objects co-existing together, one 
being the condition of existence of another.
Without their culturing media the organisms cannot support them-
selves. Badly maintained media lead to badly maintained cultures: 
the lab technician will have to reconsider his whole experiment. 
Carelessly prepared clay leads to an unstable blend, a poorly ex-
ecuted brick and therefore a poorly executed building. Experiments 
are perturbed and life is again at stake, as contamination can easily 
happen.
We could say that in general, just as media and organism go togeth-
er, a third entity, the contaminant or the parasite, is also a constant 
eventuality. As the life system is metastable, it stays that way. Once 
some life problems get solved in a certain form or another (say a 
particular configuration of organs or proteins, or the stabilization of 
certain properties in design materials), others appear. The only kind 
of system that cannot further transform itself, or can do without con-
fronting more problems, according to Simondon, is a dead system.
A microclimate like the one cells grow in offers us the opportunity to 
see their embedding in the wider milieus they are connected with. 
Bacterial communities individuate and proliferate in their media, but 
they’re also media for other kinds of biological processes and en-
zymatic outcomes. A milieu and the individual it supports can thus 
be understood in its ability to foster other kinds of milieus, to coexist 
in relation to other climates where individuals, also borne out with 
and through their milieus, might eventually communicate and inform 
each other. If we extend this idea to physiological and psychological 
levels of being, we can observe that with a particular type of activ-
ity or culturing practice comes a particular kind of human being, or 
more specifically, a practitioner.
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Simondon’s ontology primarily relies on trying to understand how 
certain types of energy transfers (known as transductions) inform 
systems that would not have communicated together before an initial 
gap or signifying difference would have thrown them together into an 
individuation process. That is, a process resulting into both an indi-
vidual and its milieu. For Simondon, systems resulting into individu-
als and milieus can still contain enough potential (Simondon calls it 
“pre-individuality”) to provoke more individuations: an individual then 
undergoes “dephasing” and becomes by communicating with a dif-
ferent domain of reality. One milieu-individual coupling is the field of 
individuation of another future individual.
Basing ourselves on Simondon’s philosophy, we can come to ob-
serve that an individual body is continuously informed by the associ-
ated milieu it derives from in its emergence. A body cannot be so 
easily understood when cut off from its milieu. For Simondon, a body 
would be akin to an individual that is always understood as a “rela-
tion of relations.”5 In other words, even in order to start understand-
ing what “a body can do,” one has to look at the way a body’s initial 
medium of emergence gets individuated, Simondon would write, into 
this milieu and its individuality.
The Politics of Milieus ///
As we try to examine our contemporary political economy in light of 
the notion of milieus, we can see how Simondon’s philosophical rel-
evance allows us to emphasize certain reconfigurations. Along with 
the sophistication and increasing interdependence of contemporary 
modes of industrial production comes the necessity to value prod-
ucts as well as the means and modes of their making. The potential 
for biotechnology to make bodies and organisms grow and prolifer-
ate is also understood in its basis as a power to make and stabilize 
specific milieus. Biotechnology is not a mode of intervention or action 
set apart from politics: it constantly participates in reconfigurations 
corresponding to current commodities, subjectivities and discourses 
as much as other technologies.
Similarly, biotechnology can help us locate specific zones of subjec-
tive and collective politicizations. Considerations pertaining to who is 
allowed to foster individual-milieu couplings and what kinds of bod-
ies are allowed to proliferate are not politically neutral. With certain 
technological and biotechnological practices come certain configu-
rations of power, but the locus of that power and its forms are not set 
in stone. They are also as metastable as the associated milieus and 
the individuals they inform.
5 Muriel Combes, “Une vie à naître,” in Pascal Chabot (ed), Simondon, Paris: Vrin, 2002, 
39.
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With developments in the genetic modification of food emerged 
forms of resistance to its perceived irreparable consequences. Heir-
loom seeds are being rediscovered in ancestral attics and regain val-
ue; urban farms sprout in cities with the debated promise of immune, 
well-lived consumption and life. Organic farming techniques and 
practices have been reconfigured as alternatives to an agro-industri-
al, mass-scaled and controlled offer. Their respective promises and 
shortcomings are still the topic of prolonged concern and debate.
Within more general concerns about genetic engineering and modi-
fication, questions abound: how are certain transformed bodies and 
milieu couplings (genetically modified seeds for example) affecting 
others? What kinds of successive effects emerge from the prolonged 
ingestion and internal culturing of specific outside couplings within 
human and animal organisms? What about the countless toxins, 
waste products and byproducts released through contemporary 
industrial modes of animal farming? Perhaps what bothers us and 
equally surprises us is how they are increasingly addressed as the 
milieus of hybrid, biotechnological processes of selection and trans-
formation of animals. The successive couplings they foster at nu-
merous scales (environmental degradation, cellular mutation) also 
concerns us.
Practices of “Do-it-yourself” biology (DIYbio) have also emerged 
since 2009. In few and certainly reductive words, DIYbio can be con-
sidered a potential reconfiguration of previous ways of doing and 
talking about biology outside of established institutions and private 
laboratories. Motivations to get into DIYbiology can also stem from 
a wish to avoid constraints as they are commonly found within the 
practice of contemporary molecular biology and synthetic biology 
(patents and non-disclosure agreements, for example). Collective 
proposals for the sharing of scientific knowledge and practices 
centered on the growing and culturing of cells for experimentation 
outside of private academic biotech centers surface in the form of 
biotech community labs. With other collective experiments such as 
community supported agriculture and the recent re-popularization of 
diverse fermentation and conservation processes (brewing and can-
ning for instance), comes an interrogation, among others, on the very 
nature and specificity of milieu-making and its politics. What these 
practices express and emphasize is the nature of our intricacy and 
relation to our milieus, as well as how our inherent caring for certain 
milieus can be seen as way to constitute ourselves.
These numerous instances of politicization reveal more than the po-
larization around either of two extremes that consider biotechnology 
as inherently good or bad in public debate. What they tell us about is 
how inherent problems such as atomic or microscale processes of 
intervention and engagement can pose for contemporary subjectivi-
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ties as well. For Simondon, such different scales of reality (the micro-
scale of enzymatic reactions and, in contrast, the macro-scale of in-
dividual and collective life and psychology, for example) have deep 
relations with each other that get worked out through processes of 
“transduction” and “individuation.” Very quickly explained, transduc-
tion refers to the successive structuration of a domain or scale (or 
phase) of reality after another, or the way energy exchanges operat-
ing in a domain of reality also structure one another. Individuation is 
the overall process that tends to the information of both an individual 
and its milieu or associated milieu.
A Simondonian view on the relational aspect of individuation can 
certainly help in complicating issues concerning the well-being and 
modes of life the living can afford in diverse milieus, just as these 
milieus in turn inform the living. The perceived danger of an environ-
mental or a human catastrophe after the incidental or voluntary re-
lease of a pathogen is one of the ways these configurations translate 
into different perceived effects of a break of isolation from an associ-
ated milieu. This both makes milieus as well as issues of practice, 
making, process and technology the objects of a continuous interro-
gation into what makes us come together as individuals and bodies, 
as well as participants, in different kinds of cultures. It is in this sense, 
Simondon would say, that the possibility of psychic and collective 
individuation offers itself to us.






//CONTAINED//  BODIES 
BY ANDREAS PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS
My fascination with Norway begun early on, before I ever visited the 
country. Admittedly, it had little to do with the country itself, and its 
focus was exclusively cartographic. I spent hours musing over the 
map with a concentration frissoning through my very body and mak-
ing my skin tingle. The reason? To my eyes, Norway looked like a 
human arm that was being slowly, painfully but pleasurably gnawed 
by the incoming fjords. Its coast emerges like a moth-eaten lace, with 
its play of blue and yellow that defies the usual clean-cut depiction 
of cartographic boundaries. I would then compare Norway’s coast to 
the line that separates Algeria from Mauritania and Mali, a straight, 
brutal, metallic line cutting the desert in two arbitrary sides. There, my 
feeling would be one of cleanliness and purity but also incomprehen-
sion, suspicion even at how straight it was. And I would return to the 
intricacy of the coast. I was 6 years old.
This fascination has not left me, but I now understand it better. First 
of all, it would seem that these different ends of the spectrum work 
together. Not in some sort of Hegelian dialectics that cannot wait 
for their synthesis, nor in the positive/negative understanding of mu-
tual constitution. Saharan desert and Norwegian sea operate on the 
same cartographic continuum, each one a desire to spread out one’s 
body differently. Each spread is a way of affecting and being affected 
by other bodies. Each spread captured my eye and my fingers, trac-
ing the lines that were thrown into relief merely by their black ink. I 
now understand that my cartographic fascination was double: on the 
one hand, the need for knowing with certainty oneself and specifi-
cally one’s limits; and on the other, the assemblage-spread of a body 
that comingles with other bodies. The latter is what Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari call haecceity, a body’s “relations of movement 


























affected.”1 Haecceity opposes standard conceptions of identity and 
reinterprets them as difference. It plays with the blue of the sea and 
the yellow of the land. This smudged sort of identity is a funambulist 
perilously balancing on the straight black line across the Sahara.
The Norwegian body is one that neither ends nor begins. Liminality 
at its most luminous, the coast bases its Escher-like structure in a 
simple but indisputable fact: a fjord is not the open sea. It is an incu-
bation of water within the land, a tellurian hug strengthened by gentle 
lapping across glacier eras. It is an invitation by the land extended to 
the water. At the same time, it is an aquatic invasion that slowly but 
surely eats up the entrails of the inner lands. On the prime-coloured, 
spreadable map of my childhood, attempts to keep land and water 
separately were not always successful: there were stretches where 
the fjord was turning a little too abruptly in, or the land was protruding 
too much out in the blue, so that the black typographic outline could 
no longer follow faithfully the interlacing and the colours would bleed 
into each other in a sort of myopic double-take. These were the bod-
ies I knew existed all around me: a body was always a continuum 
with space. No line clearly separating this side from that. No desert 
to split, only a continuum to dive in and out. And there were other 
continua: space as a continuum, and the bodies leaking into their 
surrounding space also connected with folds of space opening away 
from them, seemingly unrelated to their skin, their beliefs, or their 
physical functions. Henri Lefebvre has been writing on how bodies 
produce space: “each living body is space and has its space: it pro-
duces itself in space and it also produces that space.”2 Bodies and 
space are not found in a relation of foreground/background but fully 
folded to the extent that, ontologically, bodies are space and vice 
versa. I knew that, although I could not cite Lefebvre.
And then there were the Saharan desert bodies. Strong, bounded, 
contained, closed, certain about their limits, secure in their contours. 
These were bodies brimming with a self-aggrandising sense of iden-
tity and filled with a certainty of emplacement as of right. They be-
longed squarely within their body-contours, accepting as unintended 
but not unwelcomed consequences the displacement they caused 
and their radiating connection to all the space they colonised just by 
being there, secure in their all-thematising presence. These bodies 
were bodies to aspire to, solar strongholds of solidity. They were also 
bodies to dislike because of their strong positioning, their unyield-
ing lines. I was being suspicious of them while pining for them. I 
even wanted to become one of these bodies myself. This is the way I 
was brought up: seeking a solid identity, defining oneself against the 
1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
II, Brian Massumi (trans), London: Athlone Press, 1988, 262. 
2 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Donald Nicholson-Smith (trans), London: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 1991, 170.
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world without constantly thinking of who or what might question my 
contours. I am a child of identity politics.
But one forgets that there are always fjords seeping in like somnolent 
underground waters and eventually corrupting any linearity. A body is 
not a neatly defined, contour-bound entity. The body is not defined by 
its outline. If they were a painting, bodies would be Venetian sprawls 
of colour without drawn boundaries, staging through their expansive 
leaking a radical withdrawal from the Florentine canon of humanist 
containment. Deleuze writes
the edge of the forest is a limit. Does this mean that the forest is 
defined by its outline? [...]
We can’t even specify the precise moment at which there is no more 
forest.3
All bodies are leaking. By ‘all bodies,’ I mean human and nonhu-
man. While usually, whenever included, nonhuman bodies are either 
resource, context or the negative of the dialectics of humanity, the 
conceptualisation of bodies has now expanded to include human 
and nonhuman, geological and psychological, animal and vegetal 
bodies. This is what the schools of thought largely identified as new 
materialisms, non-representational theory, speculative realism and 
object-oriented ontologies maintain, themselves generally drawing 
from a Spinozan/Deleuzian understanding of the body.4 Thus, for 
Deleuze “a body can be anything: it can be an animal, a body of 
sounds, a mind or idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, 
a collectivity.”5 What is more, all bodies are assemblages, namely 
aggregations of human and nonhuman bodies that are contingent 
upon the conditions of their emergence and that do not presuppose 
the centrality, and certainly not the exclusive presence, of the human. 
Bodies are both actual, namely space and matter, and virtual, namely 
potential but still real. Actual and virtual are not found in a dialectical 
opposition; nor does the actual determine the virtual.6 Rather, there 
is no ontological distinction between the two, and if anything, the 
actual is determined in its folding with the virtual. Each body has a 
spatiality and materiality that is both, schematically speaking, its own 
(actual), and part of the wider continuum with other bodies (virtual). 
3 Gilles Deleuze, “Cours Vincennes: Sur Spinoza, 17.02.1981,” trans. Léopold Lambert, 
in Léopold Lambert, “A Sunflower Seed Lost in a Wall is Capable of Shattering that Wall,” 
in The Funambulist Pamphlets, Vol. 01: Spinoza, Brooklyn, punctum books, 2013, 73-75.
4 Diana Coole, and Samantha Frost (eds), New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Poli-
tics, Durham: Duke University Press, 2010; Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecol-
ogy of Things, Durham: Duke University Press, 2010; Nigel Thrift, Non-Representational 
Theory: Space | Politics | Affect, London: Routledge, 2007.
5 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Robert Hurley (trans), San Francisco, 
City Light Books, 1988, 127.
6 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Hab-
beriam (trans), London: Athlone Press, 1986.
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Bodies are properly speaking geophilosophical, namely spatial and 
temporal, part of the great earth continuum yet individually different 
to each other.7
How does a body differentiate itself from its continuum with space 
and other bodies? For, is this not at least one definition of identity, 
namely to become an identifiable, recognisable, contoured-body? 
Let us take a step back and see the whole map continuum. What I 
am looking for is not the continuum but its assemblage. See how it 
is constantly ruptured? Cartography is a continuum of ruptures, and 
rupture is the locus of corporeal singularity. Ruptures can be Deleu-
zian folds, namely co-emerging assemblages, and therefore onto-
logical differentiations. Or they can be relatively arbitrary distinctions 
between an interior and an exterior, and therefore epistemological 
differentiations, such as the Saharan desert boundaries.8 They can 
also be necessities, such as the withdrawing sea from the land; or an 
effect of political and legal strategising, such as the cutting possibil-
ity of a new state. Whatever they are, they are part of the continuum, 
constituting it in difference. The continuum of bodies is always rup-
tured by distinctions on its surface. 
Ruptures are the locus of singularity in the continuum. Through rup-
tures, bodies differentiate themselves from other bodies. Ruptures 
are the outcome of withdrawal. Every body withdraws from other 
bodies and from their space. Even haecceity, that most connected 
of states, needs withdrawal in order to come forth, and bodies need 
to withdraw from connections as much as they need leakages and 
smudges. In his work on Bruno Latour, Graham Harman writes: “ob-
jects are not defined by their relations: instead they are what enter 
into relations in the first place. Objects enter relations but withdraw 
from them as well; objects are built of components but exceed those 
components. Things exist, not in relations but in a strange sort of 
vacuum from which they only partly emerge into relation.”9 I under-
stand objects and bodies as synonymous yet coming from slightly 
different theoretical trajectories. 
On that basis, and replacing objects with bodies in the above quote, 
bodies are at the same time assemblages of other bodies, part of 
assemblages with other bodies, and withdrawn from every relation. 
Withdrawal is ontological: every body is a closed, autopoietic system 
that withdraws from full openness, connectivity or exteriority, and into 
a monadic singularity that is gathered around its autopoiesis, its self-
7 Mark Bonta, and John Protevi, Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004.
8 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice: Bodies, Lawscape, Atmo-
sphere, London: Routledge, 2014.
9 Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics, Melbourne: 
re.press 2009, 132.
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perpetuation, its conative desire.10 Its openness rests on its closure. 
Its connection with the exterior takes place only through the systemic 
interior. Assemblaging does not take place in an exterior but in a 
fractalised interior. Withdrawal is taken inside the body, takes place 
from within the body, and ultimately becomes self-withdrawal. As-
semblage rests on withdrawal. The world is what each body makes 
of it. But this is not relativism or subjectivism. The world withdraws as 
much as the body withdraws. “Nothing ‘points’ toward anything else 
or bleeds into anything else. Everything withdraws into itself.”11 
The commonality of withdrawal is, therefore, the main tool of differen-
tiation between bodies. The continuum is not threatened by this — on 
the contrary, precisely because the continuum is a series of ruptures, 
ruptures do not rupture the continuum as such: they are all inscribed 
within. So, the continuum is crossed by lines that produce meaning, 
while continuously being ruptured by them. In her seminal work on 
the body, Lisa Blackman has called this the problem of ‘the one and 
the many,’ namely the ontological difficulty of being coherent yet mul-
tiple, in other words, self yet othering.12 The main challenge is how to 
avoid categorising either of these as inferior, namely how to escape 
the trap of mapping the continuum and the rupture “onto differentia-
tions made between the civilized and the primitive, the superior and 
the inferior, the simple and the complex, and the impulsive and the 
environmental.”13 Indeed, how not to make rupture and continuum a 
dialectic of opposites, namely a question of positive presence and 
negative absence, but a co-emergence. 
This is not an easy struggle. But it is a common struggle. It is the 
struggle of each and every body that attempts to define itself without 
losing its continuum with other bodies. It is a struggle of survival that 
often dictates political cut-offs or atmospherics of illusionary com-
fort while conflict rages outside. At the same time, it is a question 
of retaining the responsibility of the continuum, and the constant 
questioning of one’s spatio-corporeal boundaries. It is a question of 
retaining both a Saharan and a Norwegian spread of one’s body on 
the map.
/// Published exclusively in this volume
10 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Niklas Luhmann: Law, Justice, Society, Lon-
don: Routledge, 2009, and Bennett, Vibrant Matter.
11 Harman, Prince of Networks, 113.




DRESS BECOMES BODY: 
FASHIONING THE 
FORCE OF FORM 
BY ERIN MANNING
My intention is not to make clothes.1
Rei Kawakubo
 Some shapes hold things apart
Madeline Gins
“Cut to invent anew,” proposes Rei Kawakubo, owner and designer 
of the fashion label Comme des Garçons. “Make an abstract image.” 
“Break the idea of clothes.”
“Break the idea of clothes,” has been Kawakubo’s call for over 40 years, 
a call that has motivated the creation of some of the most intriguing 
clothing of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, opening up the field 
of fashion to an architectural potential perhaps unprecedented. With 
Kawakubo’s insistence that clothes are not a predetermined category, 
but a proposition according to which a body is invited to continuously 
reinvent itself, she has led the way toward a textile-based architecting 
of experience. In this regard, Kawakubo has pushed and continues to 
push the Spinozist mantra “we know not what a body can do” to its 
limit, recasting not only the realm of fashion but the way fashion situ-
ates itself in relation to other practices, especially that of architecture.2 
That Kawakubo’s creations are sculptural is well-known, but they are 
also more than that. They are what Madeline Gins and Arakawa would 
call procedural architectures. Procedural architectures are proposi-
tional: it is what they can do that is foregrounded. To say that fashion 
is architectural is often to speak of it in representational terms. Despite 
the visible architectonics of Kawakubo’s designs, to focus solely on 
their form would be reductive: Kawakubo’s textile creations function 
architecturally in ways that far exceed representation. 
1 Interview with Rei Kawakubo on wwd.com (November 19, 2012)




















They are productive. It is in this sense that they are procedural.Araka-
wa and Gins define procedural architectures as “overlapping tissues 
of density.” Architecture understood this way must be considered 
beyond the built environment. Procedural architecture is “a world-
constituting procedure.”3 It builds worlds more so than buildings, its 
mandate to directly cleave the biosphere, or, in Arakawa and Gins’ 
vocabulary “to bioscleave.” This bioscleave procedural architec-
ture fashions never stops cleaving. It is an active, procedural milieu 
that remains in-act as a persistent reminder that what sites life also 
cleaves the environment, opening it to its differential. Cleaving cuts 
open the field of experience. This cut has the effect of reorienting the 
field: the cleave, like decision in Whitehead, is the decisional force 
which activates, which tweaks the in-act toward the punctual creation 
of life-living.
A procedural approach depends on the rigour of the proposition that 
sets it in motion. An architecture is procedural if it is capable of open-
ing up a field of relation or an emergent ecology such that it can 
activate the conditions for the continued interplay that keeps life in 
the process of self-invention. Most architectures, Arakawa and Gins 
argue, do anything but, deintensifying life rather than opening it to 
its potential difference. We follow their routes, we embrace their lim-
its, and in so doing our lives become predictably oriented by them. 
What if instead we built toward the density of experience, beginning 
not with form but with textures of life-living, embracing the force of 
form that is the lively interstice of environment and body? What if 
instead of assuming that the built environment contained the pre-
constituted body, we interested ourselves in the amalgam of their 
co-constitution?
The challenge is that the procedures of a procedural architecture 
must continuously be reinvented to stay apace with the architecting 
of experience. No procedure is failsafe, nor does one procedure work 
in all similar circumstances. A procedure must be crafted with care, 
must be relevant to the conditions already at hand, must be capable 
of activating the ecology of which it is part, must have enough lon-
gevity to leave a trace. More procedures fail than succeed. But this is 
part of their necessity, that they put us in the way of experimentation. 
A procedure is always connected to a constraint. At its best, this 
constraint is enabling. It asks of habit that it activate its conditions of 
possibility. From here, the procedure pushes possibility to its limit, 
excavating at the edges where possibility and potential meet. This is 
where the procedure most often fails: habits die hard, including our 
habits of reconstructing the already-known. A procedural architect-
ing will not be capable of opening up the field of experience if the 
manner of opening contains the habit fully-formed. What is essen-
3 Madeline Gins and Arakawa, “Biotopological Diagramming, A New Procedure/Method 
for Staying Alive Indefinitely,” in Alive Forever, Not If, But When (unpublished manuscript).
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tial is to work from the habit’s edging into experience, experimenting 
with the ways a habit’s repetition activates minor departures from the 
norm, keeping in mind that the only habit which holds on absolutely 
to its form is the habit of reducing experience to the what was.
With the work of Rei Kawakubo, I want to explore how procedural ar-
chitecture activates minor gestures within fashion. Where the propo-
sition, following Whitehead, is the lure that gets a process on its way, 
and the minor gesture is the activating force in the field of relation 
of the work’s working, the procedural is the following-through of a 
set of conditions toward repeatable difference. The procedural, as 
Arakawa and Gins define it, is what gives the minor gesture consis-
tency without allying it to precomposed models of formation. For the 
procedural is not a set of instructions. While instructions are usually 
organized according to a linear set, the procedure is more diagram-
matic, in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense: it activates zones of intensity 
in fields of relation and directs a follow-through that reintensifies at 
every turn. Where instructions are reiterable in their form and content, 
producing not difference but repetition of the same, the procedure 
does quite the opposite: it sets a path in motion that asks to be re-
turned to, toward different results. “Let the word ‘procedure’ stand 
for that which baffles us as to what it is even as it brings us world.”4 
Enabling Constraints ///
In the everyday, habit operates as a choreographic tool. It directs our 
movement, organizes our time, makes experience predictable, fram-
ing it in ways that are usually associated with comfort and well-being, 
two concepts that make Arakawa and Gins highly suspicious. For 
well-being and comfort too often keep us in the same place, a place 
we return to daily without much thought, a place that doesn’t encour-
age experimentation. This place, framed as it is by the architectures 
that surround us, is anything but procedural, they argue. 
Despite the focus in Arakawa and Gins’ work on the necessity to 
break habit, to open experience to invention and surprise, there is 
nonetheless in their work an attentiveness to what else habit can do. 
For habit, as both Arakawa and Gins and Kawakubo recognize, is a 
mutable force. Habit directs our movements, even while it constrains 
other tendencies. These other tendencies, constrained as they are, 
can be said to still be operative in germ at the heart of habit. The 
challenge is to make these minor tendencies operational, thereby 
opening habit to its subtle multiplicity and exposing the fact that habit 
was never quite as stable as it seemed.
In the creating of conditions for new modes of existence, in the craft-
ing of a procedural architecture, habit should therefore not be fully 
4 Ibid.
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discarded. A procedural architecting must look at habit’s repetitive 
pathways to see how they subtly diverge from what is perceived as 
their assigned choreography, finding within repetition the difference 
that keeps habit inventive. This difference, alive as it is with minor 
tendencies that keep habit from ever fully reproducing itself, is what 
procedural architectures make operative. As world-constituting proce-
dures, procedural architecture works from these minor tendencies to 
extend experience to its full potential.
 
This is another way of saying that what architectural procedures do, 
before they create architectures, is create modes of existence. Modes 
of existence as Etienne Souriau defines them, are not states but pas-
sages.5 They are the transitory and fragile interstices of experience in 
the making. 
Modes of existence neither emerge from nor belong to a subject. 
They do not define existence: they propose it. On a continuum with 
the Whiteheadian actual occasion, modes of existence are ecologies 
that activate a field of concern. This concern is active in the event itself, 
a concern for the world in its unfolding. 
Modes of existence are less species than speciations, where specia-
tion is understood as an emergent field of relation. They are specia-
tions because they don’t name a state, but activate a modality that 
pushes existence to its intensive limit. They are speciations because 
they don’t fit into existence preformed but activate the minor gestures 
of its most potentializing edgings into experience. As such they are 
ecologies, ecologies that activate differential tendencies in the milieu 
of their co-composition. Modes of existence act, cut, reorient: they are 
world-constituting procedures.
Modes of existence are precarious. They emerge as they are needed 
and then, like actual occasions, they perish. It is not their stability that 
defines them, but the persuasiveness with which they affect all that 
comes into contact with them. This persuasiveness is what makes 
them compelling. It is an active participant in the event of their coming-
to-be. 
Modes of existence come into being through enabling constraints. 
They emerge out of a necessity that has a procedural tending. This 
necessity is enabling in the sense that it provokes new forms of pro-
cess, but constrained in the sense that it occurs according to the limits 
of this singular junction. Each time a mode of existence comes into 
being, it does so “just this way,” in direct accordance with how the 
constraint was enabling in this singular set of conditions. And yet, just 
this way is always, like habit, open to deviation. Minor tendencies are 
everywhere present in all modes of existence.
5 Etienne Souriau, Les Différents modes d’existence suivi de L’œuvre à faire, Isabelle 
Stengers and Bruno Latour (eds), Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009.
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For Rei Kawakubo, crafting enabling constraints for each new pro-
cess is key to the techniques that make up her procedural architect-
ing of experience. Kawakubo does emphasize the creative necessity 
of an open field for experimentation, but there is always focused at-
tention in her practice to the quality of the constraints that delimit 
it. Her practice involves continuously experimenting with constraints 
she sets in place to see where else the process can lead, not only 
as regards the potential of the fabric she works with, but also with 
respect to the very tissues of density she takes as her matter of con-
cern. For Kawakubo as for Arakawa and Gins, what is at stake is not 
simply the form the product takes. What matters is how the constraint 
embedded in the procedure becomes enabling of new processes.
Body and environment are for Kawakubo complicit partners in the 
reorientation of what textile can do. They are her palate. But neither 
are predefined, and importantly, she does not pretend to know, from 
one process to another, where the details of their co-composition will 
lead her: each new process requires a new enquiry into the body-
environment constellation. With this as the directive that drives her 
practice, Kawakubo invests in the field of relation, the orientation of 
her practice always transdisciplinary. In the ecology of practices, she 
then requires that her process be invented each time anew through 
an emergent activation situated in the event of creation itself. 
Kawakubo emphasizes that the intuitive problem, the problem that 
opens experience rather than seeking solutions, cannot be searched 
Comme des Garçons SS 1997
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out from beyond the bounds of a given process, cannot be found 
in a world preconstituted. She writes: “Going around museums and 
galleries, seeing films, talking to people, seeing new shops, look-
ing at silly magazines, taking an interest in the activities of people in 
the street, looking at art, travelling: all these things are not useful, all 
these things do not help me, do not give me any direct stimulation 
to help my search for something new. And neither does [the] fash-
ion history. The reason for that is that all these things above already 
exist.”6 Kawakubo is not inspired by the already existent configura-
tions that make up our worlds. She wants to create at their interstice, 
in their coming-to-be: “In order to make this SS14 collection, I wanted 
to change the usual route within my head. I tried to look at everything 
I look at in a different way. I thought a way to do this was to start 
out with the intention of not even trying to make clothes. I tried to 
think and feel and see as if I wasn’t making clothes.”7 The enabling 
constraint here is clear: to work from the perspective of a new way of 
seeing. The intuition will emerge in the process, creating the problem 
in the art of time if Kawakubo doesn’t assume she already knows 
what fashion can do.
For Kawakubo, what is at stake is the making itself, not the making 
of the object. The object does not define the purpose, and cannot be 
subsumed to it. What she strives toward is to create a series of en-
abling constraints for each process that, in the ‘best case’ scenario, 
are procedural enough to create new modes of existence. Hers is 
a procedural fashioning: for each new process she invents proce-
dures that push the very idea of what a garment can be to its limit. 
Kawakubo seeks not the final form, not the production of a neutral 
layer for a pre-existing body, but the creation of a propositional field 
that activates what a body can do in its co-constitution with an emer-
gent environment.
This process of engaging with the working of the work is what Souri-
au calls “faire oeuvre.” Like the mode of existence, which composes 
in the between of existence’s necessity, or existence’s persuasive-
ness, the œuvre à faire is the force of making that only knows itself 
as such after the fact, in the tense of “Oh! This is what I was looking 
for!”8 The not-knowing-in-advance is part of the procedure. For know-
ing is always to some degree reducible to the already-known. Habit 
will play a part in the process, but it must be procedurally tweaked. 
What emerges from the process must push the habit to its limit. The 
habitual carries within itself a certain degree of belief. The ecology of 
practices that is fashion believes, for instance, that it makes sense 
that a dress follow the shape of what we perceive as our body-en-
6 “Rei Kawakubo’s Creative Manifesto,” Business of Fashion (October 30, 2013), http://
www.businessoffashion.com/articles/bof-exclusive/rei-kawakubo-comme-des-garcons.
7 Ibid.
8 Souriau, Les Différents modes d’existence suivi de L’œuvre à faire, 109.
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velope. This, we have come to learn, is how to clothe a body. We 
know, of course, that there have been other habits within fashion 
that have involved cutting cloth in ways that accentuate parts of the 
body in ways that are today unimaginable.9 We know that historically, 
the body-envelope has shifted in its proportions and emphases. We 
know that, despite the growing homogeneity of fashion across cul-
tures, there remain cultural differences in regard to cuts, fabrics and 
habits of dressing. But nonetheless we tend to dwell within the realm 
of the imaginable. 
 
Certainly a quota of the unimaginable continues to grace the sea-
sonal fashion runways. But this is the crux: that the unimaginable is 
only to be paraded, not really to be worn– note that the bustle has 
not yet come back into fashion despite Yamamoto’s and Kawaku-
bo’s best efforts! This is not to deny that each season does bring 
something new, and that we as consumer tend to welcome seasonal 
shifts in fashion. Sure, we collectively say: Lengthen and accentu-
ate the leg with low-waisted skinny jeans! Put everyone in maternity 
clothes for a summer! And then, the next year: Widen the pant to 
accentuate the waist! Despite the normative directions of fashion’s 
operations — retain the proportion between waist, breast and hip! — 
mutability does have its place. As long as its tendings are relative to 
what came before, fashion’s variations are generally accepted and 
even welcomed.
But these are not examples of the unimaginable. They are simply 
small deviations from the norm. Within most contemporary fashion, 
difference remains relative to what came before. While change is 
an option, the commitment to difference tends to be constrained 
to possibility: difference rarely engages with true potential, with 
the unimaginable not-yet. This allows fashion to plan itself long in 
advance (designers tend to work up to two seasons ahead), hold-
ing creativity within a relatively predictable frame. We might see a 
change in colour, or a change in cut, but we will rarely be introduced 
to a completely different paradigm. The tweaking of the habit thus 
still remains within the realm of the habitual — it is more of a lateral 
stretch than a recomposition. Kawakubo does not operate this way. 
Against the parsing of fashion into seasons, she works procedurally, 
her attention not focused on the already-existent. This is the force of 
her procedural fashionings, that she understands that the edgings 
into existence of habit’s mutability are composed of the more-than of 
form, the more-than of the existent shapings of garment-imagination. 
In this regard, her work proceeds at the pace of a world-constituting 
procedure.
9 There also exists indigenous traditions in garment design that challenge the idea of the 
predefined shape of a body, inviting the body to define itself through an encounter with 
the fabric. These include the Indian sari, the Malay or Indonesian sarong, and the African 
kanga or kitenge, each of which is emergent as garment in the folding.
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World-constituting never means world-constituted. To craft a pro-
cedure that is world-constituting, the fine-tuning must occur in the 
event — it must be immanent to the event’s coming — into-itself. 
Fashion that follows habit fully-formed is not doing this. It is creating 
according to an externally imposed normative framework. Kawaku-
bo’s practice departs from this approach: she is very much engaged 
in the constitutive tendencies that open habit to its more-than. In this 
regard, her fashionings actively produce what Deleuze calls “a belief 
in the world.”10 Like the world-constituting procedure, a belief in the 
world refuses to follow the world as given. A belief in the world is 
about crafting the conditions to encounter the world differently each 
time. Procedural architecture takes this as its mantra. To become 
procedural, a practice has to directly connect to habit’s mutation 
and, from there, create not new habits, but new incipient directionali-
ties. These incipient directionalities will have the tendency, over time, 
to morph into habit. A procedural architecture must therefore be ca-
pable of activating minor gestures that continuously direct incipiency 
toward new modes of existence. Much tweaking is necessary to find 
the right balance between the static and the chaotic.
When incipiency tunes toward new modes of existence, it is because 
the emergent event has been mobilized in the differential of the in-act 
and the acting. Arakawa and Gins define this differential as “a tenta-
tive constructing toward a holding in place.”11 Scales and speeds 
coexist in this tentative fragility, reminding us that the procedural 
must work at differing degrees of intensity. “Everything is tentative, 
but some things or events have a tentativeness with a faster-running 
clock than others. So that there can at least be a keeping pace with 
bioscleave’s tentativeness, it becomes necessary to divine how best 
to join events into an event-fabric, which surely involves learning to 
vary this speed at which one fabricates tentative constructings to-
ward holding in place.”12 
To become procedural, scales and speeds must be taken up from 
the perspective of the event. This approach ensures that we do not 
fall prey to building world-constituting procedures that are simply 
sized and timed for human benefit. Procedures must be crafted that 
are capable not only of creating the conditions for an event that is 
perceptible to the human, that engages the human (within the scales 
and speeds of our own emergent bodyings), but that are also capa-
ble of fielding difference and creating openings in the continuously 
speciating arena of the more-than human. 
10 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(trans), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, 172.




In Arakawa and Gins’ writings, as in Kawakubo’s, there is sometimes 
the sense that the human body rears up as the starting point rather 
than one of many potential fields of activation within the relational 
milieu. And yet, a closer look at the workings of their work (including 
their writing, in the case of Arakawa and Gins) makes it amply ap-
parent that it is the event of the work’s workings that matters. In their 
faire œuvre, in terms of what they can do, both Arakawa and Gins’ 
architectings and Kawakubo’s fashionings challenge the view that 
the human subject is at the stable centre of experience and that the 
body can be abstracted out from the complexity of the milieu:
We do not mean to suggest that architecture exists only for the one 
who beholds or inhabits it, but rather that the body-in-action and the 
architectural surround should not be defined apart from each other, 
or apart from bioscleave. Architectural works can direct the body’s 
tentative constructing toward a holding in place, its forming in place. 
But it is also the case that how the body moves determines what 
turns out to hold together as architecture for it.13 
The tentativeness is in and of the body as mobile concept. A body 
is not a definitive form, but a tentative construction toward a hold-
ing in place. The tentativeness of all bodyings must be held onto 
in the creation of procedural architectures, for this is what makes 
the event remain open to speciating potential. The minor gesture 
makes ingression into the procedure at just this intersection: the mi-
nor gesture lands onto tentativeness. In landing onto tentativeness, 
the minor gesture opens up the field of relation, making felt how the 
field is, by its very nature, co-compositional. In this tentative field of 
relation made felt by the minor gesture, “how the body moves de-
termines what turns out to hold together as architecture for it.” The 
action does not belong to a pre-constituted body. Body is bodying, 
or, in Arakawa and Gins’ vocabulary, “tentative constructing toward 
holding in place.” 
Similarly, Kawakubo does not design for a pre-existing form. She de-
signs in the event-fabric of a reorienting of what fashioning can be. “I 
put parts of patterns where they don’t usually go. I break the idea of 
‘clothes.’ I think about using for everything what one would normally 
use for one thing. Give myself limitations.”14 In Kawakubo’s prac-
tice, even the fabric, the materiality of the proposition that moves her 
work, becomes procedural, oriented toward a tentative encounter 
with emergent modes of existence that activate a bodying not yet 
defined. Procedurality moves materiality to its limit. 
That Kawakubo’s experiments are not constrained to a focus on the 
garment is key: otherwise she would not be capable of pushing the 
13 Ibid., 50.
14 “Rei Kawakubo’s Creative Manifesto.”
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material beyond its attachment to the forms vividly associated to cur-
rent habits within the fashion industry. “The main pillar of my activity 
is making clothes, but this can never be the perfect and only vehicle 
of expression. I am always thinking of the total idea, and the context 
of everything. Fashion alone is so far from being the whole story.”15 
The “total idea” Kawakubo composes with includes the totality of 
what a material can do, the material here never abstracted from the 
question of bodying: when Kawakubo asks what the textile is ca-
pable of, she is necessarily also asking how a bodying exceeds its 
putative limits. Creativity is at work, but a creativity not restricted to 
the creation of either a subject or an object. When Kawakubo says 
“one cannot fight the battle without freedom. I think the best way to 
fight that battle, which equals the unyielding spirit, is in the realm of 
creation. That’s exactly why freedom and the spirit of defiance is the 
source (fountainhead) of my energy,” what is at stake is not a capi-
talist creation of the newest new, a new body, a new object, but the 
activation of the force of relation that has as its goal the fashioning 
of a new mode of existence.16 Freedom here, as in Bergson, is allied 
to the in-act, activated in the field of experimentation. Linked to the 
concept of creativity, which in Whitehead is defined as the “actualiza-
tion of potentiality,” freedom in Kawakubo’s work is what makes the 
everyday operational.17 
Speaking of modes of existence, Souriau writes: “It’s a matter of in-
vention (like you “invent” a treasure).”18 There is no pre-determined 
existence (just like the treasure only takes form “as treasure” when it 
is considered one). Since existence is only ever invented from within 
the field of relation and no two events activate the same field in the 
same way, modes of existence as Souriau defines them are by ne-
cessity interstitial. This interstitiality is what gives modes of existence 
their differential force and protects them from becoming restricted by 
habitual forms of life. Nonetheless, to “become a treasure,” a mode 
of existence needs a push toward consistency. What gives the mode 
of existence the consistency it needs to become itself is the minor 
gesture. How the minor gesture courses through and punctuates 
a mode of existence will define how the mode’s interstitial nature 
lands as event-time. A mode of existence punctuated by the minor 
gesture of a procedural fashioning has the consistency of a bodying 
alive in an ecology it carries on its back. This carrying is the carrying 
of an intensity momentarily harnessed in the now of a potentializing 
architecture. This potentializing architecture, carried as the fashion-
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 For more on Whitehead’s concept of creativity, see Alfred North Whitehead, Adven-
tures of Ideas, New York: Free Press, 1938.
18 Etienne Souriau, Les Différents modes d’existence suivi de L’œuvre à faire, Isabelle 
Stengers and Bruno Latour (eds), Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009, 142.
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ing that is another term for the becoming-body, is always an opening 
to artfulness. 
Beyond Site ///
Kawakubo resists being cornered into ethnicity. Where she comes 
from is an accident of birth, her husband Adrian Joffe reminds a jour-
nalist.19 This is not to say that the country of her birth has no effect on 
her practice. What it means is that with the creation of new modes 
of existence come new tentative ways of siting oneself. Historical 
memory crosses over, of course, but Kawakubo is firm: her practice 
is never a replaying of history as a simple score. What matters for 
her is not the cradle of inheritance, but the force of form that pushes 
experience to its limit.
This is not to underestimate the importance of what came before. As 
Whitehead would say, nonsensuous perception, the way pastness 
folds into presentness to tweak the in-act, makes a difference in the 
coming-to-be of what experience can do. The key is to understand 
that nonsensuous perception is not analogous to the carrying-over of 
a history fully-formed. Nonsensuous perception is an inheritance of 
the past in the present, an inheritance always in the midst of reinven-
tion, of recomposition. The past is in this way always a futurity in the 
making. In Kawakubo’s case, one of the areas of inheritance, I be-
lieve, is a specific cultural encounter with two singular forms of spatial 
patterning, the kimono and the tatami. These two patternings have 
orientations in common: both tend toward a complexity of potential 
form-takings, both are minimal in their cut, preferring the simplicity of 
a straight edge that refuses to mould to a shape predefined, and, as 
a result, both are open to various interpretations of what a fashioning 
(of the environment, of the body) can do. 
In the kimono, a garment used across genders that is cut in a way 
that does not conform to a given idea of pre-existing body-contours 
(cut beyond the length of the body, for instance, refusing to use body-
dimension as a point of departure, preferring instead to foreground 
texture, color, the artistry of the textile itself) there is the inheritance of 
a different way of thinking the pattern: there is a sense of the infinite in 
the cut of the kimono, of the infinite line. For the kimono is not made 
to fit, its lines are not contouring, its cut is not first and foremost gen-
dering (though its textures can be). How it is worn is what makes the 
difference, and there of course contouring and gendering both occur. 
But that this happens in a second stage means that the garment re-
tains an openness to invention: as emergent patterning, the kimono 
evokes not shape as aligned to pre-existing form, but a processual 
unfolding that changes in each singular instance of dressing. 
19 “Adrian Joffe: The Idea of Comme des Garçons,” Hypebeast (January 10, 2011), 
http://hypebeast.com/2011/1/adrian-joffe-the-idea-of-comme-des-garcons.
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This history of an openness to the line — think the kimono as an as-
semblage of straight lines — an openness that at all stages of the 
process inquires not into the fit of the garment but into its material 
potential, is perhaps what gives Kawakubo the confidence to ask 
her pattern-makers to work collaboratively with materials before even 
thinking of the form they can create. She mentions, for instance, giv-
ing her pattern-makers a crumpled piece of paper with an invitation 
to create something beyond a form, something that is not yet cloth-
ing, not yet architecture, but a mode of existence that brings both into 
tentative appearance.20 
The tatami, as I mentioned above, is another example of an inheri-
tance that may have an effect on the kinds of constraints Kawakubo 
develops in her procedural approach. The tatami as it is used ar-
chitecturally can be seen as an activator of space’s malleability: the 
tatami room, in a traditional Japanese context, keeps the environ-
ment bare enough that the space can become the conduit for more 
than one kind of activity. Furniture is kept to an absolute minimum, 
the space itself open to continuous reorganization. In this regard, the 
tatami room can be seen as an architecting of mobility for a tentative 
holding in place, for an experience of spacing or bodying wherein 
“the design process never starts and finishes.”21 
Both these inheritances encourage us not to delimit Kawakubo’s cre-
ations to a superficial definition of “Japaneseness,” but to emphasize 
that inheritance as a nonsensuous operation has procedural poten-
tial. These inheritances, if they make a difference, do so only in the 
way they energize a procedure yet to be invented, opening experi-
ence in its unfolding to the discovery of the oeuvre à faire, not the 
work as it has been historically pre-oriented, but the work’s working 
in the now of its evolution.
Take the “Dress Becomes Body” (Comme des Garçons collection): 
the public’s response when this collection came out was to see the 
clothing only with respect to what it did to the preexisting body and 
how it aligned with or diverged from the history of fashion design. 
Within this contingent of responses came the unsettled gaze that 
wondered whether this was a collection that idealized deformity or 
disability, whether it was an affront to the body itself.
Such responses to the collection are in the mode of first contact. 
They all depend on a vocabulary of the pre-existent and on the cat-
egories available within this vocabulary. But what if we look further, 
taking Kawakubo’s procedural fashioning at its word. What if instead 
20 Timo Rissanen, “Types and Fashion Design and Patternmaking Practice” Nordes 2 
(special issue on Design Inquiries), 2007, 3. 
21 “Rei Kawakubo Doesn’t Sketch, Use A Desk, Or Like Being ‘Understood’,” on Styleit 
(June 3, 2012), http://www.styleite.com/news/rei-kawakubo-nyt/.
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of beginning from what we know, from the habits of fashion, we began 
in an encounter with tentativeness? “Persons need to be rescued from 
self-certainty, but they also need to put their tentativeness in precise 
order in relation to works of architecture.”22
In the “Dress Becomes Body” collection, a shaping occurs. Why must 
we assume that this shaping hides a body? Why not take instead this 
shaping for what it is, as the event in itself, a event that includes a body-
world co-composition? What if instead of assuming that the person is 
not the shape, we were open to a different concept of personing that 
included its architecting? Arakawa and Gins speak of “organism that 
persons.” Could this be what is at stake in “Dress Becomes Body”?
Look again, this time refusing to abstract body from shape. See the 
personing as the architecting and refrain from selecting out from the 
emergent shaping the contours of the body’s skin-enveloppe. See the 
shape for what it is: a new contouring. Acknowledge this tendency to 
see textile as that which covers and not as a materiality in its own right. 
See textile in the moving, as an active shaping of what a body can do. 
See textile as an ecology of practices that is not separate from the 
body which it clothes. And now wonder at the ways you have become 
capable of abstracting the one from the other (and then wonder about 
how you abstract the sitting body from the desk, the walking body 
from the street, the sleeping body from the bed). 
Look again. This time see the shaping not as a still body covered with 
material, but as mobile architecture. Can you see the bodying beyond 
an image of what you consider a deformation of a preexisting shape? 
Can you see that the humpback, the strange shoulder-hip tumour 
may not prefigure the grotesque body of your horrified imagination, 
but might instead remind you of what you see every day as you walk 
around the wintry city of Montreal?
22 Gins and Arakawa, Architectural Body, 50.
Comme des Garçons SS 1997
162
Look again. Now see the tentative architectures. See the movement 
that was made invisible by the tendency to abstract textile from body. 
See the backpack, see the cross-body purse. See the puffy coat with 
the baby underneath, collar slightly open for its head. See what you 
see every day from November to March in your cold climate and 
wonder again why when you saw it in the subway, on the street, in 
the café, you didn’t see it as a disfigurement. Wonder at how quickly 
just yesterday you were able to see this body-dressed-for-winter as 
a body separate from its fashioning, at how quickly you unburdened 
the skin-envelope from its Michelin-Man coat. And note in surprise 
what Kawakubo’s work has given you: a new mode of perception. 
Now looks again and see not the clothing that mask a moving body, 
but a shape in the making that includes movement, the includes 
textile, that includes body, the three together an ecology that is an 
emergent bodying, a procedural fashioning. Note with some awe that 
the “Dress Becomes Body” collection is not the high and useless 
fashion you may have assumed it was, but a lively encounter with 
the everyday. 
 
The envelope has been ruptured. We are accustomed to the act of 
excision, of subtraction. Parsing is what we neurotypicals are best 
at. We see the winter-clad body with its thick coat, the knap-sack, 
the heavy bag and we simply excise them from existence. We as-
sume that the body is the shape underneath instead of the force 
taking form of an ecology, instead of a speciation. What else does 
that mean we don’t see? 
The “Dress Becomes Body” collection is a world-constituting proce-
dure for autistic perception: Kawakubo has created a shaping that 
refuses to celebrate the parsings that make reflective conscious-
ness the order of the day, and she has made it available for all of us. 
With “Dress Becomes Body” she has introduced us to a modality 
of perception not so far from our everyday experience that we can’t 
account for it once it’s made available for perception, and yet far 
Winter in Canada (2014)
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enough that we perhaps realize how we’ve become distanced from 
the operative interstitiality of modes of existence in-forming. 
Souriau has a word for the cleaving that makes operational a mode 
of existence: instauration. This untranslatable word, which means to 
constitute, to create, to found, to inaugurate, is defined in Souriau 
as the capacity of the mode of existence to settle itself into the world 
as procedural. “A philosophy of instauration will bring together at 
once the modes of the in-act and those of being, studying by which 
path they can be combined.”23 Instauration directs the mode of ex-
istence toward what Whitehead calls the becoming of continuity. In-
stauration is the inflection that makes felt the difference in the event. 
Allied to the punctuating force of the minor gesture, instauration 
marks the decisional cut in experience. It is here, in the activation of 
difference, that new modes of existence are redirected toward new 
forms of life-living.
The “Dress Becomes Body” collection invents a mode of existence 
that is in alliance with what Arakawa and Gins call “a site of sited 
awareness.”24 It makes felt the double articulation of the in-act and 
the acting at the very level of perception itself. To articulate the con-
cept of sited awareness, Arakawa and Gins develop the concept of 
the landing site. The landing site seeks to articulate how a percep-
tion, a movement, a tendency, extracts itself from the wider field of 
experience to land just this way. For Arakawa and Gins, this landing 
can be said to be an “apportioning out”: “That which is being ap-
portioned out is in the process of landing. To be apportioned out in-
volves being cognizant of sites. To be cognizant of a site amounts to 
having greeted it in some manner or to having in some way landed 
on it.”25 It is important to understand that the landing is not first and 
foremost spatial nor is it oriented by a preexisting subject or object. 
The siting is a bringing into relation. This bringing into relation has 
the capacity to dimensionalize, and when this happens, architec-
tural tendencies in the environment are brought to the fore. But the 
landing site can also have other functions, working more at the level 
of perception, of attention, or even making felt edgings of experi-
ence that are still in germ. Arakawa and Gins write of “dancing atten-
dance on the perceptual landing site,” of “landing sites dissolv[ing] 
into each other, or abut[ting], or overlap[ing], or nest[ing] within one 
another,” of “distributing sentience.”26The landing site is not a loca-
tion, not a point, but the tending, the abutting, the segmenting that 
selects out what is most persuasive at this eventful conjuncture. 
23 Souriau, Les Différents modes d’existence suivi de L’œuvre à faire, 164.




“Dress Becomes Body” sites awareness by creating the potential 
for a perceptual landing to occur differently. How perception lands 
has an effect on how a tentative architecting toward a holding in 
place bodies. In the event of “Dress Becomes Body,” the emergent 
shaping procedure invites perception to reorient: perception lands 
differently. The landing site activated by the collection is operational, 
it makes felt perception’s processual nature. Siting awareness in the 
field of relation opens perception to its neurodiverse potential. This 
challenges our tendency to assume that what we perceive is simply 
preconstituted form, opening perception to what for neurotypicals 
has tended to become latent. With “Dress Becomes Body,” we di-
rectly perceive the activity of shaping. Because perception lands 
differently, the work gives the neurotypical the rare opportunity to 
participate in the ecology that is autistic perception, an ecology 
where morphogenesis trumps form, and body becomes bodying. 
In the siting of awareness activated by this and other Comme des 
Garçons collections, as with Arakawa and Gins’ built procedural 
architectures such as Bioscleave House in Long Island and the 
Reversible Destiny Lofts in Tokyo, what is at stake is the process 
of shaping that lands awareness differently. To land awareness is 
a way of working the work, of faire œuvre: it brings into focus not 
the work as such but the very procedurality of the work’s workings. 
This is not to say that all work by Kawakubo and Arakawa and Gins 
does this to the same degree. Different procedures produce dif-
ferent ecologies, and the same is true in reverse. While for me, for 
instance, Arakawa and Gins’ Tokyo lofts are capable of activating 
a procedural architecture that remains vital and reorienting at each 
juncture, I find myself less certain about Bioscleave House in Long 
Island. Similar materials were used in each of these two architec-
tures, and yet what they do is divergent, it seems to me. This is 
likely because the fields of relation (cultural, social, environmental) 
are profoundly different in the two cases. Whereas in Tokyo the ar-
chitectural inheritance of the tatami room brings a certain continuity 
to the work of Arakawa and Gins, opening habit to its mutation in a 
way that makes the everyday operational in new ways, in New York 
the house feels strangely deactivating, its hard, bumpy floor some-
times more of an affront to movement than an activator. Perhaps in 
New York, the house is simply too excised from the everyday, out of 
context and therefore procedurally not quite ready yet. This is not to 
say that the house has no potential, but simply to emphasize that 
each ecology of practices will emerge to different effect, opening 
up different fields of potential that will themselves always to some 
degree have to connect with the inheritances that come with the act 
of life-living.27 
27 See Jondi Keane and Trish Glazebrook (eds), Inflexion 6: Arakawa and Gins, Montreal: 
Senselab, 2013.
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What is most interesting about a procedural approach, it should be 
clear by now, is not the final form a process might take. What is at 
stake is the shaping itself, how a form might be capable of remaining 
procedural, and even more so, how its procedurality is capable of 
keeping minor gestures alive. In the case above, both architectures 
remain procedural, but they do so to different degrees. What matters 
is how these degrees are taken up in experience. What matters is 
what new processes they enable: what new modes of existence they 
solicit, what minor tendencies they call forth. What matters is how the 
work is attended to in the modality of sited awareness, how its ins-
tauration is felt and how the work’s faire œuvre persists, persuasively. 
What matters is how the event continues to be procedurally capable 
of carrying the untimeliness of event-time — “Oh! That’s what it was!” 
— while operatively attending to the singularity of the event in this 
Reversible Destiny Foundation, Bioscleave House / Photo by Léopold Lambert (2008)
Reversible Destiny Foundation, RD Lofts / Photo by Léopold Lambert (2014)
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iteration of its coming-to-be. For work that works does take a stand. 
It stands in the time in which it lands, and it makes demands on 
that time. It marks it. A procedural architecting, a procedural fashion-
ing, always involve an encounter with a work that persists even as it 
stands, that engages with the openings of potential even as it takes 
its place, here and now.
This is the strangeness of the procedural as world-constituting, that 
it must at once be taken up in the absoluteness of its self-determi-
nation in the here and now and that it must at the same time remain 
open to the differential of times not yet invented. How to create condi-
tions whereby the here and now and the necessity of time’s unfolding 
coexist? This might produce some anxiety. “What can I do so as not 
to be paced out of existence?” ask Arakawa and Gins.28 The only way 
not to be paced out of existence is to remain steadfastly in the act. 
For to be paced out of existence suggests being on existence’s edge 
and watching it go by. This only happens when there is an assump-
tion that what matters is outside of the event, this event of life-living. 
If we consider our being to always be in the midst, if we consider that 
the body is never one, never outside, never enveloped, but always a 
singular speciation of an emergent ecology, there is no danger that 
we will be paced out of existence. But this does not mean that the 
immortality Arakawa and Gins make the beacon of their work will 
be attained.29 What will remain immortal is not the human body, but 
the procedural force that bodies, that architects, that fashions, the 
procedural force that sites awareness in the field of relation. What 
will persist, in shifting ecologies that include us but are not limited to 
us, is the more-than, the body as a society of molecules, a tentative 
construction toward a holding in place. 
Modes of existence as they are crafted out of ecologies of practices 
are never primarily human. They are ecological, active at the inter-
stices of what life is becoming, life understood not in terms only of the 
vital, but as an active vector that passes through the organic and the 
inorganic. Life as life-living, as force of form invented in the cut that 
cleaves experience, opening it to new modes of existence.
Choreographic Architecture ///
In addition to siting awareness, “Dress Becomes Body” architects 
mobility. Architecting mobility does not mean creating a site for mo-
bility. It refers instead to a way of understanding the siting of aware-
ness through a focus on the force of form. A choreographic architec-
ture dances attention, siting an event in the midst of its potentiality. 
28 Madeline Gins and Arakawa, unpublished paper.
29 For a more detailed exploration of how attention dances, see Erin Manning, “The 
Dance of Attention” in Always More Than One: Individuation’s Dance, Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2013.
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When a choreographic architecture comes to the fore, what is per-
ceived, what is lived, is not the siting of the body but the fielding of 
its mobility. It is here, in the differential folding of the choreographic 
potential of mobile architectings that fashion and architecture most 
readily meet. For when fashion becomes procedural what it does is 
assist us in attending to how a bodying is already an architecting of 
mobility at a different scale. 
Kawakubo’s work embodies such choreographic tendencies, bring-
ing to awareness the dance of attention active in the materiality of 
her textile creations. This is very apparent in her early work, often 
termed “deconstructive.” I draw attention to the work of the so-called 
deconstructive period for two reasons. First, to challenge the usage 
of the way the term deconstruction tends to be used in fashion, and 
to suggest that deconstruction, taken as an engaged rethinking of 
what textile can do, is still very much at work in the current collections 
produced by Comme des Garçons.30 
When deconstruction is theorized in relation to Kawakubo’s work 
(as well as to other Japanese designers such as Yohji Yamamoto), 
it tends to denote the making apparent of the seams of a garment 
in a way that creates a conversation about the garment’s form. It 
foregrounds, for instance, the unfinished seams and tends to make a 
statement about counter-culture (emphasizing, for instance, the way 
30 It is important to emphasize that not all collections are primarily designed by Rei 
Kawakubo, though she does supervise the process. Junya Watanabe has been an im-
portant designer for Comme des Garçons, first as a patternmaker starting in 1984, and 
then as a designer in 1987. He started designing under his own name in 1992. Other 
designers include Tao Kurihara and Kei Ninomiya.
Comme des Garçons AW 1982 Comme des Garçons AW 2008
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a given designer refuses to conform to Haute Couture’s norms). Der-
rida’s definition of the term takes it much further. For Derrida, decon-
struction is never a method, but rather a way to return again to the 
act of reading or making in order to see how it stages its alliances 
to form, to history, to epistemology.31 This approach encourages an 
account of how the work moves, and what it can do in its incipient 
activity. In the case of fashion, this allows to turn not to the form itself 
but to the materiality of construction itself, to the ways in which the 
deconstructive gesture activates the force of form.
In the context of the choreographic in its relation to dance, it is always 
compelling, I find, to explore the share of movement that “remains,” 
that is “left over” in the passage from force to form. This is particu-
larly perceptible in the work of choreographer William Forsythe. In 
rehearsal, Forsythe repeatedly encourages his dancers to “leave be-
hind” the form of the movement in order to explore what exceeds its 
form, its representational stature. I have written about this in terms of 
the “what else,” asking what else movement can do in its fielding of 
relation? It seems to me that the “what else” is of central importance 
in Kawakubo’s so-called deconstructive work, a gesture that once 
again brings architecture and fashion together, but not in terms of 
scale or form, I want to argue, but in terms of what is left behind. How, 
for instance, has what takes shape altered, refigured, reoriented past 
ecologies of fashion in the making? How has its operation incited a 
31 See, for instance, Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(trans), Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, and Dissemination, Barbara 
Johnson (trans), Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983.
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reengagement with inheritance? The garments portrayed in the im-
age below from the spring-summer 2011 collection are particularly 
interesting in this regard. What is at stake here is not simply the mak-
ing apparent of the seams of the garment’s production but a fore-
grounding of the immanent potentiality in the seams, at the edges, in 
the linings of the garment. The infinite line returns here, but where it 
goes is not toward the kimono. The kimono is perhaps what the form 
could have been. The garment below is what was left behind.
What was left behind is the “what else” of Kawakubo’s procedural 
fashionings. This left-over share of movement-moving, the share that 
has not quite taken form, opens up future processes. Like the what 
else in Forsythe that activates the more-than of form, the what else 
of fashioning is what opens material to the potential of its infinite line.
 
It is important to emphasize that these garments (like many others), 
placed on display for the runways of that 2011 season, are not for 
direct consumption. They take the season’s garments (the works that 
will be sold in boutiques around the world) and emphasize their pro-
cedurality, making felt not only the tentativeness of their propositions, 
but the more-than, the what else, of their constructedness.
Kawakubo states repeatedly that fashion is neither the starting nor 
the endpoint of her research. Fashion for her is not limited to the idea 
of a holding-in-place of a body as pre-formed. Nor is it about decon-
structing the past in the linear sense often attributed to both her work 
and that of other Japanese designers such as Yohji Yamamoto, nor 
simply, as the deconstructive vocabulary within fashion would have 
it, of revealing tradition and pulling it apart at the seams. It is, rather, 
about constructing toward a tentative holding in place, more re-con-
structing than de-constructing, thereby cleaving the body-concept 
toward an architecting that sculpts mobility more than form. That this 
work reveals its seams is of course necessary at times, and amongst 
my favourite pieces of Comme des Garçons are these early works, 
not simply because they shed and fade and show their fragility, but 
because they open the act of dressing to the fragile articulations of 
its very composition, allowing the garment to function as a lively inter-
stice. That the garments feel alive is key to their artfulness.
Kawakubo does not work from a desk. She does not use fabric 
swatches. She does not sketch. She seeks no ultimate experience, 
no precise moment of revelation. As she says, “there is no eureka 
moment, there is no end to the search for something new.” Instead, 
she works, intuitively, problematically, to create conditions for the ac-
tivating of connections heretofore unavailable to her, she constructs 
to make felt a relation that has not yet come to the fore. But she 
does not stop there. “Often in each collection, there are three or so 
seeds of things that come together accidentally to form what ap-
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pears to everyone else as a final product, but for me it is never end-
ing.” Kawakubo continues, she persists in a serial manner, working 
in the interstices of what is on the way, in the art of time. “There is 
never a moment when I think, ‘this is working, this is clear.’ If for one 
second I think something is finished, the next thing would be impos-
sible to do.”32 
In a procedural fashioning there can be no end to the process. This 
is a serial adventure with pinnacles of form that emerge along the 
way. The middle, the milieu of the in-act, is what is at stake. In this 
milieu, architectings of mobility produce tentative bodyings. Fabric 
shapes. But metamorphosis is what is most sought after. Kawakubo 
designs in interstitial seriality, always toward that which “can and can-
not be found.”33 ”Boundaries for an architectural body can only be 
suggested, never determined.”34
In the middling, everything is at stake. Remember: this is not pure 
process. It is replete with the becoming of continuity, with the cleav-
ings, the enabling constraints that make of process a practice. A 
collection must emerge, for it is from here, from the materiality of 
a form-taking, that the next procedure, the next dress, coat, pair of 
pants will invent itself. 
But are these really still dresses, pants, coats? Ideally we would need 
a processual concept for these incipient forms. A dressing? A coat-
ing? A trousering? The same would need to be said of the procedural 
architectures - not a house but a housing, a lofting, a rooming, a 
thresholding. For procedural processes to make a difference, they 
must be created such that they can perform, reshape, constrain in 
ways unforeseeable. This is a difficult call, and often it fails. When 
this happens, the potentializing “dressing” returns to the habitual 
“dress,” the “thresholding” becomes reduced to “entryway.” In such 
cases the modes of existence the procedural fashioning sought to 
create lost the sense of their potential trajectory, becoming less a 
pathway than a finite project, as Souriau might say, losing the force 
of their incipient directionality.
The complicity here between a procedural fashioning and a proce-
dural architecting is as speculative as it is pragmatic. In either case it 
cannot be about the product. It has to be about how the procedure 
does its work, and keeps working. This is hit and miss. It requires a 
long and rigorous process of experimentation, of study, and a willing-
ness to begin anew without pretending to know the starting point. Re-
call Kawakubo’s constraint: begin with the belief that we don’t know 
32 “Rei Kawakubo Doesn’t Sketch, Use A Desk, Or Like Being ‘Understood’.”
33 Ibid.
34 Gins and Arakawa, Architectural Body, 68.
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what clothing can be. In a procedural approach nothing can be taken 
for granted. It is always a question of the ecology at hand, of the ar-
chitecting toward mobility of an emergent bodying: 
Landing site configurations articulate at least this many positions; 
nearnearground, nearmiddleground, nearfarground, middlenear-
ground, middlemiddleground, middlefarground, farnearground, 
farmiddleground, farfarground; nearmiddlefarground, nearfarmi-
ddleground, middlenearmiddleground, middlenearfarground, farne-
armiddleground.35
But take care, Arakawa and Gins remind us, not to think of these shift-
ing grounds as positions, for they are also “areas of an architectural 
body, which takes its ubiquitous cue and command from the form and 
features of an architectural surround, subtending all positions within 
the surround’s confines.”36 The environmental surround in a proce-
dural fashioning is infinitely productive, for the starting point is topo-
logical: the body is that which folds.37 Without articulating it as such, 
I believe Kawakubo’s procedural fashioning takes this notion of the 
body as its starting point. The fold is where it always begins — the 
35 Ibid., 71.
36 Ibid.
37 This concept is developed at more length in Erin Manning and Brian Massumi, “Just 
Like That: William Forsythe, Between Movement and Language,” in Thought in the Act, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014.
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fold of the tissue paper she gives her pattern cutter as an inspira-
tion, the fold of the texture that constrains the scissors when she cuts, 
the fold that resists, that reshapes, that escapes finite form. Hers is 
a lifetime of research into the fold, the fold produced by the body’s 
bending, its kneeling, its touching, the fold of the texturing of a given 
piece of fabric, of the pleating so often part of her designs, the fold 
of the inside-out that brings the back to the fore in a garment, turning 
the seam on itself, the fold that resists becoming a seam, the imper-
ceptible fold, even, of the infinite line.38 For it is a fold, imperceptible 
as it may be, that I see as the inspiration of her Autumn-Winter 2012 
two-dimensional collection, a collection that strangely accentuates 
the body’s n-dimensionality. 
A procedural architecture, in its siting of awareness at the scale of the 
middlenearmiddlefarground, takes the fold at its point of inflection, 
making apparent how the fold is the force of form the Euclidean archi-
tecture of our most normative surrounds must always build against: 
the fold of the hill within the landscape, of the air as it rushes against 
cement, creating a vortex that bends and twists, the fold of the body 
that moves with the building’s capacity to make space for it. To com-
mit to a procedural approach is to commit to this fold, imperceptible 
as it might be, and of course to commit to how it cleaves, and then to 
persuasively include it, to architect at its limit, inventing new ways of 
colluding with it, all the while attending to the dance of attention ac-
tive within the force of the event’s own procedural unfolding. For what 
the fold does first and foremost is remind us that the body is never 
one, is never outside the ecology of its environmental architecting, its 
nearfarmiddleground never a question of bare ontology. The body is 
that which folds into the architectural surround, that which folds into 
the architecting of mobility that sites awareness, that which folds into 
its own activity, that which remains infinitely serial, that which can-
not but procedurally unfold. What a procedural fashioning can do is 
bring this tendency to its limit. Kawakubo’s procedural fashionings 
begin here, at this point of inflexion, architecting toward the creation 
of fragile modes of existence. Here, in the edging into itself of world-
constituting procedures, Kawakubo designs not for the body but for 
a belief in the world. 
/// Published on March 13, 2014
38 There is a conceptual connection between the absolute fold or infinite line described 
above and Deleuze and Guattari’s “abstract line.” They define an abstract line as “a line 
that delimits nothing, that describes no contour, that no longer goes from one point to 
another but instead passes between points, that is always declining from the horizontal 
and the vertical and deviating from the diagonal, that is constantly changing direction, a 
mutant line of this kind that is without outside or inside, form or background, beginning 
or end and that is as alive as a continuous variation — such a line is truly an abstract line, 
and describes a smooth space. It is not inexpressive.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 




A SENSING BODY -
A NETWORKED MIND 
BY ADRIENNE HART
An inbuilt desire to stray from the path, across the grass in a city park, 
is one example of how the learned or ‘schooled’ body misbehaves. 
I’m interested in the tension between our body’s social contract and 
hard-wired collective behaviour. I’m also interested in what happens 
when the mind no longer requires a body to communicate. When we 
sit at a desk computer or peer into a smartphone, our minds log in 
and our sense of embodied self rapidly decreases. The networked 
mind locks into a network stream and sends itself to locations far 
from the host body’s reach. How relevant is the body in an age that 
allows minds to roam free? Should we fight for the notion of body or 
are we already floating around in corpses, our vessels proving only to 
serve some kind of nod or nostalgic reflection to the past?
The Influence of Embodiment on Mind-Perception ///
Psychologist Kurt Gray among others has recently developed the 
idea that we’re all “Cartesian dualists,” our minds able to work in-
dependently of the body.1 Writer Matthew Hutson describes a more 
complex picture drawing from Gray’s paper on the subject:
Their results suggest that we see the body together with some of 
the mind — the part that feels things — as one type of stuff, and the 
remainder of the mind — abstract cognition — as another. A sensi-
tive body versus a competent mind. They say we’re Platonic dualists, 
as Plato believed our eternal minds knew the universe’s ideal forms 
before we became implanted in and corrupted by the body, which 
came with sensation and desire.2
So what we plant online might only be part of what makes us who 
we are. The sensing body is left to consume, digest and react to our 
growing and increasingly singularitarian abstract cognitive self.
1 Kurtist Gray quoted by Matthew Hudson, “Are you looking at me? What goes on in our 
minds when we see someone naked? The more we see of a person’s body the stupider 
they seem,” on aeon.co (November 6, 2013).










































As a choreographer I spend vast amounts of my time in the studio 
challenging and questioning how we move. A dancer trains his/her 
body for years with daily technique classes only to spend a profes-
sional career battling with this codified technique. Now imprinted on 
the body, they risk becoming products of an institution. We challenge 
the body to consider in a split second the many possible pathways 
available. But to “embrace every possibility” mental discipline is re-
quired along with strategies to avoid deception.3 My thinking is that 
technology has networked the mind, placing a new system within a 
new type of architecture for us to flow through, which in turn shapes 
how we think. So where does that leave the sensing body?
Automation ///
My old route from Shoreditch to Liverpool street station in London 
comes to mind. On hitting the main street flooded with suits, free pa-
per handouts and generic coffee shops, I sink into the groove, I be-
come we and, collectively, we march; the sound of progress reaches 
a deafening pace; the rules I follow are simple and mimic that of a 
flocking bird or a bug in a swarm. I’m not even that aware of the 
noise around me anymore, and instead my brain disconnects from its 
immediate environment as I reach for my phone to go online. There 
my mind expands out to form a small part of many other networked 
minds. I feed it, feed off it, rely on it, get too consumed and bump out 
of synchronicity with my fellow pace makers. Up until that point I have 
been existing in some kind of dualist “lock-in”:
At a certain density, the bugs would shift to cohesive, aligned clus-
ters. And at a second critical point, the clusters would become a 
single marching army. Haphazard milling became rank-and-file — a 
prelude to their transformation into black-and-yellow adults. It’s a 
phase transition, like water turning to ice. The individuals have no 
plan. They obey no instructions. But with the right if-then rules, order 
emerges.4
I see the body as this moving form in constant transformative flow. In a 
way the body becomes a form escapism, where ideas can geminate 
and rattle around for a while without the interference of an external 
force. We have the ability to do that, internalise and process an idea 
before projecting a slightly altered self, back into world. Vernon Lee, 
best known for her work on aesthetics at the turn of the 20th century, 
described how “the subjective inside us can turn into the objective 
outside.”5 Lee’s Beauty and Ugliness, which was first published in The 
3 Jorge Luis Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths,” in Labyrinths, Penguin Classics, 
2000, 51.
4 Ed Yong, “How the Science of Swarms Can Help Us Fight Cancer and Predict the 
Future,” on wired.com (March 19, 2013).
5 Vernon Lee quoted in Carolyn Burdett, “The subjective inside us can turn into the objec-
tive outside: Vernon Lee’s Psychological Aesthetics,” Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long 
Nineteenth Century 12, 2011, 2..
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Contemporary Review in 1897, noted physical changes in the body 
when looking at art and architecture. She hinted at our entangled 
nature with things. Ian Hodder, on the other hand, suggests that “the 
lack of inertness is linked to the lack of isolation.6” He speculates in a 
thought experiment that only a child born suspended in darkness de-
prived of all external stimuli unable to even touch and therefore learn 
from its own body might escape such a fate.“ The thing ties people 
together, and into relations of dominance and subordination.”7 But 
what if we could train our mind to enter that dark suspended space 
and free our bodies momentarily from all the connections, cutting all 
the strings?
While you were sleeping… ///
“Our need for belonging comes right after physical safety,” and yet, 
if we are to assume Maslow has our needs all worked out, why do 
we put our ‘physical safety’ on the line in order to stay connected?8
When you are a passenger in a car you hand over responsibility to 
another. Perhaps the cars motion sends you off into a deep thought, 
and bumping over car lights triggers you awake. A sideways glance 
over to the driver whose eyes are at half mask affirms the fact that 
you’ve both been sleeping. Where are the bumps in the road now 
that the digital world has spilled out and mapped itself on top of the 
physical world — two realities operating at the same time. Duality 
exists today at the expense of our bodies.
I like the body when it misbehaves because in that moment it over-
rides a system. Singularity shattered into infinite possibilities. When 
I am in a state of data or information flow I feel disembodied. The 
mind expands beyond the confines of the body and connects/locks 
into a stream where it is subject to a flurry of influences as I bounce 
from link to link. The flow is unyielding and constant. Can I hover mo-
mentarily above the stream and forge pathways that are not simply 
reactionary but self-aware? The sense of an embodied mind might 
return and there creativity can serve the purpose of offering both the 
individual and the collective an alternative.
/// Published on February 10, 2014
6 Ian Hodder, Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships between Humans and 
Things, Hoboken: Wiley and Sons, 2012, 5.
7 Ibid., 9.




DREAMS OF FLYING - 
FLYING BODIES 
BY ELENA LOIZIDOU
There is no dream but in forgetting a word.
Edmond Jabès1
Is it possible to provide a meaningful relation between dreams of 
flight, a common variation amongst the form of dreams, and the 
body? And even if we are capable of doing so, even if we assume 
that we agree as to how we conceive the body, what kind of path-
ways such a relation opens up for us? Would we be able to sense 
ourselves being moved towards different political, ethical, or aes-
thetic directions than the ones that we have been given and taught to 
obey? Even if we are able through the dream of flying, to see how we 
can break the mould of formality, would we want to shape the break 
into a new mould, or would we prefer to remain suspended in air, de-
fying gravity? And then again, to desire or want to remould the break 
provides us with an encounter with an agentic self — a self that can 
direct its future in this or that way, that perhaps, most probably it can’t 
exert such agency. Indeed, perhaps the most we can learn from this 
encounter with the dream of flying is precisely to let go of the chimera 
of remolding — turning into some form or blue print for the future the 
sense that such a dream may open up to us. 
The dream of flying is a particular type of dream. It is one that puts 
our bodies into a position that we can’t really achieve when we are 
not asleep without the assistance of technical support, auxiliary 
wings — remember Daedalus and Icarus’s flight — or without being 
on a plane or some other air vehicle. The dream of flight, we may say, 
puts our bodies in an impossible position, up in the air, defying grav-
ity, breaking the law: a formality of movement. The dream of flying 
positions our bodies beyond this law. In this brief piece I will consider 
where Freud’s and Bachelard’s accounts of this type of dream can 
take our bodies. 
1 Edmond Jabès, “Outside Time: The Dream of the Book” in The Little Book of Unsus-






















Freud did not have much to say about dreams of flight. In The Inter-
pretation of Dreams, Freud dedicates less than three pages under 
the subheading, “Other Typical Dreams” on dreams of flying.2 Freud 
tells us that he had never had such a dream: “I have no experience 
of my own of other kind of typical dreams, in which the dreamer 
finds himself flying through the air,” especially, he continues, “since I 
turned my attention to the subject of dream interpretation.”3  Despite 
his inexperience in this area he proceeds to provide us with a brief 
analysis of his understanding of how such dreams come about:
… these dreams, too reproduce impressions of childhood; they re-
late, that is, to games involving movement, which are extraordinarily 
attractive to children. There cannot be a single uncle who has not 
shown a child how to fly by rushing across the room with him in his 
outstretched arms, or who has not played at letting him fall by riding 
him on his knee and then suddenly stretching out his leg, or by hold-
ing him up high and then suddenly pretending to drop him. Children 
are delighted by such experiences and never tire of asking to have 
the repeated, especially if there is something about them that causes 
a little fright or giddiness. In after years they repeat these experiences 
in dreams; but in the dreams they leave out the hands which held 
them up, so that they float, or fall unsupported.4
Freud positions the dreams of flying to a childhood scene, and spe-
cifically one that takes place in a familial environment. Dreams of fly-
ing, a common adult occurrence, are mere reproductions of scenes 
that they have experienced as children, being lifted into flying by an 
adult. The pleasure (when lifted) or fear and anxiety (of falling) of this 
experience is being repeated or re-lived later on in life in the flying 
dream. Reference to any sexual arousal that may be connected to 
either the dream of flying or the actual experience of being lifted by 
an adult in the air, is mentioned in the actual text and elaborated and 
supported by two footnotes. In these two footnotes, Freud directs us 
to analytic and medical research on the matter. The analytic literature 
connects the enthusiasm that children demonstrate either when they 
are lifted in the air or watching acrobatics to the stimulation of the 
sexual organs or the witnessing of a sexual act in humans or animals. 
The medical discourse appears to suggest that the first pleasurable 
sexual arousal in children, particularly in boys, is witnessed “while 
they were climbing about.”5 Freud categorically dismisses Strüm-
pel’s  account of the flying dream as the “image which is found ap-
propriate by the mind as an interpretation of the stimulus produced 






by the rising and sinking of the lobes of the lungs at times when 
cutaneous sensations in the thorax have ceased to be conscious.”6 
Such an interpretation focuses he notes on the source that may trig-
ger a dream (inflation and deflation of the lungs) which he finds un-
satisfactory, or rather hypothetical. Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
he had not experienced himself any dreams of flying, and despite 
the fact that he has no material to enable him to provide us with 
a fully-fleshed interpretation of such dreams, he insists that these 
dreams have their roots in early memories of sensations of pleasure 
(being lifted) and anxiety (the fear of fall) that one may have experi-
enced in his or her childhood, drawing on his wider experience of the 
dream analysis of psychoneurotics  which showed that dreams have 
their roots in “infantile experience.”7 In line with his method of dream 
analysis — dreams provide us with access to our unconscious, and 
consequently to our hidden desires, anxieties, drives — Freud points 
out that each analysis of a dream remains particular to each dreamer, 
as the content of each dream is unique to each one of us. 
Nevetheless, even if Freud recognises that the content of each dream 
will provide us with access to the particular unconscious, he simulta-
neously direct us to read the content in his usual way. The cause of 
anxiety of falling or the pleasure in the dream of flying has its origin in 
sex. His medical professional colleague assures him also of the rela-
tion between being elevated and sexual sensation that Freud sees as 
being repeated in the flying dream: “Patients have often told me that 
the first pleasurable erections that they can remember occurred in 
their boyhood while they were climbing about.”8 The individual mean-
ings that each flying dream is meant to body forth, are therefore nar-
rowed down, by returning us to the probable cause in the dream 
— sexual desire. Of course Freud has made very important contri-
butions to our understanding of the operation of the psychic world 
through sexual desire and this should not be underestimated. Never-
theless, by reducing the meaning of a dream, and here in particular 
the dream of flying, to sexual desire, Freud inadvertently limits the 
possible interpretations that we may deduce from the flying dream 
itself, the multiple ways in which pleasure is shaped by our relation to 
our bodies and the pleasures that flow through them. For example, 
Luce Irigaray (sexual difference), Hélène Cixous (female sexuality 
and writing), Judith Butler (queering gender), and Chrysanthi Nigi-
anni (female sexuality, queering gender, writing and pleasure) have 
all shown us in distinct ways how polymorphous is female sexuality 
and pleasure, drawing to our attention to the limits of psychoanalyti-




9 Luce Irigaray, “When our lips speak together,” Signs Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society 6:1, 1980, 69-79; Hélène Cixous, “The Laugh of the Medusa,” Signs Journal of 
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Moreover, if the dream of flight is reduced to its content — irrespec-
tive of the particularities of the content — which in turn is directed by 
a particular prism (context) of interpretation (sexual desire), we may 
want to consider to what extent Freud’s interpretations of the flying 
dream really addresses the materiality of the body. We may want to 
ask to what extent the context through which the dream is interpreted 
is an abstraction of the material body, an abstraction of the material 
body in flight, and as what happens to a particular material body 
while in the dream of flight.
///
Gaston Bachelard recounts his understanding of the dream of flight 
in his book Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Move-
ment.10 As Colette Gaudin points out, Bachelard’s account of dreams 
in general is critical of psychoanalytic interpretations. As she writes: 
In L’eau et le réves, Bachelard explains his refusal to account for im-
ages as in terms of organic impulses by his lack of medical knowl-
edge, alleging that this prevents him from going to the same depths 
as psychoanalysis. The real reason is that he wants to seize the spe-
cific originality of the symbol without reducing it to its causes.11
Indeed we can observe that, like in L’eau et les réves (translated in 
English as Water and Dreams), in Air and Dreams: An Essay on the 
Imagination of Movement, when Bachelard accounts for the dream 
of flight he diverts us from the causes of such dreaming, its content 
and symbolisation. When he explains, for example, that somebody 
seeing themselves flying does not necessarily relate to a desire to 
ascend in society, it is not a metaphor for the achievement of some 
aspiration, but rather it is related to some movement in the dream-
ers’ instinctual world and their dynamic imagination.12 Put otherwise, 
Bachelard urges us to avoid exploring the contents of such a dream 
or reading such a dream in a symbolic way, as a revelation of some 
deeper or, unconscious meaning, something that Freud in his In-
terpretation of Dreams follows. Instead he urges us to view it on its 
surface, understand and follow the dynamic movement that it pro-
duces in the soul, and understand it as an internal movement that 
Women in Culture and Society 1:4, 1976, 875-893; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, New 
York, London: Routledge, 1990; Chrysanthi Nigianni, “Butterfly Kiss: The Contagious 
Kiss of Becoming-Lesbian,” in Chrysanthi Nigianni and Merl Storr (eds), Deleuze and 
Queer Theory, Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press, 2009, 168-182; Chrysanthi Nigianni, “The 
Taste of Living,” in Patricia McCormack (ed), The Animal Catalyst: Toward Ahuman Theo-
ry, London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
10 Gaston Bachelard, Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement, Dallas: 
Dallas Institute Publications, 2011.
11 Colette Gaudin, “Introduction” in On Poetic Imagination and Reverie, Indianapolis, 
New York :The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1971, xvi.
12 Bachelard, Air and Dreams, 57.
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shakes the soul, and deforms reality — the reality of our inability to 
fly. Bachelard tells us that flight dreams require us to look away from 
the form of the flight (e.g., flying with wings) and from the symbolisa-
tion/signification of the content of the dream.13 Instead, he asks us 
to concentrate on the movement that such dreams introduce upon 
the dreamer: a “‘journey for its own sake,’ an ‘imaginary journey’ that 
is more real than any other since it involves the substance of our 
psyche.”14 And once we focus on what the flight dream does, we no-
tice an ascending, a deforming reality, exposing us to an imagination 
that is not bound to a form (that “frees us from the tyranny of forms, 
and restores us to substances and to the life of our own element”) 
and to the desire of the soul to ascend, to unburden itself from the 
formal restrictions — or as Bachelard puts it, transforms the motion 
of the soul into the “whole soul in motion,” to the joy that we gain from 
the fear of falling.15 Indeed, the didactic lesson of the flight dream 
according to Bachelard lays in teaching us not to be afraid of falling. 
This is indeed a diametrically opposite lesson from the one we may 
infer from Freud. Freud suggests that the falling or descending we 
may experience in the flying dream produces anxiety, for we are fear-
ful of the fall. It is only then, according to Bachelard, that we may be 
able to see what the flight dream is: “a future with a vector breaking 
into flight.”16
Without causes to guide us, no origin to the sensations that follow the 
flight, no symbolic interpretations, Bachelard’s reading of the dream 
of flight opens our horizon to listen, to feel the subtle movements 
of our soul, to feel the body breaking with its form, weight, organs, 
bound-ness, and breaking, and not be in fear of what the future of 
this break may bring. It is a journey, a pleasurable journey, throwing 
us in unknown, undiscovered directions.
///
I have told, and re-told two possible stories about the body in the 
dream of flight. Freud’s story, brings back the body to earth, chains 
it to a sex that is presented here at least as being one (we are aware 
that Freud understood sexuality to be multiple) and returns it to a 
familial scene. The other, Bachelard’s story, unchains the body from 
its form, shows us its movement, its ability to fly beyond itself fear-
lessly. Freud’s story is a story of needs, desires, fears, an origin, and 
a cause that can’t really be proved, the other, Bachelard’s is a story of 
pleasure beyond needs, a joy without cause or origin, with a direction 
that is not directive, a break from a past, a release of the imagination. 





If we are to think of these stories politically, Freud’s story of the flying 
dream restricts our vision within the horizon of the familial, and while 
psychoanalysis may undo the fear of the fall, we will not escape from 
having our body reduced to the one sex or the one of sex. This is not 
to say that the body is not sexed, as of course it is. Bachelard moves 
the body away from the familiar and familial, to directions unknown. 
Bachelard’s story opens up a space to sense an organisation of life 
beyond the one that the family scene offers. It entices us to glimpse 
such a future without fear, while simultaneously it offers no guaran-
tees of an idyllic resolution. We can choose to break from Freud, and 
indeed many women philosophers (Irigaray, Cixous, Butler, Nigianni) 
have done so, and we may choose to break from form, and it may 
indeed be not even be a choice but rather a political necessity. We 
may break from form and it may just happen only in a flying dream, 
“a future with a vector breaking into flight,” and it may be just enough 
for us to sketch a new political horizon.17





THE ACT OF WAITING 
BY JOANNE POUZENC
In a society obsessed with speed and efficiency, there are not so 
many situations where a body accepts waiting. Most of the times, 
when waiting is necessary, waiting spaces try to provide the mini-
mum comfort for a body to cope with the context: seats, magazines 
and smart phones provide the mind the mental escape the body 
needs to stay uncomplainingly inactive while maintaining a distance 
from the other waiting bodies.
In fact, if the space allocated for waiting doesn’t show the specific 
characteristics of a waiting area — queuing lines poles, peripheral 
chairs and benches, red digital numbers and their stressful call — 
the act of waiting becomes less acceptable: the minds seem to be 
programmed to react to signals they can clearly identify in order to 
accept a given situation. Logically, the occupied time feels shorter 
than the unoccupied time or in other terms, time is running faster 
when it’s not dedicated to waiting. And the number of distractions 
needed to occupy the minds keeps diversifying: we are seeing now-
adays the multiplication of visual displays in waiting places being oc-
cupied by moving advertisements aiming to replace boredom with 
consumerist desires.
With the beloved expression die Sehnsucht (literally, the research 
of something desired), the German language offers an alternative 
to the notion of boredom: adding a nostalgic and therefore poetic 
understanding to the act of waiting, the Sehnsucht transforms the 
time of the passive wait into an active process, a longing necessary 
in order to enhance the object of the desire.
The Waiting Dichotomy ///
Furthermore, the act of waiting implies by definition a clear separa-
tion and relation of power between the one waiting and the one able 
to make that waiting end: the waiting body has expectations that the 
body able to end the wait — becoming the body practicing author-
ity — is supposed to fulfill. Sometimes marked by the presence of 
a physical border (encounter, glass wall), the dichotomy is strength-





























ground level between one side and the other — acts as a spatial 
disposal to generate a respectful relationship between the one who 
wants and the one who can. We often ignore the fact that the result 
of such a wait could be frustration: what happens when on the other 
side of the border, one can’t deliver the object of the awaited desire?
Anger towards the empowered body naturally follows the feelings 
of boredom and frustration. And in some circumstances — imag-
ine you’re a refugee waiting at the border, being the next in the line 
when the decision to close the border is taken — the frustrated body 
searches allies to defy the authority by opposing the group as a 
strength argument, taking advantage of the collective character of 
the frustration. But in most of the cases, the act of waiting is moti-
vated by a personal survival reaction, where the other waiting bodies 
can’t take the risk of being collectively associated because every sin-
gle body is in wait of a decision concerning their own waiting/living 
situation, transforming then the empowered body into the all-mighty. 
For example, the asylum seeker waiting for its authorization to find a 
refuge is isolated into a waiting zone — where wait seems to never 
end — but generally, no other asylum seeker would compromise its 
own awaited future to defend somebody else’s.
Accepted Waiting Spaces ///
In some situations, the act of waiting is accepted as a necessary 
condition. When the act of waiting is related to the maintenance of 
discipline and order to guarantee one’s security and when that wait-
ing time is generalized to the collective — one is being a part of 
collective waiting — the condition of waiting is well accepted. The 
act of waiting is sometimes divided into several waiting times and 
spaces in order to be more acceptable: one reminds for example 
the succession of waiting lines in order to reach the top of the empire 
state building: every single waiting line is thought through in order 
for the body waiting to be in visual contact with the end of the line. 
There is first the line to the encounter, separated by a hidden door 
from the line to the elevator, spatially separated from the 86th floor 
line to the next elevator, passing by some entertaining disposals all 
made to make you forget you are currently waiting and to make you 
constantly think that your waiting time is almost over. The scenogra-
phy around the goal to reach is made up to make you think it’s worth 
the wait.
But there are some more common examples of this phenomenon of 
the succession of waiting line: the airport (even though, despite their 
massive democratization they must still be considered as uncom-
mon spaces due to their access being mainly restricted to middle 
and high class people).
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Successive Waiting Times in Unidirectional Movement ///
In the airports, the waiting periods are clearly identified and known 
to any traveler. One has to wait first to check-in, then to pass the se-
curity checks, then to board until finally getting in the plane, leaving, 
and finally waiting for that travel to end, somewhere else. The uni-
directional aspect of the movement in airports — the differentiation of 
the ways in and out — helps the traveler through the different filters to 
accept his situation as it is by definition constantly progressing. Also, 
the different qualities of waiting spaces — standing in line, standing 
in movement, shopping while waiting, waiting sitting, etc. — trans-
forms the usually passive act of waiting onto an active process where 
the bodies unnecessarily in movement follow their path forward.
Moreover, the act of waiting is nowadays in airports produces a valu-
able asset as airlines use this fact to sell “non-waiting” privileges for 
a ridiculously high price. In airports, time is money.
Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s, airport design was based on the 
efficiency of a system and therefore on speed — their forms were 
adapted at the same time to the plane typologies and logistics and 
to reduce the displacements of the travelers, who were trying to 
reach the shortest way possible between the plane and the doors of 
the airport, whereas their designs nowadays focus on providing the 
best set-up for mass consumption, using consumption as a tool to 
transform the passive wait into an active one. The traveler is guided 
today through a mandatory non-linear (the longest, the better) walk 
amongst supposedly cheaper duty-free products from perfumes to 
leather outfits, technology to jewelry, etc. At the same time, the repeti-
tion of shopping utilities in the airports is used as the contemporary 
solution for economical balance: the infrastructure of the airport it-
self and the numerous and necessary surfaces of the waiting areas 
are paid partially by the outrageous price of the rent of commercial 
premises and therefore, their offers are primarily limited to luxurious 
products.
Waiting in Transit ///
But one part of the airport that is specific enough to look at is the 
international transit area. Meaning, the somewhere, between where 
one comes from and your final goal. The only place where it doesn’t 
really matter where in the world you actually are. The place where 
people from different cultures and different backgrounds are arbi-
trarily gathered, not sharing the same departure point nor the same 
arrival one. The place where nobody has apparently anything in com-
mon with any other body except the place they are all together at that 
instant: T.
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Legally, even though those spaces are located on a national ground 
under national authority, those transit areas act in fact as a buffer 
zone in between many national borders: when the border acquires 
thickness, the interaction within appeals as a fascinating space for 
exchange and negotiation. It’s an in-between space and creates a 
time suspended in a nowhere / nowhen.
International terminals are not connected with any outside context: 
there is no weather feeling, no smell, no sound, no clue from the out-
side. The only hints of local cultural identity appear here and there on 
certain billboards amongst the ones selling the international dream.
Also, the use of wireless internet is restrained and quantified: airports 
facilities proposes pricey internet connections for a certain amount of 
time, giving the opportunity of spending free time on a non-free web. 
And the time one spends in the transit areas is often relative to the 
price of your flight ticket: the less you pay, the more you wait.
But what is fascinating in the transit area — and the truly valuable 
asset of those transit areas — is the variety of people inhabiting it 
for a short period of time. Whether amenities and facilities orientate 
travelers towards avoiding social contact, the value of those possible 
and hazardous encounters is the true richness.
When Time and Space Stop ///
But what if something goes wrong? What happens when for one rea-
son or another you are not able to board and leave? What happens 
when your wait is longer than it is supposed to be?
Imagine you’ve come to the airport today in order to fly away. A vol-
cano explosion somewhere in the world, a snow storm in a rather 
warm country, a sand blizzard, a “situation” comes up, and doesn’t 
allow you to travel as easily as the initial plan written on your board-
ing pass.
You will start by waiting. More than you planned to. You will first wait 
among other waiting bodies. And everybody has the same questions 
and tries actively to find positive answers: “if I can’t get on that plane 
what does it mean?” “When is the next flight?” “Will I get my connec-
tion flight?” “When will I arrive?” “What will happen to my luggage/
properties?”
At first, the personnel on the ground will try to make you patiently 
wait by evoking circumstances out of their control or possibility of 
any control. Then, they will start dividing the waiting time onto shorter 
periods — as in some other context, they divide the waiting space 
into a succession of waiting spaces — and they will try to keep you, 
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geographically, in a controlled space: “the flight to where-you-want-
to-go will board in 15 minutes. Please stay in the boarding area for a 
coming boarding. The airline company thank you for your patience.” 
Then, they will renew that message, again and again, until finally get-
ting you on board or having to cancel your flight. In fact, if the flight 
is cancelled, it’s not such a drama: you’re at the departure point: you 
lost a day. But you may go back home, enjoy your rest and come 
back the day after once you finally get in touch with somebody at a 
crowded encounter who is able to redirect you to another flight pos-
sibility.
But if the flight is just delayed: you’ve been waiting standing in queu-
ing lines for hours, not able to leave your cabin bag to just even go 
to the toilet if you don’t want to lose your waiting position. And if it’s 
winter, you’re dressed too warmly. If it’s summer, you’re not dressed 
warmly enough for the air-conditioned spaces. The level of discom-
fort you’re feeling reminds you that once, “standing cells” were used 
as a powerful tool of punishment and torture. You may finally board 
and arrive in another city, with the mission of finding out where and 
when your flight connection to your final destination will be. Another 
series of queuing lines is ahead. It’s more likely night time, as you 
already spent the whole day waiting somewhere else. You don’t really 
know what you have to ask for: a flight? a bed? a dinner? a phone 
call? help?
You end up understanding that whatever you ask for, you won’t have 
it: not because somebody doesn’t want to give it but because they’re 
not able to do so — there is no flight at night. The hotels are all full. 
There is no possible transportation from the airport as the roads are 
blocked. The subway stopped working. The shops are closed. The 
restaurants as well. You are surprised to be able testify to how easy it 
is to experiment with chaos in a supposedly working system.
And once you are finally feeling hopeless, you have one option: there 
is a space, somewhere in the airport where fortune beds are settled. 
You can have earplugs and a bottle of water. But you should hurry: 
the beds are limited and the crowd has decided to get its own bed 
even if it means that the crowd will have to run faster, to step on 
somebody else’s feet, to shout louder, or more simply, to ignore the 
other bodies. At that moment: you are nowhere, and you have noth-
ing to do. Time doesn’t matter anymore. And neither does space.
Moment of Grace /// 
But despite the accumulation of unfortunate circumstances, it is pre-
cisely when time and space stop, when the connections — physi-
cal or/and immaterial — are cut that we can observe another phe-
nomenon. When time and space don’t matter anymore, some rare 
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unexpected connections start sparkling among the crowd. It’s the 
precise moment that people choose to start talking and actively take 
some time. And the solidarity coming from the action of taking time 
for each other bypasses the imagination of what one imagined as the 
“perfect” non-moment.
I have seen a pilot-to-be anxious about his final examination, a cou-
ple of old people flying for the first time to visit their newborn grand-
child, a Spanish speaking woman with her child desperate  to be 
misunderstood taken care by a German woman jumping between 
French, Spanish and English to get things solved, a Romanian gay 
couple with four women in their early fifties sharing the limoncello 
they brought back from Italy from their “holidays between girls” while 
explaining the aftermath of the fall of Communism and the economic 
consequences of capitalism applied to the industries in their country, 
a Spanish plumber and a south American Berliner looking for food to 
sustain the most hungry ones and taking care of a mother-to-be. In 
that unique context, one can think of a Sartrian “huis-clos” on a giant 
scale: nevertheless, to reverse Sartre’s conclusion of “Hell is other 
people” to “Heaven is each other,” stopping time and space is not 
enough: it also has to not last too long.
And the day after, the older blind woman looking for her  rolling chair 
— surprisingly not there anymore — finds her way walking alone 
among the bed skeletons and the rests of the improvised camp. The 
beds will be cleaned up just after, the space will be cleared, as if none 
of it never happened.




FOR JUST ONE NIGHT 
BY CHRYSANTHI NIGIANNI
I felt wrapped in its atmosphere, folded in its mood. Toute une nuit 
(1982) is a film about what happens between two. Happening as 
repetition. Repetition as stylisation. A stylisation of affect. Affect as 
image. Sentimentality as aesthetics. Chantal Akerman’s film feels like 
a choreography of twos, a dance of portraits of intimacy, a diagram 
of love. 55 dramatic encounters, embraces and separations involving 
75 nameless characters, usually couples, lasting anywhere from 30 
seconds to five minutes, all arranged in Toute une nuit: all night long, 
all in a single night.1 
If we could find a plot or a subject in this film it would be as Catherine 
Fowler (2003) comments “love, loneliness, eroticism and insomnia,” 
and throughout its 90-minute duration the film seems to be asking, 
acting and re-enacting persistently the same question: what is a rela-
tion? A question that acquires a heightened tension by being repeat-
ed in time, in just this time, in the whole of one night, Toute une nuit.
In Toute une nuit Chantal Akerman puts at the heart of the act of re-
lating, at the heart of the affection-image, love. The question of love 
is largely avoided and suspected in the contemporary philosophical 
terrain although it was once one of the most significant philosophi-
cal concepts (Plato’s eros, Aristotle’s philia and Augustine’s caritas). 
Today, at best, love, if still present (most notably in the psychoanalytic 
circles), is synonymous with desire, whereas philosophers seem to 
have little or nothing to say about it. Whereas on the one hand, love 
is constantly pursued and uniquely desirable, in popular culture, art 
and literature, on the other hand, it is mainly perceived as conspicu-
ously naïve. 
In Toute une nuit, Chantal Akerman is not afraid to work with love’s 
naïvete, its clichés and stereotypes and invites us to look again — a 
1 Catherine Fowler, “All Night Long: The Ambivalent Text of “‘Belgianicity,’” in Gwendolyn 
Audrey Foster (ed), Identity and Memory: The Films of Chantal Akerman, Carbondale: 




























looking, which is replayed with variation. Love and lust, so banal in 
the context of human history, are transformed into exciting events 
when captured in isolated moments and out of the context of a larger 
narrative, as is the case of this film. With Toute une nuit Akerman cre-
ates affection-images as snapshots that dismiss the depths and put 
emotion as motion on the surface. 
In her essay ‘Pleats of the Mater, Folds of the Soul’ Guiliana Bruno 
revisits Deleuze’s definition of the affection-image and opens it up, 
beyond the microphysiognomy and the face: 
In limiting oneself to such a perspective one risks equating affect with 
the expressions of passions, which is simply one side of the possible 
manifestations of emotional life. To map the terrain of affect on, and 
as, a larger surface, one needs to go beyond physiognomy, to look 
outside the contour of the face and avoid the restrictive enclosure of 
affect within the close-up.2
What she suggests is to think of affect as an extensive form of con-
tact: a transmission that communicates in different spaces in a 
tangible way. She thus argues in favour of an affection-image as a 
landscape of affects, as haptic spatiality. Moreover, Bruno’s notion 
of space widens up to include “‘atmospheric’ formations such as 
the play of light and shadow, the use of colour, the design of empty 
space, the power of the void, and the movement which is nonac-
tion.3” However, in valorizing space and the landscape, time is once 
more neglected or seen as an extension of space (time and move-
ment subsumed to space). 
Toute une nuit gives primacy to time and emotions (rather than space 
and affect). Bodies in sympathy are bodies in emotional states, the 
latter experienced as temporal phenomena “intimately related to 
episodes of affects.”4 The film’s structure and aesthetics seem to 
engage directly with the issue of time and relationality, and with the 
issue of oneness and unity, providing us with a different empiricism, 
thus with another thinking. 
The film consists of mini-narratives, snapshots of couples in various 
phases of a love affair: meeting, parting, running away together; a 
matching of bodies, looks and gestures, which are repeated with dif-
ference. These gestures are central in this film, while the nameless 
characters and the fragmented mini-narratives function merely as 
2 Guiliana Bruno, “Pleats of the Mater, Folds of the Soul,” in D.N. Rodowick (ed), Afterim-
ages of Gilles Deleuze’s Film Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2009, 213.
3 Ibid.
4 Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2000, 12-14, 68-69.
194
props through which movement is realized. Akerman does not use 
a narrative in order to achieve continuity and unity; unity and conti-
nuity are ensured in the affect: through constant affective change 
and e/motion that endure throughout the film. By repeating similar 
gestures (e.g., embraces, kissing, the ‘I love you’ phrase), meaning 
gets dispersed and we get immersed into an atmosphere of repeti-
tion as variation, a distribution and redistribution of affects and feel-
ings. What is gleaned from each individual image is later taken away 
through repetition with a difference, variation or contradiction.
Thus the structure of the film (that of repetition and fragmentation) 
enables the spectator to actually feel and experience change as fluc-
tuation: a variety of emotions, different intensities in kind, the pas-
sage from one qualitative state to another. In short, the spectator 
experiences what Bergson calls a “qualitative progress” that charac-
terises the flow of time itself: not a growing, increasing intensity that 
simply changes in degree, but “an experience of a variety of feelings, 
each already announced by the one that precedes it, becomes vis-
ible and definitely eclipses the previous one.”5 
Each shot is but one moment of a nameless encounter, of a story 
always in the middle that does not provide us with any information of 
what has preceded or what will follow. The moment then is the con-
summation of past and future potentials, a singular event that falls 
outside the chronological time of succession and distinction. Time is 
pausing through fragmentation, and our sense of linear time stops, a 
halt that causes an emotional charge outside any meaning, or story. 
“Time will concede for a moment. How else, since people love each 
other.”6 Time is absolving and affect gets deterritorialised creating an 
affective image of a ‘could be.’ Such an image invites us to look at it 
with intimacy even though in anonymity. 
The film creates a new aesthetics and ethics of the surface: no lon-
ger a representing or depicting image, but image as event, a contact 
by itself. In Toute une nuit the gaze is touching rather than grasping, 
comprehending, or possessing, and desire does not have enough 
time to culminate, dramatising instead the contractile abilities of 
emotions in a here-and-now. An affect-image is here not only the 
folds of space (as Guiliana Bruno argues) but the unfolding of time, 
the stretching of the moment that adds up to the texture of the im-
age — an image whose force is not to be found but on the surface 
as a plane of durational intensity, as emotional becoming. Becoming 
as pathos.
5 Henri Bergson, An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, cited in Suzanne 
Guerlac, Thinking in time: An introduction to Henri Bergson, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2006, 49.
6 Odysseas Elytis, “The Monogram,” in Eros, Eros, Eros: Selected and Last Poems, Port 
Townsend: Copper Canyon Press, 1971.
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There are two times in the affect-image of Toute une nuit: the time of 
the bodies, of passions, and actions, which is expressed in the tem-
poral figure of the ‘moment,’ and the time of love as an incorporeal 
event borne out of these moments, the multiplicity of connections, at-
tractions and repulsions, from the multidimensionality and simultane-
ity of actions and passions, of states of affairs (duration as oneness in 
the sense of synchronicity). The time of love in Toute une nuit is similar 
to the time of a choreography: it is the overarching tempo all ges-
tures and bodies submit to, resonating with each other and inducing 
a forced movement that goes beyond them. This tempo, this rhythmi-
cal time finds expression in the sonorous lines of the melody of a pop 
song, a refrain we hear every now and then during the film, usually 
carried across the city by the wind, or by a passing car. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari, “the song is like a rough sketch of a calming 
and stabilizing, calm and stable, centre in the heart of chaos” — the 
sketching of an uncertain and fragile centre within this seismography 
of moments, within the acentred plane of the affection-images.7 
Far from being the process of accumulating multiple perspectives 
and storing them into a unifying subject, into one perspective, that of 
the loving subject or the loved object, the oneness of time in Toute 
une nuit is the result of a posited intersubjective simultaneity — that 
is, the sum of repetitions of singular encounters that can do away 
without any individuality (all subjects are nameless, anonymous); a 
repetition that does not allow any love story to progress in linear fash-
ion, no Law of lack to be confirmed; a repetition that nevertheless pro-
vides emotions with a new dynamism and intensity: love as perpetual 
re-beginning, so that love is what makes the difference (in repetition).
The beloved appears unknown to us, implying, enveloping, imprison-
ing a world that must be deciphered, that is, interpreted. […] To love 
is to try to explicate, to develop these unknown worlds that remain 
enveloped within the beloved.8 
To try to make meaning out of an affect, to find a word for a sensa-
tion, to develop possible worlds enclosed within the beloved, to liber-
ate the souls implicated in things: it passes through a repertoire of 
emotions. Emotions are the indecisive between affect and cognition, 
sensations and meaning. Emotions are bodies’ stammering between 
… and … and …
Chantal Akerman’s cinema is a material and temporal capture of 
what has passed invisible in thought, what Deleuze calls a “darker 
and more agitated world: bodies and qualities which are also bod-
ies, breaths and souls are bodies, actions and passions themselves 
7 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
II, Brian Massumi (trans), London: Continuum, 2003, 311.
8 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, Richard Howard (trans), Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000, 68.
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are bodies.”9 Her cinematic image works as the surface that maps 
the traces of movements, e/motions, encounters, that happen in the 
depths of bodies. This is a mapping which refrains from teaching any 
lessons, making any judgment, or producing any theory, and thus we 
have an image as a new ethics of the surface, as pure contact: “follow 
the border, there is an ethic of surfaces.”10
Toute une nuit works as a pure surface (no symbolic elements, no 
metonymy, nothing to interpret); a surface whose expressivity is the 
temporal figure of the ‘moment’ and, through repetition, the event as 
the force of the infinitive ‘to love,’ ‘to kiss,’ ‘to leave,’ ‘to embrace,’ ‘to 
desire.’ This is a surface that incarnates what Bergson calls ‘inner 
identity,’ that is, the ‘actual apparent state of the human soul,’ con-
stituted by a series of personal e/motions, which are transpersonal, 
yet highly singular, since they are constituted by each passing mo-
ment in particular. The melodramatic delivery that characterizes the 
film (burlesque gestures weighted with emotion, a theatricalisation 
of the body encounters) provides time with a heightened tension, a 
cumulative effect, and every passing moment as e/motion is a climax: 
Time is what interferes and transforms. It is divided in moments. A mo-
ment is of course a nothing of time. Still it can contain all the climax.11
This is a climax that does not get resolved since everything returns on 
the surface and gets repeated somewhere else, in another moment, 
and all surface events communicate in one and the same event, that 
of love as a limit-experience, wherein forms become delirious, the 
sensory-motor schema collapses and anticipations shatter, while af-
fect transforms into emotion, into thinking, and back into affect.
Thus an ethics of the surface, the ethics of the image in Toute une 
nuit is not about relationships but about relating, an ethics of love as 
symbiosis, which means sympathy: “Sympathy is bodies who love or 
hate each other, each time with populations in play, in these bodies 
or on these bodies.”12 Sympathy as becoming together in pathos, in 
the “transmission of affect,” in “an intense state of emotion,” from one 
body to an other in the felt moment. Here, sympathy is in partiality 
and acts as an “inequality of affection,” through intensity and on the 
basis of differences.13 Relating not as contract but as contact that is 
the condition of all possibility and ideality:
9 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberi-
am (trans), London: Continuum, 2006, 47.
10 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, Mark Lester (trans), London: Continuum, 2004, 
9-10.
11 Kiki Dimoula, Definitions (Time), (my translation).
12 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues II, 39.
13 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1991, 38.
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Sympathy is not a vague feeling of respect or of spiritual participa-
tion: on the contrary, it is the exertion or the penetration of bodies, 
hatred or love, for hatred is also a compound, it is a body.14
The ethics of love in Toute une nuit finds its expression in amor fati, 
the will to want the event, to want ‘to love’, to follow up the event 
without the body and beyond accomplishment, not in a sense of 
the Lacanian lack (love as disavowal or a mystification of what is 
impossible), but in the sense of extraction and counter-effectuation: 
extracting dynamic elements from passions and actions, from what 
is happening between the two, from states of affairs. There is thus a 
counter-effectuating of the event of love that is beyond the bodies 
that gave it birth, so that from a pathetic wish ‘to be loved,’ the energy 
of the surface produces the power ‘to love,’ 
not an absurd will to love anyone or anything, not identifying myself 
with the universe, but extracting the pure event which unites me with 
whom I love, who awaits me no more than I await them, since the 
event alone awaits us, Eventum Tantum.15
Bodies in sympathy refuse continuity and a linear narrative. They 
speak through breaths, stammering and im/mobility, through em-
bracing and parting, with gaps, interruptions, in their seclusion, in 
their companionship, from one image to the next, from one moment 
to the next and the next. The Whole in one night, for just one night. 
/// Published exclusively in this volume








New filmmaking practices within contemporary arthouse cinema are 
responding to current socio-political realities with new cinematic im-
ages of the human body. They center around grotesque characters 
embedded within plots of comic absurdity. Particularly, since 2009, a 
Greek film trend has attracted international attention with the film fes-
tival premiere of Giorgos Lanthimos’s social thriller Dogtooth (2009) 
and its follow-ups Alps (2011) and Attenberg (2010) by Athina Rachel 
Tsangaris. The films have been produced in the midst of, and as a 
response to, the current Greek social crisis, which involves an eco-
nomic turmoil of rapid transformation and neo-liberalization in a time 
of ongoing bankruptcy.
Gilles Deleuze acknowledges cinema’s genetic value in its “constitut-
ing bodies and in this way restoring our belief in the world, restoring 
our reason.”1 Moreover, it is through the human body that cinema 
deserves its philosophical merit and forms its “alliance with the spirit 
and with thought.”2 The implication of these arguments carries the 
assumption that the material human body is essentially political and, 
according to Deleuze, it is so through its ability to move and to “move 
us into thinking.”3 As such, Dogtooth, Alps and Attenberg prove anew 
that the human body is a dynamic political and affective force with a 
high ability to negotiate social politics. 
Reverberating with Deleuze’s formulation of artistic exploration of the 
human body, the films deal frankly with social traumas through their 
on-screen interrogation of physicality. Dogtooth, Alps and Attenberg 
belong to a young generation of contemporary European arthouse 
cinema that operates through a strong demand to shoot more acute 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (trans), 































issues through formal and thematic experimentations. Their interest 
in the construction of uncanny images of the performing body that 
create an aesthetically ‘weird’ physicality, a weird body, aims at mov-
ing the viewer to spaces and situations which lie beyond familiar film 
experience.
Thematically, Dogtooth, Attenberg and Alps portray the lived expe-
rience of everyday characters in absurd situations. They are trau-
matically affected by the insularity of post-capitalism and the effects 
of paternalism in various households. In Dogtooth, the narrative of 
the family is used as a metaphor for capitalist violence wherein the 
oppressive regime of patriarchal power and its mechanisms of ma-
nipulation is keeping the characters’ obedience at bay; Attenberg 
articulates the betrayal of an industrial promise on the example of 
a deserted industrial coast town and its effects upon the physical-
ity of the protagonist, while Alps negotiates its resulting postmodern 
symptoms, that is, the physical manifestation of the character’s iden-
tity loss and dispersion. 
However, it is within the aesthetics of these films where the implied 
critique is more genuinely evocative. The films show an interest in 
portraying the emotional status of the characters through a mise-en-
scene that has a preference for disorder. Acoustically hyper-stimu-
lated images that picture the characters’ bodies in uncanny clarity, a 
fragmented cinematography that captures limbs, decapitated bodies 
and off-screen voices make conspicuous the characters’ physical 
and psychological framing — an overall fragmented image of the 
body that not only frames weirdness, but leads to exhausting viewing 
conditions. 
In Dogtooth, for example, captured by an unstable long-shot frame, 
the older daughter of a family pushes herself at the wedding anniver-
sary of her parents, into a moment of “performative excess,” into cre-
scendos of hysteric dance performances until exhaustion and then 
devours her dessert. Her madness culminates in a subsequent bath-
room scene, where in a diagonal line to the camera, she smashes her 
face with a dumbbell to knock out a dogtooth and then escapes from 
her family prison. Earlier, a similar unstable psychological condition is 
established through the camera focusing on the lower body parts of 
the two sisters who anaesthetize each other while their voices speak 
off-screen, slashing each other to retaliate and, soon after that, com-
mit incest. In yet another moment, the older daughter enacts a scene 
from the movie Rocky 4 and, in a close-up, jerks violently toward 
and away from the camera, bearing out the strikes of an invisible 
opponent and loses herself in performative, citational grunts. Almost 
identical moments create unease and spatial uncertainty in Atten-
berg, when the frame focuses on the characters’ partial bodies that 
drop on all fours, hiss at each other like cats in the heat, or, scratch 
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themselves like monkeys. At other times, a handy-cam follows them 
as they break into uncontrollable weird dances of their own invention, 
or, engage in sex scenes that are unnatural and painfully awkward 
to watch. In Alps, the unstable camera close-ups reveal a linguisti-
cally anorexic young nurse with eyes that seldom blink and a face 
that scarcely changes expression. In yet another moment, we can 
see her play-acting a dead girl, citing half-remembered script lines to 
provide comfort for the grieving family. In case of failure or complaint 
however, she endures violent strokes and loses her mission. 
The films have been commonly referenced for their weird premises, 
eerie atmospheres, absurdist dialogue, grotesque humor and illogi-
cality. The terms weird, eerie, absurd, grotesque in this context bear 
a conceptual synonymity as they find a common degree of aesthetic 
expression within the films and are therefore subsumed under the 
blanket term weird. Usually, the epithet weird refers to films of the 
horror-genre characterizing what lies beyond the ordinary or normal 
and, therefore, evokes in the Freudian sense uncanniness, or “unfa-
miliarity” (das Unheimliche).4 It is within the same conceptual context 
that many theorists such as Martin Heidegger, Albert Camus and 
Jean Piaget locate absurdity, namely as something unfamiliar, “either 
identical or intimately related to the uncanny feeling.”5 
Furthering this premise, absurdity in Dogtooth, Attenberg and Alps, 
as portrayed in the characters’ absurd performances and situations 
of humor, is magnified through a formal interest in images that gener-
ate feelings of disorientation. These aesthetic strategies that bear el-
ements of Deleuze’s “aesthetics of the false,” namely, a cinema that 
embraces aesthetic diversity by opting for alternative means of rep-
resentation, serve in Dogtooth, Attenberg and Alps as political ploys 
to address the viewer’s agency: it calls for a sophisticated viewer 
response in discerning meaning and value with regard to the film’s 
critical philosophical agenda in portraying characters and situations 
of uncertainty, ambiguity and ephemerality.6
It is within this absurdist context that Marina’s exaggerated physical 
choreography in Attenberg is to be understood. In matching dresses, 
she and her best friend Bella work hard to perfect silly walk variations 
in the streets of her bleak industrial town. Each movement is per-
formed in slow motion, broken down to smaller kinetic close-ups and 
camera angles, as if pointing to what the naked senses cannot dis-
tinguish as separate movements. With a mathematically calibrated 
4 Sigmund Freud, Art and Literature: Jensen’s Gradiva, Leonardo da Vinci and Other 
Works, Albert Dickson (ed), James Strachey (trans), Vol. 14: The Penguin Freud Library, 
London: Penguin Books, 1985, 339-376.
5 Katherine Wilthy, Heidegger on Being Uncanny, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009, 49.
6 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 137.
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camera sound and an overtly saturated color palette, these repetitive 
studies of the body are reminiscent of a post-millennium version of 
Eadweard Muybridge’s studies of stop-motion photographs that un-
conventionally disrupt the film’s formal as well as thematic flow.
Physical absurdity in Attenberg is furthermore reenhanced through 
camera strategies: when Marina invents elaborate ways of wriggling 
her shoulder blades, the extreme close-up of the moving bones dis-
connect the shoulder from the body. This invokes a feeling of absurd 
uncanniness at work, a deviant appearance of physical activity. Such 
effects of absurdity and the uncanny are generated in Deleuze’s 
concept of the “affection-image”: for Deleuze, the close-up is not a 
partial object but abstracts the object (such as a face) from all spatio-
temporal coordinates. It is not an enlargement that requires a transla-
tion of dimension, it is an expression which is to be understood by 
itself — it staves off the image from its conventional spatio-temporal 
coordinates wherein even the background loses its coordinates and 
becomes “unheimlich.7 The image becomes an uncanny any-space-
whatever, a place that has lost its homogeneity, a space of virtual 
conjunction.8 
Steven Shaviro formulates contemporary media-art as “digital tech-
nologies, together with neo-liberal economic relations that have giv-
en birth to radically new ways of manufacturing and articulating lived 
experience.”9 His socio-technological statement finds further voice 
in Laura U. Marks’ haptic visuality as well as haptic aurality as sug-
gested by Jean-Luc Nancy.10 Both notions describe a form of sensory 
experience, a haptic perception that renders vision as embodied and 
material.
Alps, for example, portrays the nurse “Monte Rosa” through varied 
aesthetic components such as color, light, sound and framing to 
generate instability, fluctuation and ephemerality. The nurse’s emo-
tional fragility is perpetrated through tonal alternation — often her 
pale contour dissolves into the bright pastel tones of delicate blues 
7 According to Freud, the “Unheimliche” or “uncanny” belongs to his theory of aesthet-
ics as a quality of feeling. It is  related to something that is frightening because  it is 
not known and familiar, something novel that causes “intellectual uncertainty” doubt, 
ambivalence. Situations that according to Freud might arouse such feelings are doubts 
whether an apparently animate being is really alive, as for example automata or the im-
pression of automatic, mechanical process at work behind the ordinary appearance of 
mental activity. Other situations are fear of castration, repetition of coincidences, the phe-
nomenon of the double. see: Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in Sigmund Freud, Art and 
Literature, The Penguin Freud Library Volume 14, London: Penguin Books, 1985, 339-376.
8 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, London: Athlone Press, 1986, 89-126.
9 Steven Shaviro, “Post-Cinematic Affect: On Grace Jones, Boarding Gate and Southland 
Tales,” Film-Philosophy 14:1, 2010, 2.
10 Laura U. Marks, The Skin of The Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and The 
Senses, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000, 2; Jean-Luc Nancy, Listen-
ing, New York: Fordham University Press, 2007, 5-7.
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that aim at de-saturating her, as if denying her solid presence. The 
film depicts this overt instability of the performing body as its centre 
of meaningful action. Screening time is devoted to the staging of 
her different roles in a plethora of indeterminate settings with various 
groups of people, of her oscillating and floating between moods and 
modes of life. 
The sound follows this thematic through a digital monotonicity, a 
haunting ‘leitmotif’ that hints at her entrapment between these vari-
ous modes of existence, the betwixt loop of being from which she 
yearns to escape. As if pending between the Deleuzian movement, 
and time image regimes, her unrequited becoming other is further-
more mirrored through a fragmented and grainy image that lique-
fies her silhouette and creates often unrecognizable images, evoking 
through their haptic and aural quality a disquieting and ominous ef-
fect on the viewer. 
Similar images are articulated in Dogtooth where an eerie sound de-
sign frames the characters’ physicality emotionally as well as formal-
ly: often it seems as if microphone particles replace the very pore of 
the characters’ body to capture every swallow and scratch in uncan-
ny clarity, to create distance between the body and its environment. 
Such a phenomenological (Deleuzian) understanding opens the 
films up to affective, hence sensory, readings that evoke sensorially 
confusing abstractions of the body. Dogtooth, Attenberg and Alps, in 
this respect, exemplify how film can experiment with given fictional 
conventions to open up ever new definitions of the human body as 
the weird body that, in turn, reconfigures the sensory apparatus, film 
making practices, performance strategies and not least, definitions 
of the cinematic medium itself. 





TWO BRIEF TREATMENTS ON
LANDING SITE THEORY 
BY ALAN PROHM
When the social body is wired by techno-linguistic automatisms, 
it acts as a swarm: a collective organism whose behavior
is automatically directed by connective interfaces.
Franco Berardi1
The variable that in the end prevents happening, defined as the 
swarm on-rush of events through presence, from collapsing totally 
into automaticity, destiny, is landing, the surface and voluming of it, 
and the voluming full of tentativity and potential that flowers in its 
wake, imaging along. The degree and mode of awareness (reflexiv-
ity, imaging) on the landing as it happens, or you/we have it happen 
as. And world becomes:
- Perceptual landing site: 
visual, tactile, kinaesthetic, auditory, gustatory, olfactory.
- Imaging landing site: 
visual, tactile, kinaesthetic, auditory, gustatory, olfactory.
- Dimensionalizing landing site: 
perceptual to imaging, imaging to imaging.2 
Landing Site Theory (a) — Supercession of Phenomenology, 
or Some on-the-fly Theory of Everything Happening ///
Landing site theory, thinking the landing and imaging constituting 
world, is the (more than just a) theory of perception at the core of 
what artist-theorist-architects Madeline Gins and Arakawa call bio-
topology, an “art-science” defined as less a field of knowledge than 
a “meadow of knowing,” knowing about/in/as sited awareness, ar-
1 Franco “Bifo” Berardi, The Uprising: on Poetry and Finance, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e) 
(Intervention Series 14), 2012.
2 Madeline Gins and Arakawa, Chapter 2: “Landing Sites,” in Architectural Body, Tusca-













































chitectural body, life in sapient-sentience plus the diagramming.3 
Biotopology establishes itself as a way of thinking for doing that can 
address the eventning that is/decides life, and informs the urgent 
and speculative practice of a procedural architecture, designed to 
extend it:
If you study hard and always strive to know the full range of the 
body’s capabilities, you will in all probability not have to die.4
Landing site theory, at the core of these efforts, staying alive through 
living as an architectural body, amounts then both to an epistemol-
ogy, a theory of first-person knowledge building, and to a conscious-
ness practice, a discipline for firming and loosening our hold on 
landing, happening. Both as epistemology and as consciousness 
practice, landing site theory is essential for building body. And most 
probably for not dying. The study of the body, the organism that per-
sons, landing, is the study of how the body can land further, inner, 
wider, longer, also. 
Where its promise seems greatest, is landing site theory’s offer of 
the keys to the secret of holding open the tentativeness of events 
and everything. Not to stop time, but at least to not die, now, or 
at any point. With oneself as always the core of one’s events, how 
not to be had by the collapse that happening just passes off as 
just happening? Not sacrificing active landing to the automatic. Not 
excluding a single chance or possibility. Holding as many horizons 
open as far around as necessary, or expedient. Fine insight on/into 
the acts of fixing and settling that the deciding of events in the end 
comes down to. Up at the tip of the formation of facts, landing field-
ing landing into events, we can study the collapse of wide to tight in 
slowed time with our own eyes and find the points/joints where fate 
may be made to take the different turn, and as-if Destiny reverses. 
Help it happen that way. It’s all yours. 
Reversible Destiny as a project(ile) looks to the extension of con-
sciousness (or sapient-sentience) outward and in every direction, 
into a more, into a further that is inherent/implicit/potential in the em-
bodied happening of landing and imaging and building. The body 
has it within itself. Everywhere that isn’t disinhabited and lost to the 
automatic, is living. Bios is the cleaving. The topology is a system 
or knack for keeping track. Procedural architecture is the vision of 
building for the body in bios cleaving, with a topology for staying and 
staying alive. 
3 For more on this“Meadow of Knowing,” see Madeline Gins and Arakawa, “Introduction 
to Elementary Biotopology,” in Making Dying Illegal, New York: Roof Books, 2006, 56.
4 Ibid., cover.
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Through(out) the body, architectural, cast wide, informed by the theo-
rying of its own landing sites, sapient-sentience’s complicity in the 
infinite visceral intricacy of all the things happening, at once, in line, is 
strengthened, dispersed and intensified. It is with us, and also within. 
Everything is more, there is less less. Here all reductions and auto-
maticities run for the hills and hide. Maybe including dying.
Body, a having membrane and holding organs, is architectural, is 
in Bioscleaving the cleaving that most supports us being a we, or 
me being the I that says ‘I am.’ Body claims its space as sapient 
sentience shaping personing out of places, and takes, a container 
containing, life lived out into every eventning as limbs or patches of 
skin, all of it her, or him, happening. Body is what we have of it, and 
what we take as us. Like each other. Grow. 
So, body is among other things its channels of intake — the more 
hardwired the more I — what intervenes in the channeling costs and 
charges — fields collapse from fences and fences grow tight to wire 
— what does the wiring wins — win the wiring, ladies & gentlemen, 
that is the only way — and the only way is from within — Out – you 
are the wiring, ladies & gentlemen, win from within — cast wide. 
Field. And the fences go flying:
The spreading of the connective modality in social life (the network) 
creates the conditions of an anthropological shift that we cannot yet 
fully understand. This shift involves a mutation of the conscious or-
ganism: in order to make the conscious organism compatible with 
the connective machine, its cognitive system has to be reformatted. 
Conscious and sensitive organisms are thus being subjected to a 
process of mutation that involves the faculties of attention, process-
ing, decision, and expression.5
Landing site theory. Allow it to introduce you to the receptive/reflexive 
texture (landing channeled but untrammeled) “this texture that is a 
distance,” “this as-if-woven breathing web of landing sites,” through 
which we/you enter ourselves as the events that seem to contain us, 
when in reality it is we that field them into place. Beware: the infra-
structure that interfaces us is us, Ladies & Gentlemen, including the 
channels and the diagramming, and currently they, who?, those who 
own, own a disturbingly large portion of this, us. There is a problem 
5 Berardi, The Uprising, 122.
Perceptual Landing Sites (II) by Arakawa and Madeline Gins (1981-84)
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here. Our bios. Their power. Unless ours. 
What would it take to grow a body that could stop dying? 
Madeline and Arakawa tried.6
Landing Site Theory (b) — 
A Supramodal Science of Active Happening /// 
Landing site theory, the core concern of the art/science biotopology, 
takes the stage of phenomenology and just stands up and starts 
talking, all on its own accord, at first as a team of two (A+G), using 
new language with little stop to reference or correlate, new words 
and ways with words emerging convergent with meeting all the new 
challenges of this happening actively. How we happen. How to hap-
pen. What and how to happen as. This, ladies & gentlemen, is the 
challenges. And facing such challenges the conscious body wins. 
With Arakawa and Gins, landing site theory suddenly comes along 
in seed form offering to articulate the whole soft interfacing between 
person-as-organism and person-as-environment. It provides, rule-
of-thumb-like, a science of how the happening that’s happening ap-
pears to happen and how it can be brought to happen actively. It is 
supramodal in that its base articulations are primordial to the sepa-
ration of senses and sensory modes, in a dimension of the world-
constructing going on within consciousness that all senses draw 
from and feed into. 
Landing locates the initial thinking/eventning, the first of its first phi-
losophy, infra- to the physio-chemico-electric differentiation of sense 
modalities, in the impact/impulse of anything happening at all in a 
sensorium, to an awareness. Even the notion of imaging, it must 
be noted, is supraordinate to the individual modes of imaging as 
differentiated within the sensory net — and here the word image’s 
general immediate association with visual image, in fact just one of 
6 Madeline Gins died on January 8 2014, and continues.
Detail from Critical Holder Chart 2 by Arakawa (1985-91)
209
its many sub-varieties, must be overcome. Imaging, too, as a term 
and a force, is beyond the distinction between senses, and points us 
beyond that, or better infra, near-side, en-deça of that, to simply the 
aftering of an impact/impulse of anything happening. What gets built 
up from there is another story. 
The fact of an impact/impulse/tacting/landing/act of happening after-
ing at all is of course of great importance in the history of conscious-
ness. This is in fact its birth crisis, as some see it.7 The capture and 
seconding of an intake, this, more than just the channeling of physio-
chemical-electric impulses along the specialized nerve and organ 
pathways, is the functionality that really makes mind, including body, 
a quantum leap within the un-foldment of bioscleave through organ-
isming. Imaging is the retain function that allows for forwarding of any 
kind and all. So, life, imaging along.
As a phenomenology or the supercession of phenomenology, land-
ing site theory is rigorous about anchoring its construction in the now 
of current landing, assuring maintenance of the phenomenological 
reduction, epoche, a permanent disclaimer at the basis of any ap-
proximative-rigorous thinking practice, holding the world as posited 
real off in brackets from the alone knowable, the world-in-constitu-
tion-as/within-sapient-imaging-along.8 In phenomenological terms 
7 See Zoltan Torey, The Crucible of Consciousness: An Integrated Theory of Mind and 
Brain, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009. The notion of “reflexive awareness,” as what dis-
tinguishes human conscious thought from animal modes, is based in a mechanism of 
impression-retention and recallability, permitting “the endogram’s accessibility to itself.” 
This conception provides a very important link between Arakawa and Gin’s landing site 
theory and academic neuroscience and theory of mind. See Chapter 6, “Reflection: The 
Key to Human Awareness,” in Zoltan Torey’s book. 
8 This thinking, on world-constituting, sapient-sentience, imaging along, is articulated 
most fully in Madeline Gins and Arakawa’s still unpublished manuscript, Alive Forever: 
Not If but When.
Visualization of Landing Sites by Arakawa and Madeline Gins (1997)
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the point is keeping the needle on noeisis.9 In landing site theory 
terms, it is sapient imaging along that never gives up on the landing.
The strange flavor of this theory, as some may sense it, is I believe a 
by-product of it targeting traction on a complexity of within, as Mad-
eline and Arakawa call it, rather than mastery of one from without. 
Phenomenology: EGO – NOEISIS – NOEMA
Biotopology: ORGANISM THAT PERSONS – SAPIENT IMAGING 
ALONG – BIOSCLEAVE/-ING
What landing site theory lets go of to go forward is the disinterest-
ed and hands-off stance in this older mode of thought, and what 
must be acknowledged as a lethargy common to philosophy quite 
generally. Phenomenology as a style/profession of theory shows no 
particular need of going further, toward the realization, becoming 
lived world, of the better knowing it promotes. Biotopology, as the 
art-philosophical-scientific project outer-lying landing site theory and 
underlying Reversible Destiny, arises from and carries within it the 
need to go further, urgently, to actively happening. More. As more 
architectural bodies. Wider. As organisms-that-person-not-dying. 
Landing site theory, which you must build, promises to put this, this 
short-hand, rule-of-thumb, intuitive, fresh (re-)start phenomenology 
in your hand, supramodally speaking, of course; so, to undo this 
reductive metaphor and start over with that sentence we could say: 
landing site theory puts this less reductive, more more-adducing and 
acuter mode of knowing in your hand, chest, foot, shoulder, forearm, 
small of the back, thigh, cheek, liver, tongue, abdomen, base of the 
skull, left hip, metatarsal tissue, cartilege of the right inner ear, eyeball 
muscles, soft grey matter, heart, hair, etc., all there, free of charge, 
ready for you to use. For what? Worlding. That’s your job. Where else 
is it going to come from? 
Sapient/purposive imaging takes impressions everywhere of the 
various parts of the whole it encounters and, in so doing, delivers 
up world.10
Landing site theory equips us as worlders, thinkers with a simple set 
of terms for articulating the worlding we do that way anyway, and for 
becoming conscious agents within it:
[…] an organism that persons organizes, transforms and redirects 
bioscleave, countless bioscleavings, step-by-step, by degrees, to 
constitute world, her world of each moment as imaged.11
9 A helpful, simple text of reference here is by Arakawa and Madeline Gins’s good friend, 
Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: an Introduction, New York: SUNY, 1986.
10 Gins and Arakawa, Alive Forever, Not If, But When.
11 Ibid.
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To catch landing and land on purpose, knowingly, aim. Sapience in 
the sensing. Sentience as the active intelligence of perceiving. Per-
ceiving to world. A theory of perception will allow you to explain how 
impressions are taken in. A theory of landing sites empowers the 
knower/thinker/body to create the world more consciously by em-
bodying it into place. Procedurally. Because the difference between 
a world happening as it happens and a world happening as you have 
it happen, better, forever, is procedurality. 
And the difference between a world built to happen, and one built to 
support you from every angle and at every step in having it happen, 
happening it more, is procedural architecture:
Architecture will come into its own when it becomes thoroughly asso-
ciated and aligned with the body, that active other tentative construct-
ing towards a holding in place, the ever-on-the-move body. 
[…] an architectural surround that is procedural, a tactically posed 
surround, fills an organism that persons with questions by enabling it 
to move within and between its own modes of sensing.
The body must either escape or “reenter” habitual patterns of action 
— habitual actions that have customized life into only a few standard 
patterns. Upon the body’s mastering new patterns of action, bioscle-
ave emerges reconfigured.12
Procedurality as an enterprise and a tool involves architecture tak-
ing this challenge to build for bodies’ ability/agility to catch landing 
and imaging as they land, and handle the happening that landing 
that way advances. It is using this handy/leggy/torsoey/etc., jargon 
to think then build the happening of the world in event/acts of land-
ing and imaging in their full range of modalities. And to make more 
life. The premise/promise of this art-science — behind procedural 
architecture biotopology, and behind biotopology landing site theory 
— is that procedurality in the activity of happening, supported archi-
tecturally, activates the body to greater life and longer. In landing and 
imaging actively, in constituting world on purpose. Building world by 
being a body architecturally. Fill it out, and be. More.
So, let’s. Yes thank you.13
/// Published on May 5, 2014
12 Gins and Arakawa, Architectural Body, 62.
13 For the extended version of this text, in homage to Madeline Gins at the time of 










Have you bottled her?
Samuel Beckett1
He sat naked in his rocking-chair
of undressed teak.
The corner in which he sat
was curtained off from the sun.
Seven scarves held him in position.
Only the most local movements were possible.
Samuel Beckett2
“The first volume of The Funambulist Papers is almost published, and 
I was coming back to you to know if your text for the second one 
will still be ready to be published around December as we originally 
talked about,” wrote Léopold Lambert in an October 2013 E-mail. 
“Taking the risk of being a bit redundant,” he continued, “I’d like to in-
sist on the importance of addressing the question of the body, [...] as 
the essays will come from very different people and it would therefore 
be great to have [one] object of investigation with so many different 
approaches.3” Also sprach der Seiltänzer: thus spoke the tightrope-
walker, and in this way  —  ambulatorily, via agchibasien  —  was the 
funis (‘thread’) furnished for the present foray (this very brief essay).4
Let us begin, then, by binding the body with a tightrope, the better 
to parse its particular parts and inspect its peculiar prospects, as if 
submitting the latter to the hands of Hans Bellmer, perverse belle-
mère of this essaie qua petit papier (this petit traité akin in some 
1 Samuel Beckett, Endgame, New York: Grove Press, 1958, 10-24.
2 Samuel Beckett, Murphy, London: George Routledge & Sons, 1938, 1-2.
3 Email conversation with Léopold Lambert (October 2013).


























ways to Bellmer‘s Petit Traité and Petite Anatomie de L’Inconscient 
Physique).5 The binding of the body in the works of both Bellmer and 
Francis Bacon is like that (the binding) of a butcher, or more frighten-
ing still of a murderer (‘sacred,’ or ‘profane’, sacrificial or straight-out 
homicidal). Writing explicitly of this webbing, constricting or binding 
in the work of Bellmer, Peter Webb wove together the following con-
crete and conceptual coordinates of these cases/encasements:
In Paris in 1946 [Bellmer] had made studies of women in relation to 
his [Donatien Alphonse] Sade and [Georges Albert] Bataille projects. 
Soon after that he had taken photographs of [...] Unica Zürn naked 
on a bed and in a chair, tied up with string which creates extraordi-
nary folds and shapes in her flesh.6 The inspiration for these images 
5 Samuel Beckett, “Who now?”…“Where now?”…“When now? […] Unquestioning,” in 
The Unnamable, New York: Grove Press, 1958, 3. We shall turn to the question of Who 
[What] Where and When below.
6 Compare this with the opening description in Samuel Beckett’s first published novel, 
Murphy (a novel having to do with its titular protagonist’s Greek homonym, Μορφή — i.e. 
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comes from the photograph of a murder-victim described in [his Pe-
tite Anatomie de L’Inconscient Physique]: ‘A man, in order to trans-
form his victim, had tightly bound her thighs, shoulders and chest 
with tight metal wire, criss-crossing in all directions, causing blisters, 
irregular spherical triangles running along the folds of the flesh, unsa-
voury lips, creating multiple breasts in unspeakable settings.’7
Switching for a moment from this Webb excerpt to an excerpt from a 
study by Peter Kollar,8 one could note here that this binding is the bindu 
(बिंदु.), the point, of architecture — or more precisely the architectural 
gesture: its pointing (in this case its pointing toward — to ward and 
precinct — ‘man’). “Architecture ‘takes hold’ of man, whereas other 
forms of art have to be ‘taken hold of’ by him,” writes Kollar, condens-
ing in one line a whole thread from the Vastu-Shastra.9 A binding or 
building-like ‘hold’ that, at first glance, might appear more loose and 
à-l’aise than the bindings of Bellmer — but that is in fact just as rigor-
ous (nevermind rigorously mortal), as Gilles Deleuze amongst others 
has shown — “the ‘cage motif’ which Bacon employs in the form of a 
glass box or podium, as a shrine [or contemplative temple], as bed-
posts or simply as cordoned-off space” (“motifs such as ropes, cages, 
podiums, glass boxes, curtains or rondelles”) is and are used both 
“to isolate” a body “loaded with emotionality, pain, existential fear and 
psychological depth [that would otherwise overwhelm — indeed de-
stroy — the work]” and to conduct all “attention” — indeed transduce 
all tension[s] — “with regard to the essential figure” being figured.10
“It is a very simple technique,” states Deleuze (“elementary, my dear 
Watson,” as Holmes-sweet-Holmes ne’er did say): “putting the Figure 
inside a cube, or rather, inside a parallelepipèd of glass or of ice; stick-
ing it onto a rail [...] as if on the magnetic arc of an infinite circle; or com-
bining all these means — the round area, the cube and the bar — as 
in Bacon’s strangely flared and curved armchairs.”11 This architectural 
technique, the yantra (“literally the ‘vessel of yoking’, [...] [the] device, 
sacred diagram, [...] [that is] the foundation of the temple” according 
to the Vastu-Shastra), “do[es] not consign the Figure to immobility but, 
on the contrary, render[s] sensible a kind of progression, an explora-
tion of the Figure within the place or upon itself.”12 Deleuze’s use of an 
with form[s] and formation[s], with [meta]morphosis and morphogenesis), an excerpt of 
which appears as an epigraph of the present paper.
7 Peter Webb, Hans Bellmer, London: Quartet Books, 1985, 232. 
8 Peter Kollar, Symbolism in Hindu Architecture as Revealed in the Shri Minakshi Sundar-
eswar, New Delhi: Aryan Books, 2001, 7.
9 See for instance Dvijendra Nath Shukla’s translation, The Hindu Science of Architec-
ture, Lucknow: Vastu Vanmaya Prakashanshala, 1958, 454-465.
10 This by means of “a picture within the picture”: Barbara Steffen, “The Cage Motif,” in 
Wilfried Seipel, Barbara Steffen and Christoph Vitali (eds), Francis Bacon and the Tradi-
tion of Arts, New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 2003, 176.
11 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, Daniel W. Smith (trans), Lon-
don: Continuum Books, 2003, 1-2.
12 Kollar, Symbolism in Hindu Architecture, 88-89.
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uppercase F in ‘Figure’ (and here, in addition, scare-quotes13) serves 
to distinguish it from normative figuration[s]: an important distinction, 
since the ‘Figure’ in this case is, as Gilbert Simondon — formative in-
fluence (speaking of forms and formation) on monsieur Gilles Deleuze 
— puts it in his treatise On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 
“the [F]igure of a [G]round,” as opposed to a figure distinct and dis-
tinguished from ground (hence we have here a “distinction” by way of 
indistinction, or again a “clarification” by blurring).14
The ‘Figure’ here is, in its figuration of the ground or ground-figuration, 
an indistinct “quidam quelconque”15: “[a] quidam, [an] ‘unknown’,” 
which might be described as “a vast pre-individual field,16 an omni-
present yet essentially amorphous figure [...] that, like the [in]famous 
‘compound ghost’ of T.S. Eliot’s fourth and final Quartet, is both ‘in-
timate and unidentifiable.’ Identities emerge from this field ‘only in 
specific contexts’,” with and in the specific confines of ropes, cages, 
podiums, glass boxes, curtains or rondelles (as above,17 so below18), 
each one “but a fragment, a particular façade, of the larval being” qua 
quidam quelconque “hovering vastly over the[ir] shoulders.”19 In the 
Vastu-Shastra this ‘Figure’ is the Vastupurushamandala, the subject 
of the present essay and of Stella Kramrisch’s landmark treatise The 
Hindu Temple.20
“The Vastupurusha is the Anthropocosmos [qua Pharaonic pr-aA]”21 
wrote Schwaller in “The Hindu Temple” subsection of The Temple of 
Man.22 Although anthropoid, this ‘Figure’ (the Vastupurusha qua pr-aA 
or Anthropocosmos) is not human — hence Schwaller’s observation 
that it “is anthropomorphized but never humanized;” Kollar calls it 
13 The scare-quotes (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/scare_quotes) that suggest the exis-
tence of a ghost in the shell (押井 守).
14 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, E.N. Mellamphy, 
D.A. Mellamphy and N.B. Mellamphy (trans), 2010 (available online at http://archive.org/
details/Simondon--ModeOfExistenceOfTechnicalObjectsinProgress).
15 Lifting this phrase from Samuel Beckett’s, How it Is, New York: Grove Press, 1964, 9..
16 See footnote 19 below (re: a related quotation from Bellmer’s Petite Anatomie de 
L’Inconscient Physique, ou L’Anatomie de L’Image, Paris: Terrain Vague, 1957, 29).
17 See the epigraphs at the beginning of this essay.
18 Hear ‘here’.
19 Dan Mellamphy, “Alchemical Endgame,” in Aaron Cheak (ed), Alchemical Traditions 
from Antiquity to the Avant-Garde, Melbourne: Numen Books, 2013, 636.
20 Stella Kramrisch, The Hindu Temple, Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1946. 
René Schwaller provides the Greek translation and explores the Egyptian manifestation 
of this Vedic conception in his equally monumental study, The Temple of Man, cf. Chapter 
8, “Du Temple Hindou,” in Le Temple de L’Homme: Apet du Sud à Louqsor, Paris: Édi-
tions Caractères, 1957, 726-734.
21 The word Pharaoh (pr-aA) literally means ‘Great House’, i.e., an architectural principle; 
it is the principle (according to René Schwaller) of the Anthropocosmos qua Vastupuru-
sha. 
22 Schwaller, Le Temple de L’Homme, 728.
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“superhuman,” and indeed it is in many respects Übermenschlich.23 
“This is the raison-d’être of [architectural] symbolism in traditional civi-
lizations, where the main preoccupations are directed toward [...] the 
knowledge and the attainment of certain states which are ‘superhu-
man’: symbolism is used to communicate, as far as this is possible, 
the nature of the states in question.”24 “In civilizations where the tra-
dition is no longer effective or has become largely unrecognizable, 
symbolism is lost,” argues Kollar, “or what is worse, is subverted, since 
the chief preoccupation of the people shifts to the strictly human, even 
to the base-material or ‘subhuman’ level; traditional symbolism hence 
becomes ‘superfluous’ since all that is ‘worth’ communicating can be 
communicated in human terms.”25
The Übermenschlich Anthropocosmos qua pr-aA\Vastupurusha is, 
according to the Vastu-Shastra a primal, primeval and pre-individual 
unity (what Simondon would call a “primitive magical unity”).26 “Ac-
23 Ibid., 27, emphasis in the original. Kollar, Symbolism in Hindu Architecture, ix.
24 Kollar, Symbolism in Hindu Architecture, ix.
25 Ibid.
26 Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 99; cf. Part III (“The Essence 
of Technicity”) Chapter I (“The Genesis of Technicity”), Section i (“The Notion of Phase 
Applied to Becoming: Technicity as Phase”), 99-102, METO III.I.i (available online http://
archive.org/details/Simondon--ModeOfExistenceOfTechnicalObjectsinProgress).
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cording to the many myths of Hindu tradition, the fall from unified be-
ing into separate existence” — or to wax Levinasian, from existence to 
existents27 — “has something frightening, asuric and undetermined in 
its nature. ‘Once there was some existing thing not defined by name, 
unknown in its proper form in blocked heaven and earth; seeing that, 
the Devas seized it of a sudden and laid it on the earth face-down-
ward. In the same position as they were when they seized it, the De-
vas stayed on it where it lay. Brahma made it full of gods and called 
it Vastupurusha’. [...] Only after this can ‘the existing thing undefined 
by name, unknown in its proper form’ receive its name, Vastupurusha, 
and its proper form, the square, [fourfold, or quadrature].”28
Here we have a mythic recounting or accounting of “the fundamental 
procedure from unity to quadrature,” from formless (i.e. unformed) 
chaos to a formal, four[fold]-element cosmos.29 The diagrammatic 
form (/mandala) of the existent (/vastu) entity (/purusha) reflects the 
quaternity of its elemental existential composition qua deposition — 
being fourfold like the four chymoi, stoïcheia, purusharthas (humours, 
elements, “[anthropological] ends”) etc. — but in a ‘man’ner distinct 
from the later post-Pythagorean/post-‘Pitha-guru’ and more impor-
tantly post-Purushan — hence human-all-too-human — models/man-
dalas such as those of Aristotle, the Stoïcs, and the whole Patristic 
Tradition that followed in the[ir] aftermath.30
27 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, Alphonso Linguis (trans), The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1978; (re: Alphonso Lingis — translator of Existence — and the existent 
author [of the present essay]).
28 Kollar, Symbolism in Hindu Architecture, 49-50. 
29 Ibid., 52.
30 See Joseph Rykwert, The Dancing Column: On Order in Architecture, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1996, 69. 
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Whereas figures such as those outlined by Marcus Vitruvius Pollio in 
De Architectura (his Ten Books on Architecture, circa 15 BC — spe-
cifically section 1:2-3 of Book Three, the book on temples and archi-
tectural orders), made famous after its revival in the Renaissance by 
Leonardo’s mandala (viz. ‘Vitruvian Man’ by Leonardo da Vinci, circa 
1490), are based on a body with outstretched arms and legs, limbs 
extended to their maximum range (e.g., “the so-called ‘metrologi-
cal relief’ in the Ashmolean Museum” which “shows the top-half of a 
man’s body with his arms stretched-out full”31), the V² or Vedic Vision 
by contrast is compact, compacted, confined by (rather than config-
uring) the mandala as such — unextended, in other words, rather than 
in a state of extension. Extension in the Vedic Vision (the V² Vastupu-
rusha mandala) gives rise to the building that is based on, and grows 
out from, the basic mandala — a building that stands, according to 
Schwaller, as an extensive “symbol” of the latter; the mandala itself 
remains purely intensive (hence its association in this essay with the 
bound figures of Bacon and Bellmer, not to mention Beckett).32 
Extension in the Vedic Vision takes the form of a dismemberment 
moreover, following Book Ten of the Rig Veda: as Rykwert explains, 
“the ninetieth hymn of the Rig Veda suggests the creation of the cos-
mos and of society through a sacrificial dismembering of Purusha, 
the first man.”33 The creation of the cosmos and of society is in other 
words (in the words of T.S. Eliot, author of The Waste Land, during the 
composition of that poem, in an essay for The Egoist) “a continual 
self-sacrifice, a continual extinction” of Purusha — Avast! — into a 
Vastu: an existent form, an existent formulation. Purusha as such is 
a pre-existent, pre-individuated “impersonality”: an “impersonality 
[...] surrendering [indeed sacrificing] itself wholly to the work to be 
done.”34 A Vastu, then, is its “objective correlative, in other words, a 
set of objects, a situation [or] a chain of events which shall be the 
formula for [its] particular [manifestation]” and its manifested Grund-
stimmung: its ultimate architectural effect qua affect.35 
31 Ibid., 99.
32 Architecture in both the Vedic and Pharaonic traditions is “symbolic” according to 
Schwaller; that is, it is a matter of making symbolic structures—“symbols” as such—
that articulate a vast synthesis, manifesting manifold dimensions of the diagrammatical 
Vastupurusha. At the beginning of his treatise on The Temple of Man, Schwaller con-
fesses that within [t]his text he is obviously “obliged to use words, which, although they 
define the idea, are by that very fact misleading. Indeed to speak of the esoteric is neces-
sarily to be exoteric. […] So, what can we do? We have to use words, but our aim is much 
higher; only the symbol can translate the synthetic sense of thought. It is a question of 
evoking that which can no longer be defined. It is thus a ‘feeling’ that we must bring into 
being, an ‘unexpressed intuition’, a ‘certainty’ for which the word-that-would-not-limit-it is 
lacking.” Schwaller, Le Temple de L’Homme, 16.
33 Rykwert, The Dancing Column, 72-73; or, quoting Kramrisch, “the Purusha sacrifices 
itself into existence”: “it spends itself in an ever renewed, ever proceeding sacrifice by 
which the universe [and its existents] subsist[s].” Kramrisch, The Hindu Temple, 68.
34 T.S. Eliot, The Egoist 6:4 (September 1919), 54-55.
35 T.S. Eliot, in The Athenæum (September 1919), 940-941, emphasis in the original. 
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Following the diagrammatics of the Vastupurushamandala, the par-
ticular manifestation and particular architectural affect effected by the 
individualization of objective correlativization “[is] such that” when all 
of the facts (“which must terminate in sensory experience”) “are giv-
en,” the latter affect and manifested effect “strike us” as if they were 
the inevitable outcome[s] of the initial gesture (the initiating diagram-
mandala). Eliot likens this to the trajectory of all great tragedies (as 
did Nietzsche, in a way, throughout his Philosophy in the Tragic Age 
This is moreover the symbolic crux of Marshall McLuhan’s movement, in his work, from 
Typographic Man to [what we might here call] Hieroglyphic Man (cf. Nandita Biswas Mel-
lamphy, “Nietzsche’s Pharaonic Thought: Hieroglyphic Transduction,” in Ozone: Journal 
of Object-Oriented Studies 1:1, 2012), based on the architectonic of Edgar Allan Poe 
and reflected in the principles put forward by Baudelaire, Eliot, and long before them, 
Leonardo. “Baudelaire and Valéry,” he wrote, “recognized in Poe a man of the Leon-
ardo da Vinci stature. Poe saw plainly that the anticipation of effect was the only way to 
achieve organic control for the creative process. T. S. Eliot, like Baudelaire and Valéry, 
gives his entire sanction to Poe’s discovery. In a celebrated passage […] he writes: ‘The 
only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an ‘objective correlative’; 
in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula 
of that particular emotion” or affect-effect. “Poe set this method to work in many of his 
poems and stories”: this “method of artistic [/architectural] perception. [...] Such is also 
the case in symbolist poetry.” Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of 
Typographic Man, University of Toronto Press, 1962, 276-277.
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of the Greeks: his Philosophie im Tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen 
of the late 1870s); for example in the “most successful tragedies” 
of William Shakespeare “you will find [for instance] that the state of 
mind of Lady Macbeth walking in her sleep has been communicated 
to you by a skillful accumulation of sensory impressions; [and] the 
words of Macbeth on hearing of his wife’s death strike us as if, given 
the sequence of events, these words were automatically released by 
the last event in the series.”36 The difference in the case of the Vastu-
purushamandala is that the evoked “state” or ground-mood (Grundst
immung/“mood”/“mode”/“state [of mind]”) correlates not with an ini-
tial human impulse, impetus or catalyst, but rather with a gesture that 
— although “anthropomorphized” — is ultimately “never humanized” 
and that accords instead with what Kollar calls the “superhuman,” 
with the Übermenschlich Anthropocosmos qua pr-aA\Vastupurusha.37 
This is the conundrum of Hamm in Beckett’s Endgame and of Hamlet 
in Shakespeare’s Hamlet: the correlations in these cases are beyond 
the bounds of the human-all-too-human, “in excess of the facts as 
they appear [to the latter]” and a matter instead of architectural ges-
ture — architectural gesture, gestation and suggestion.
Each [architectural] structure, as the outcome of an [architectural] 
gesture, is according to Schwaller “an analyzed moment of the syn-
thesis [or associated milieu]”38: one that arises as a ‘Figure’ — in the 
Deleuzo-Simondonian sense, hence the uppercase F39 — from what 
36 T.S. Eliot, in The Athenæum (September 1919), 940-941.
37 Schwaller, Le Temple de L’Homme, 27; Kollar, Symbolism in Hindu Architecture, 
ix. 
38 Schwaller, Le Temple de L’Homme, 44.
39 “The [F]igure of a [G]round” as opposed to a figure distinct and distinguished from 
ground; Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 113-114.
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Kramrisch calls “the Germ of the temple.”40 The ‘Figure’ in some re-
spects “hooks” and “catches” the background, bringing [an aspect 
or aspects of] this background “blackground” to light as this b[l]ack-
ground (“Ground”) in a sense flings it forth.41 Architect and theorist 
Paul Virilio touched on these ideas in his Architecture Principe and 
Aube Crépusculaire when he spoke of the concordant discordance 
and conjunctive disjunction of the hook and the whip, of brake-
pedals/decelerators and the gear[s] of whip-lashed/far-flung accel-
eration.42 The fact that Virilio, in discussions with Deleuze, found the 
crossing of flinging/flailing whip and harnessing hook in the ‘Figure’ 
of Pharaonic metempsychosis (which Virilio then extended to Papal 
and Pontifical avatars) accords rather remarkably with the statements 
in Schwaller’s architectural study. 
“Ten years ago I did this big exhibit on speed at the Cartier Founda-
tion in Jouy-en-Josace,” Virilio explained to Sylvère Lotinger in Cre-
puscular Dawn; “and what image did I use at first? The Pharaoh. 
Why? Deleuze and I discussed it quite a bit.”43 It is a matter of allowing 
— indeed fostering, promoting, propelling — given gestures, given 
movements, while also engaging — hence harnessing or capturing 
40 Kramrisch, The Hindu Temple, 10. A quote from Bellmer: “le germe du désir est avant 
l’être, le faim avant le moi, le moi avant l’autre” (“the germ of desire is [there] before 
being, hunger [there] before the I, the I [there] before the other”): Hans Bellmer, Petite 
Anatomie de L’Inconscient Physique, ou L’Anatomie de L’Image, Paris: Terrain Vague, 
1957, 29.
41 See Robin Mackay and Reza Negarestani, “Editorial Introduction” Collapse: Journal 
of Philosophical Research and Development, Volume VII, 2014, 33; re: this background 
blackground qua “b[l]ackground”. cf. Gerard Manley Hopkins (where “each hung bell’s 
/ Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad it’s name”), quoted in Aaron Cheak (ed), 
Alchemical Traditions from Antiquity to the Avant-Garde, Melbourne: Numen Books, 2013, 
600-601.
42 See, for instance, Paul Virilio, Crepuscular Dawn, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2002, 
65, where these are likened to the Pharaonic coffin/afterlife-raft complete with crossed 
arms bearing both whip and hook.
43 Ibid.
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— them by hook or by crook, flailing and cracking the whip. Simply 
harnessing or simply fostering, simply catching-hold-of (be-getting) 
or simply letting-go-of (letting-be) would “be” ([be-]get/let[-be]) of no 
avail: nothing new would come of it. The Pharaoh with “the two hands 
crossed on his chest [...] holding on the one side a hook, and on the 
other a whip” (ibid.) is in this sense, like “the Pope [with his] hook or 
the Bishop [with his] cross” (ibid.) and like “Innocent X” — speaking 
of Popes — ‘X’ed or crossed by curtain-like lines, hooked by rope-
rails, caught-up as was Beckett’s Murphy in the Μορφή (“Figure”) of 
a chair (chair = flesh in French) in Bacon’s ‘Study after Velazquez’s 
Portrait of Pope Innocent X’, what Deleuze describes as the “non-rep-
resentative, non-illustrative, non-narrative” THERE IS (IL Y A là, ici) of 
a [matter-of-44] ‘fact’ [qua quidam quelconque]:45 here (ici) there is (il 
y a) a ‘Figure’ flung from the ‘Ground’ as well as a ‘Ground’ flung forth 
and held there — hooked there, given place there — as a ‘Figure.’
“The relation of the Figure to its isolating place defines a ‘fact’: ‘the 
fact …,’ ‘what takes place is …,’” writes Deleuze.46 In a sense, this is 
what makes Bacon’s Figures (not to mention those of Bellmer and/
or Beckett) akin to Egyptian sculpture and/or architecture: “[indeed] 
there are many things that make Francis Bacon Egyptian” [and 
we might add here, Hindu, mightn’t we? oui, bien sûr!], states De-
leuze.47 Bacon himself, notes the latter, publicly declared “his love for 
Egyptian sculpture” (and perhaps privately also that of the Hindus48) 
what’s more. “A painting by Bacon has an Egyptian look to it” — all 
the more so because its anthropoid forms are inhuman: or rather, 
because their relation to “humankind is an accident” rather than an 
“essence.49” The essential is not the human-all-too-human: the latter 
is an after-effect — albeit an after-effect that brings into being the 
“analyzed moment” and its analytical monument. What gives rise to 
this moment and this monument is that “magical diagram” or “yan-
tra” described at length in The Hindu Temple for instance, and The 
Temple of Man, while only very briefly touched-upon in the present 
essay, as the yantra of the Vedic Vastupurushamandala and Phara-
onic pr-aA qua inhuman (pre-/post-human) Anthropocosmos.50
/// Published on November 21, 2013
44 What’s the matter here? (namely the hitherto-unnamed ‘matter’ qua ‘matrix’ in play: 
that of the now-named hence so-called Vastupuruhamandala/pr-aA/Anthropocosmos 
‘man’ifested — i.e., ‘individuated’ — in-the-flesh*-and/or-stone, or thrown on the throne*).
45 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 100-2.
46 Ibid., 2.
47 Ibid., 123.
48 (insertez ici un clin-d’œil crépusculaire) ;-)
49 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 135.
50 Kramrisch, The Hindu Temple, Schwaller, Le Temple de L’Homme, 27. 
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GHOST IN THE SHELL-GAME: 
ON THE MÈTIC MODE OF 
EXISTENCE, INCEPTION
AND INNOCENCE 
BY NANDITA BISWAS MELLAMPHY
I begin, then, properly, in and with the proper voice (that of Pierre 
Ménard).1 To begin, then, anew: 
The purpose of this study is to create an awareness of the significance 
of technical objects. Culture has become a system of defense against 
technics; now, this defense appears as a defense of man based on 
the assumption that technical objects contain no human reality. We 
should like to show that culture fails to take into account that there 
is a human reality in technical reality and that, if it is to fully play its 
role, culture must come to incorporate technical entities into its body 
of knowledge and its sense of values. Recognition of the modes of 
existence of technical objects should be the result of philosophical 
thought, which in this respect has to achieve what is analogous to the 
role it played in the abolition of slavery and in the affirmation of the val-
ue of the human person. The opposition established between culture 
and technology, between man and machine, is false and is not well-
founded; what underlies it is mere ignorance or resentment. Behind 
the mask of a facile humanism it hides a reality that is rich in human 
efforts and natural forces, a reality that constitutes the world of techni-
cal objects, mediators between nature and man.2 In Mamoru Oshii’s 
Inosensu (a.k.a. Ghost in the Shell 2),3 the inextricability of human and 
technical realities suggests that the established opposition between 
1 Jorge-Luis Borges, “Pierre Ménard, autor del Quijote,” in Labyriths, Daniel Yates (ed), 
New York: New Directions, 1962, 36-44. 
2 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, E.N. Mellamphy, 
D.A. Mellamphy and N.B. Mellamphy (trans), 2010, (available online at http://archive.
org/details/Simondon--ModeOfExistenceOfTechnicalObjectsinProgress). This passage, 
however, is not “quoted” here, in the name, again, of Pierre Ménard.
3 Footnote 13 of the previous chapter; this essay, in certain respects, emerges from (and 
extends) that footnote, as well as (emerges from and extends) an early essay by that very 

































culture and nature, human and machine, is not only easily subverted, 
but ultimately so falsifiable that it can be technically manipulated so 
as to shed light on a dimension that remains indiscernible to human-
ism: that it is by way of technical objects and technical existence that 
human beings most authentically relate to their living milieu and to 
living processes. Humans play with dolls/automata/avatars and wear 
masks (faces, façades) as part of their everyday lives, but they are 
ultimately blind to the technical connectors that animate them: “Life 
and death come and go like marionettes dancing on a table. Once 
their strings are cut, they easily crumble.”4 
Echoing Kleist’s riveting claim that puppets are like gods, in Oshii’s 
film the technical object is, on the one hand, the tragic protagonist 
that must be liberated (very much as Simondon had envisioned in his 
introduction to METO),5 and on the other, already more liberated than 
the human. 
the definition of a truly beautiful doll is a living, breathing body de-
void of a soul […]. The human is no match for a doll in its form, its 
elegance of motion, its very being […]. Perfection is possible only 
for those without consciousness, or perhaps endowed with infinite 
consciousness.6
And yet humans use and abuse them, enslave them without a second 
thought. Humans have even transferred this logic of abuse onto other 
humans; according to the ancient Greeks, for example, the slave was 
an animal machine (this idea was later modified by Descartes) and 
therefore not governed by political laws and philosophical principles.7 
4 Dialogue in Mamoru Oshii’s Inosensu by Batō
5 Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects.
6 Dialogue in Mamoru Oshii’s Inosensu by the renegade Kim. 
7 Book One of Aristotle’s Politics, New York: Dover Publications, 2000, Chapters iv-vii; 
Georges Canguilhem, Simondon’s teacher, incisively articulates the set of questions that 
Still from Mamoru Oshii’s Inosensu (2004)
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Humans get rid of robots as soon as they are superfluous or obso-
lete. When constantly exchanged for newer models, some of these 
machines find themselves abandoned, lost, and without proper 
maintenance, they degrade and degenerate […]. ‘Humans are dif-
ferent from robots’: this is as obvious as saying ‘black is not white’ or 
simply that ‘man is not a machine’ […]. But why this obsessive idea 
humans have to want to re-create themselves? […] In every age, 
children are excluded from the norms of human behavior (insofar as 
we consider ‘human’ a being having its proper identity and acting 
autonomously). But then what is a child that endures the chaos pre-
ceding maturity? — It differs profoundly from ‘human’ beings while 
nevertheless possessing human form. A young girl who cradles her 
doll does not cradle a thing replacing a baby, nor an object of mater-
nal apprenticeship.— Neither does the she imitate a mother raising 
its child. No: she undergoes an authentic experience; she experi-
ences the profound nature of what it means to raise children. Raising 
children is the simplest way to realize an old dream of humankind: 
that of creating life artificially.8 
This is perhaps the ‘reality’ that is masked by the longstanding op-
position between humanity and technicity, a reality that is supposed 
to constitute both the world of technical objects as well as the world 
of inner memory and subjectivity. “If the essence of life is information 
carried in DNA, then society and civilization are just colossal memory 
systems, and a metropolis like this one, simply a sprawling external 
memory” (Inosensu). In this view, the organic — including such meta-
physical concepts as intentionality and identity — can no longer be 
conceived as separate[d] from its technical articulation and individua-
tion. It is not that the body disappears in Oshii’s rendering; it is almost 
as if sexualization and gendering become ‘wearable’ technologies 
that can be tactically manipulated and recoded to produce further 
(often monstrous) avenues of individuation.9 
arises when considering the opposition between nature and culture, human and tech-
nical object, master and slave as developed by the ancient rationalist tradition: “The 
slave, according to Aristotle in the Politics, is an animated Machine. This is the crux of 
the problem to which Schuhl only alludes in passing: Did the Greek conception of the 
dignity of science lead to their disdain for technique and the resultant paucity of inven-
tions? And did this in turn lead to the difficulty of applying the results of technical activity 
to the explanation of nature? Or, rather, did the Greeks’ high regard for purely speculative 
science and detached contemplation explain the absence of technical invention? Did 
their disregard for work cause slavery, or did the abundance of slaves due to military 
supremacy explain their low regard for work? Are we obliged to explain the ideology in 
terms of the socioeconomic structure or, rather, the socioeconomic structure in terms 
of the ideology? Did the ease of exploiting human beings make it easier to disdain the 
techniques that would allow them to exploit nature? Does the arduousness of exploiting 
nature justify the exploitation of man by man?”: Georges Canguilhem, “Machine and 
Organism” in Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (eds), Incorporations: Zone 6, New 
York: Zone Books, 1992, 49.
8 Dialogue in Mamoru Oshii’s Inosensu by Haraway.
9 It is well-known that Oshii was inspired by the grotesque dolls of Hans Bellmer. See 
Steven Brown, Tokyo Cyberpunk: Posthumanism in Japanese Visual Culture, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
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Outside the schema of the logos — of words, reasons, rationaliza-
tions, standard measures — established oppositions between ‘na-
ture and culture,’ ‘humanity and technicity,’ ‘spirit and body,’ et ce-
tera, find themselves reticulated (inter-connected) as elements within 
a ubiquitous technical network of ongoing modifications, which Si-
mondon characterizes as being in a constant and constitutive pro-
cess of ‘transduction.’ Technical objects are ‘mediators’ (mediations) 
between ‘man’ and ‘nature’ not only in an ‘instrumental’ sense but 
also in an altogether ‘constitutive’ sense; from this vantage (as Os-
hii, for instance, suggests), rather than ‘bodies’ and ‘souls’ we see 
instead ‘shells’ and ‘ghosts’. In Oshii’s Inosensu, death is not the 
cessation of life; rather, bodily life is the technical animation, individu-
ation and articulation of death (inertia). Life (æmæth in the Hebrew 
text at the heart of Inosensu: the animating ‘truth’) is portrayed as an 
artifice of death (mæth) embodied in the ningyō — literally ‘human-
shaped figures,’ anthropoid forms — without consciousness. “By in-
scribing æmæth upon the Golem’s brow, the clay man lived, drawing 
energy from the word for ‘truth’. But simply removing the æ to form 
mæth or ‘death’ returned the Golem back to inanimate clay” (Hebrew 
Kabbalah paraphrased in Oshii’s Inosensu). Only the puppet truly 
experiences both life and death: life as the animation of death (some-
thing impossible for human self-consciousness). “People die simply 
because it is inevitable. But death is a condition of life for a doll.” 
Whereas Inosensu explicitly questions the value of consciousness for 
an understanding of the human and humane (e.g. the most ‘human’ 
relationship in the film is between a cyborg and a cloned canine!), 
Christopher Nolan’s film Inception suggests that although conscious-
ness is limited (that is, ill-equipped to process all the data streaming 
into it), it too functions by way of technical manipulation and artifice. 
Our world is full of gaps, blank areas, dead-spaces, blind-spots, and 
the latter tend to be problematic for humans conceived in intentional 
and rational terms; but this is not the case for non-conscious/non-
human operators, which in Oshii’s film are masters of mètic métis-
sage (i.e. able both to make and maneuver in the ‘gaps,’ ‘blanks,’ 
‘dead-spaces’ and ‘blind-spots’ of what could be called ‘aporetic ar-
chitecture’). Just as Oshii’s anthropomorphic ningyō explicitly allude 
to Hans Bellmer’s dolls (which themselves transgress the human/
machine boundary),10 so also Nolan’s depiction of the manipulabil-
ity of consciousness in dream-states is inspired by the gestural art/
artifice of Francis Bacon (“bringing us back by a commodius vicus of 
recirculation” to the last chapter): “I quite like the paradoxical nature 
of the [fact that] […] the less [Bacon] tells you about what’s there, the 
more I find myself thinking about [it]. [And] Because you never have 
the resources to fully create the world that you’re creating, you are 
leaving a lot of void — you’re leaving a lot of gaps — and so part of 
what you start trying to do is use those necessary gaps intelligently, 
10 Brown, Tokyo Cyberpunk, 23.
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so that where you’re not showing something, it’s helping you rather 
than [giving you a] feeling [of and for] the limitations of the world 
you’re creating.”11 
The kind of intelligence to which Nolan alludes here is not mobilized 
through intentionality, logical thinking, or the framework of logos (or 
indeed the search for capital-T Truth: a Truth beyond all deception[s]); 
instead it conducts, transducts, and instructs itself via randomness, 
aporia, kairos and mètic hexis (crafty cunning, mechanisms of ma-
nipulation). Throughout the labyrinthine twists and turns of the latter 
lies the question — and quest — of artifice (truth as deception, or 
if you like: “truthiness” — as the mètic master of and on televisual 
media, Sir Stephen Colbert, might have said): 
They say we only use a fraction of the true potential of our brains 
[…] but they’re talking about when we’re awake. While we dream, 
the mind performs wonders […]. In a dream your mind continuously 
does that: it creates and perceives a world simultaneously — so well, 
in fact, that you don’t feel your brain doing the creating. And that’s 
why we can short-circuit the process […] by taking over the creating 
part.12 
There is no “Inception” without deception in Nolan’s film; not only can 
consciousness be deceived, it is always being deceived. The dream-
state in Nolan’s film is a stochastic ‘field’ or ‘plane of immanence’ 
(and the “stochastic intelligence” described in Sarah Kofman’s trea-
tise on Poros and Mètis13): one which, as in Oshii’s vision of uncon-
scious (‘pre’- and/or ‘post’-conscious) anthropomorphism, operates 
as a “perfect” and “dangerous” field of possibilities. 
Cunning intelligence, or the mètic mentality, is a mode of dissimula-
tion (involving risk and play) that proceeds by way of skillful handling 
or manipulation, rather than by way of logos or ‘logical measures’ 
(e.g. logical speech and rationality); by “tricks [rather] than by gen-
eral methods.”14 This manipulation must always involve an artfulness 
— a ‘gaming,’ even ‘gambling’ instinct — that creates opportunities 
out of the gaps and weaknesses in environmental informational re-
sources: “challenging the fatalism of the moralist, the gambler is he 
who, in the face of no matter what situation, thinks that there is always 
something he can do.”15 For the mètic player, there is no ‘knowledge’ 
without the gaming ‘skill’ and ‘instinct’ of ruse, of cunning, and of 
11 “Film Meets Art: Christopher Nolan, Inspired by Francis Bacon,” on youtube.com 
(November 26, 2013).
12 Dialogue in Christopher Nolan’s Inception (2010) by the con-artist Cobb.
13 Sarah Kofmann, Comment s’en sortir?, Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1983, 14.




acting at the decisive instance (indeed in the stance /movement-
space and decisive-moment/instance) in order to accomplish a trick 
or truc.16 This is the attitude of the con-man who uses sleights of rea-
son17 to perform sleights of hand: “that which, in the last analysis, 
justifies the gaming attitude is the fact that the only conceivable way 
of unveiling the black box, is to play with it.”18 These gaming skills are 
also the same used by the skilled hunter: corporeal agility including 
quick-wittedness (e.g. the dromikos of a skilled runner, the agrupnos 
of the vigilant watcher, the stochazesthai or keen eye of the great 
marksman) and skills of dissimulation (“the art of seeing without be-
ing seen” in the words of Détienne and Vernant).19 
Mètic mentality is thus intimately involved with bodily conditions 
(hexeis; singular hexis; synonymous in many respects with the San-
skrit vastu) which are themselves “indistinguishable from habits and 
practices.”20 Dissimulation here is synonymous with dissimulative 
bodily states: “thought does not just happen within the body, it hap-
pens as the body.”21 Mètis always involves a métissage,22 a [ghost-
in-the-]shell-game involving pretense, the mixing and mixing-up of 
16 A truc in French” is “a tricky little ‘device’, ‘gizmo’, ‘gimmick’ or ‘thingamajig.’
17 See Mary Beth Mader, Sleights of Reason: Norm, Bisexuality & Development, New 
York: SUNY Press, 2011.
18 Thom, Modèles Mathématiques de la Morphogenèse, 298.
19 Marcel Détienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Les Ruses de L’Intelligence: La Mètis des 
Grecs, Paris: Flammarion, 1974, 35-36.
20 Debra Hawhee, Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece, Austin: Univer-
sity of Texas Press, 2004, 58.
21 Ibid.
22 Dan Mellamphy, “YOU, the U-Bomb, or ‘YOU-bomb goes Kabloom’: An Essay on 
Anonymity, Risibility and Quantum Subjectivity,” The Canadian Review of Comparative 
Literature XXIII:ii, 1996, 426-455.
Still from Mamoru Oshii’s Ghost in the Shell (1995)
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appearances and consistencies, corporeal quantities and qualities in 
order to be able to do something that gains advantage. Thus cunning 
intelligence since Greek antiquity has involved the ability to deceive 
by way of the technical manipulation of appearance and multiplicity 
(i.e. abilities to alter and morph bodily conditions or bounded physi-
cal states of any kind). The countless cunning conceits (polyMètis), 
streaming series of stratagems (polymèchanos) and ubiquitous ‘U-
turns’ (polytropos) of Ulysses, attest to the artfulness of a mètic math-
ematician who invokes the mathesis of Mètis and its métissage[sse] 
when faced with “a puzzling local situation” for which ‘universal rea-
son’ (logos, the logistics of ‘logic’) proves inadequate: “All the major 
achievements of mathematicians are due at the outset to ‘artfulness’: 
a paradoxical situation, for in mathematics — a science of exemplary 
rationality — progression is accomplished more by tricks than by 
general methods of great weight.”23 
Articulating itself techno-mechanically (as polymechanoi) via cunning 
chathonic twists and turns (polytropoi) that polymètically pull[s]-into-
being-or-action what which would otherwise remain mere potential, 
the architecture and architectonics of deception in Inception make 
technical use of traps, tricks, gestures, suggestions, forgeries, imper-
sonations, mirror-reflections, staircases, labyrinths and other sorts of 
hooks and/or bait that play with the limitations of physical bounded-
ness. The team of technicians qua assembled con-artists consists of 
agents whose functions in Nolan’s Inception are those first of confus-
ing construction (for “the architect” Ariadne, the web-spinner), sec-
ond of drug-decoction (for “the [al]chemist” Yusuf, le souffleur), third 
of impersonation (for “the forger” Eames, the not-what-(s)he-seems), 
fourth of the watcher and gatekeeper (for “the watcher and gate-
keeper” Arthur, rounding-out the four-square round-table), and fifth 
— quintessentially, as the pempte ousia in the midst of the previous 
four-square/round-table — of “Inception” and/or of “extraction” (for 
“the Inceptor” and/or “the Extractor” Mr. Cobb, a husk of a man who 
manages to infiltrate — incept-and/or-extract — other men’s husks 
in this splendid shell-game). The “Inception” or “extraction” always 
begins with an aporetic architectural diagram/yantra, in this case that 
of a circular maze: a labyrinth explicitly situated outside the domain 
of logos, as the character Cobb confesses to the architect Ariadne 
(these deceptive designs and their mètic métissage are “not, strictly 
speaking, legal,” he tells her). 
Deception is embodied from the outset in that aporetic architectural 
design, diagram, mandala or yantra, which is gestural in that its aim 
is less that of representation and expression than that of suggestion 
and impression. “This architectural technique, the yantra (‘literally the 
‘vessel of yoking’: [the] device, sacred diagram, [that is] the Founda-
tion of the temple’ according to the Vastu-Shastra), ‘do[es] not con-
23 Thom, Modèles Mathématiques de la Morphogenèse, 300.
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sign the Figure to immobility but, on the contrary, render[s] sensible 
a kind of progression, an exploration of the Figure within the place or 
upon itself’,” writes Dan Mellamphy in the previous chapter (referring 
in this passage to Stella Kramrisch, Gilles Deleuze, the Vastu-Shatra 
and The Logic of Sensation). Like Oshii’s sublime puppet animated 
by its strings (strings that intertwine its ‘Figure’ with its milieu and/or 
‘Ground’ ), mètic mentality is corporealized in the tricks and traps of 
paradoxical or aporetic architecture. ‘Body’ becomes the interface of 
Figure and Ground, at times appearing distinctly as Figure, and at 
times remaining indistinguishable from Ground (hence becoming its 
associated milieu). 
In a dream you can cheat architecture into impossible shapes” ex-
plained Cobb at the outset of Inception. “That [fact] lets you cre-
ate closed loops, like the Penrose Steps, the infinite staircase, […] 
paradox[es of all kinds]. A closed loop like this helps you disguise the 
boundaries of the dream you’ve created.24
The mètic mentality relies on its technical finesse, on its ability to in-
vent ways out (poroi), ways of getting out of aporias (spaces in which 
there are no apparent ways out): 
Where indeterminacy (apeiras), reigns [there is] the absence of limit 
and direction — obscurity; where you are trapped, surrounded, pris-
oner of inextricable entanglements, it is Mètis that intervenes — in-
venting strategies, expedients, tricks, ruses, machinations, méchanè 
24 Dialogue in Christopher Nolan’s Inception (2010) by the gatekeeper, Arthur.
Stills from Christopher Nolan’s Inception (2010)
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and technai, in order to go from absence of limit to determination, 
from obscurity to light.25 
Within logos, reality is understood to be involved in a complex dy-
namic of appearing and disappearing making ‘truth’ a process of 
‘unconcealment’; the pursuit of ‘truth’ becomes synonymous with the 
systematic separation and exclusion of deception from knowledge. 
But from the mètic perspective, the complex dynamic is understood 
completely differently; it is the perspective required of the hunter/
gamer who must survive not by logic but by cunning. Conscious-
ness, intentionality and experience ‘turn out’ to be constructs within 
a fundamentally deceptive environment of asymmetrical conflict be-
tween predator and prey. 
Dissimulation, the “ability to see without being seen,”26 depends en-
tirely on seizing decisive moments (not on chronos or æon but on 
kairos) and on making them tactical weapons, moreover, within a 
theatre (or network: a ‘net’) of predatory operations. In Inception, the 
mètic operants act as ‘hunters’ within a mètic theatre of operation — 
the target’s subconscious — but the mètic operant must also see it-
self as “hunted,”27 as bait for the traps of other mètic operators within 
25 Kofmann, Comment s’en sortir?, 16. 
26 Détienne and Vernant, Les Ruses de L’Intelligence, 36.
27 This is a point also made by Grégoire Chamayou: “hunting presupposes a form of 
empathy with the prey: to track prey effectively, one has to put oneself in its place.” The 
hunt is “not a fight among equals”: Chamayou, Manhunts, 65.
Stills from Christopher Nolan’s Inception (2010)
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a magical milieu (e.g. in Inception, the weaponizability of the sub-
conscious and the ever-threatening “projection” of Mal, Cobb’s dead 
wife — yet another ghost amongst shells). In the dream-state, any 
awareness or self-consciousness is always constituted by deception 
and illusion, and so self-consciousness is haunted and tainted by 
self-deception and the mentality of traps: are ‘you’ who ‘you’ think 
you are? How are ‘you’ lure or bait for something else? The mode of 
existence of technical objects is mètic. Inception plays out a mètic 
view of asymmetric war between deceptive operants in a deceptive 
milieu of operation. 
Although it employs and deploys both military and political tactics, 
the mètic model of asymmetric war (based on predator/prey ecol-
ogy) is not inherently military or political if one considers the close 
relation between agon and logos in occidental thought (the struggle 
— agon — between equal opponents being the basis both for the 
military and the communicative/political model of ethics). The face-
to-face contestation between equal opponents in war is also the ten-
dency of political association that enables the intertwining of various 
logoi, and hence making possible public dia-logoi or dialogue. Logos 
governs the logic of war and political association in the history of the 
occident. Mètis, in contrast, is the mode of intelligence that belongs 
not to war or the city but to technics, namely the machinations of 
hunting and trapping (not symmetrical and agonistic but asymmetri-
cal and deceptive). 
One of the problems in the study of warfare today is that it has identi-
fied elements of asymmetry in the paradigm of war that cannot be un-
derstood within ‘the governing logic’ of war as ‘symmetrical’ and ‘ag-
onistic,’ and yet it does not know how to make sense of asymmetric 
warfare outside of the logos-driven framework of occidental thinking;28 
asymmetry outside the laws of war is simply called “terrorism.”29 But, 
as I argue here, the very mode of existence of technical objects is 
mètic. As such, it is not simply that mètic warfare “makes use of” 
ruse[s]:30 mètic wars are designed and conducted as (i.e., in terms 
of, along the [twisted and turning] lines of) ‘ruse,’ ‘rebus,’ ‘riddle,’ and 
cunning conceit[s] (in this sense, the mythic sphinx’s riddles can be 
seen as an example of mètic warfare) such that any possible solution 
to a problem of (and in) war is discovered only through the twists and 
turns — labyrinthine lines — of technics rather than straightforward 
logics/logistics. Moreover, whereas the aim of dialogical persuasion 
28 This is notable, for example, in light of the absence of any mention of the concept of 
‘cunning intelligence’ in Grégoire Chamayou’s recent work on predation and warfare in 
Manhunts: A Philosophical History, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012
29 Take for example the concept of ‘asymmetric enemy’; see Gal Hirsch, “On Dinosaurs 
and Hornets: A Critical View on Operational Moulds in Asymmetric Conflicts,” in RUSI 
Journal, (August 2003), 60-63. 
30 Chamayou, Manhunts, 71.
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is to change another’s thinking — this is the point of dia-logoi — 
mètic persuasion aims directly at changing bodily conditions (hex-
eis), thereby automatically changing the target’s thinking process. 
“For Empedocles says those who change their bodily conditions 
(hexin) deem to change their thought (phronesin).”31 
The persuasive techniques of mètic war would thus be found not in 
deliberative/communicative political models and strategies, but in-
stead in the manipulative tactics of marketing and public relations.32 
Mètic warfare, which manipulates the boundaries of classical war-
fare (e.g. the military logic/logistics of defining a ‘theater of war’) thus 
plays on æsthesis and depends on manipulative, technical tools rath-
er than on logical/dialogical principles (be these in the guise of mili-
tary ‘reason’ or communicative ‘ethics’). Where logos sees ‘minds’ 
and ‘bodies,’ the technics of mètic war (like the marionettes of Kleist 
and Oshii) see[s] ‘shells’ animated by ‘ghostly strings’ that are inex-
tricably bound to a broader (albeit obscure or occluded) associated 
‘machinic milieu.’ To consider war and politics from the perspective 
and on the basis of such mètic mentality is to discern it from a techni-
cally anthropomorphized but never quite humanized (human-all-too-
human) perspective. 
/// Published on December 4, 2013
31 Hawhee, Bodily Arts, 57.
32 In my current book manuscript The New ‘PR’: Post-human Rationality in War, Cognition 
& Culture, this is the basis for what I am calling the New ‘PR’ of Post-human Rationality in 
contemporary modes of technical persuasion
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Though MIMI THI NGUYEN still believes that punk saved her life, 
some of her greatest life lessons are learned from the movies. These 
are: be excellent to each other; fair is fair; and I’m perfect, but nobody 
in this shithole gets me, because I don’t put out.
PHILIPPE THEOPHANIDIS is doing research on the ideas of com-
munity and inoperativeness. In this regard, his efforts are success-
fully not working. He likes to wear an old t-shirt bearing the inscrip-
tion “Qualities are for losers,” even though he feels he’s not qualified 
to do so. When asked to introduce himself in a casual, if not funny 
way, he replied that he would rather not. When pressed, he tried and 
failed, and tried again, and failed again. Hopefully, he managed to 
failed better.
HANNA BAUMANN has boundary issues.
SOPHIA AZEB has a fraught relationship with her dentist owing 
largely to her (several) terrible habits, including but not limited to 
tobacco-smoking, pen-chewing, and single-handedly emptying Lon-
don (and often Marseille) of its sugar stores with her morning coffee. 
She still has all her own teeth, however, and flosses regularly.
DEREK GREGORY’s first love is the theatre, but he consoles him-
self with the thought that lecturing means you get to write the script 
*and* grade the audience ....
STUART ELDEN is interested in territory and geopolitics and enjoys 
cycling. Sometimes he is able to combine these, such as on a hot 
June day in 2013, when he rode round the sea of Galilee, starting in 
Israel, and traveling across the Jordan river, through the occupied 
Golan Heights, through a cleared minefield, very close to the Jordan 
border, and back to the town of Tiberias.
GASTÓN GORDILLO particularly enjoys the spatial intersection of 
land and sea, where matter changes its texture and becomes liquid 
and swimmable. He is drawn to that spatial and material threshold 
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colloquially called the beach to read, write, and of course also to 
swim, particularly but not necessarily in the summer. His beach toolkit 
always includes swim goggles and a Moleskine notebook. 
PEDRO HERNÁNDEZ MARTÍNEZ hates architecture but, also ... 
he loves architecture! One could say that he suffers from agorapho-
bia, an irrational fear of being trapped, which forces him to struggle in 
order to escape, attacking and destroying architecture and the ideas 
that established it.
TINGS CHAK doesn’t like borders, and borders of all sorts. She be-
lieves in the freedom to move, freedom to stay, and freedom to return 
for all migrant people, and spends a lot of her time drawing, disrupt-
ing, and shit-disturbing.
ALEX SHAMS has always been obsessed with traffic and crowds. 
He is especially interested in the strange sensation of other people’s 
sweat imprinting itself onto his body while he is holding on for dear 
life in the Cairo metro. Other times it’s the way sweat moves between 
bodies at Iranian shrines that fascinates him, including but not lim-
ited to that particular moment when the love and lust for saints and 
gods overwhelms and produces not only tears and moans but also 
extremely dank under (and over) shirts.
As a child SOFIA LEMOS was never truly present, and she would 
read and reenact historical events always adding to it a pinch of salt. 
Lemos is interested in radical political imaginaries thereby using 
speculation as a tool to critically unfold history and render alterna-
tive understandings of the body and its agency. Growing up brought 
about the here and now, and today she revels in being a cultural 
organizer and researcher.
GRÉGOIRE CHAMAYOU currently admires kangaroos for their 
sound ability to summarize, which can be watched here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFWUlObSgn0
RENISA MAWANI lives and works in the busy port city of Vancouver. 
Due, in part, to her spatial location, she thinks a great deal about bod-
ies in motion: human (migrants), nonhuman (insects), and objects 
(ships).  Though she is fascinated by oceanic movements, her body 
restricts her from making her own….she has yet to acquire sea legs.
NICK AXEL is generally skeptical about the appearance of things, 
which can sometimes lead to a performance of the devil’s advocate. 
He look into things. Not at them, over or around them, but through 
them, always searching to evoke the latent potential of what we have 
at hand.
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As a kid, SARAH CHOUKAH was fascinated with science fiction 
stories and movies. Her favorites depicted how machines, cyborgs 
or space aliens would threaten one day to take over the world. That 
kid is still secretly disappointed we didn’t bring back carnivorous di-
nosaurs in a clever feat of bioengineering just yet. There’s neverthe-
less a lot to figure out when it comes to the potential biosciences and 
biotechnologies have in shaping a certain sense of ourselves, and 
vice versa. Just in case.
ANDREAS PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS  is a philoso-
pher who pretends to be an artist who pretends to be a legal aca-
demic who pretends to be a theorist who pretends to be a writer who 
pretends that he is not pretending.  This is why he has recently taken 
to seeing the world from up there, usually on an airplane. Very little 
margin to pretend up there.
ERIN MANNING has three cats, a cat-toad and a step-son. The old-
est cat left home at about the same time as the step-son, both of 
them signaling that better food was to be had elsewhere. They both 
still visit on occasion. When the cats aren’t deciding where she can 
sit, she writes, paints, sews and dances.
ADRIENNE HART once spent a year living in one of London’s last 
untouched factories from the 1800s. Sleeping rooms were small white 
pods slotted next to one another in varying formation, the smallest 
only wide enough for one body to launch itself into. She always had 
the best nights, sleep in that pod, and somehow her claustrophobia 
did not apply.
Although ELENA LOIZIDOU is a Reader in Law and Political Theory, 
her research and interests lay primarily outside the field of law. She is 
interested in finding out whether anarchism offers an art of living that 
runs parallel to the one provided and cultivated by neoliberalism, and 
she loves the minimalist sounds of John Cage, spring sun rays and 
drawing. She lives in London and dreams of warmer climates.
If there is something JOANNE POUZENC has trouble learning, it’s 
the art of waiting. She can not do nothing. And even if you think she 
actually does nothing, she is probably analysing the details, imagin-
ing someone else’s stories, picturing the moment and trying hard not 
to forget it. Because there is just one thing she’s sure about: time 
exists, and so does everything within.
CHRYSANTHI NIGIANNI often finds herself in world-weariness. 
She thinks philosophy is a mood rather than discipline. She likes 
the type of psychoanalysis that makes philosophy suffer.  She feels 
trapped in the body of knowledge and seeks instead darkness and 
ignorance. This is where she can start writing. Whatever she starts 
writing about, it ends up being about love.
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INA KARKANI is fascinated by anything that frustrates and dares 
our routine of being boring human bodies. Weirdness in cinema is 
one part of it. She loves philosophizing about living entities, human 
or not, that perform gorilla dances, wiggle with their shoulder blades 
and hiss like cats in heat.
ALAN PROHM considers inquiry a full-bodied experience: if you 
never work up a sweat, it’s not worth thinking. He believes all the arts 
can be talked like one language, in space, at power, and is on a hunt 
for the levers leveraging the aesthetic for more radical efficacy. Start 
now.
DAN MELLAMPHY, also known under the name of Yhpmallem 
Sawsib Atidnan, is a Borgesian Bharatnayam Blackbelt or ‘Maeter-
linckian triple-B{ee}’ with an assortment of degrees adding up to the 
five Pythagorean polyhedra or ‘Keplerian panchatantra.’ He keeps 
the latter degrees stuffed in a ‘panch’ing bag, (पांचबैग) at his neigh-
bourhood gym (a gymnasium coincidentally named after the chapter 
on gymnosophy from Sarane Alexandrian’s primer on occult physics 
and metaphysics).  In Year Zero he married a Bengal-Donegal ‘Bhean 
Gual’ named Nandita (see Nandita Biswas Mellamphy). 
NANDITA BISWAS MELLAMPHY, also known as the Yhpmallem-
nad, was born on the Ring of Kerry at a well-named wishing-well: the 
Spring of Sauron. As a child, she worked on the infamous Bengal-
Donegal Express in the role of Engine-Room ‘Bhean Gual’ (coal-girl) 
and has always, as a result, had a fascination with fire (and, of course, 
soot). On one of the Express Trips, she was scouted by a Bollywood 
Movie-mogul and cast as a young pre-cog in Hrishikesh Muke-
herjee’s नामुमकिन. With the proceeds from that film, she became a 
struggling academic, met her husband Danananda Mahalamfi and 
secured, shortly after that, a primo professorial position.
SEHER SHAH is interested in the ambiguous relationship of objects 
and landscapes. She uses the basic elements of architecture such 
as the wall, grid and column to examine various formal and visceral 
qualities of particular moments in architectural history. Using histori-
cal and personal iconographies, her interests use constructed land-
scapes, the X-large or mammoth sized object, erasure, Corbusier 
and courtyards to explore through drawings, prints, photographs and 
sculptural objects.
Although LÉOPOLD LAMBERT founded the Funambulist, he would 
fully experience corporeal pain if he were to attempt tighrope walking. 
Similarly, his obssession for questions related to the body should not 
make him forget that sitting at a desk does not qualify as fully em-
bracing his existence as a body in the world! As always, he is thankful 
to count so many talented friends and colleagues, who enrich his 
clumsy understanding of this world.
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THE FUNAMBULIST is a blog written and edited by Léopold Lam-
bert since 2007. It approaches architecture through its political and 
narrative implications, borrowing concepts from other disciplines. In 
2013, The Funambulist, Punctum Books and the Center for Trans-
formative Media Parsons The New School for Design published the 
first volumes of The Funambulist Pamphlets, a series of small books 
collecting articles written on the blog, organized by themes: Spinoza, 
Foucault, Deleuze, Legal Theory, Occupy Wall Street, Palestine, Cruel 
Designs, Arakawa + Madeline Gins, Science Fiction, Literature, Cin-
ema & Weaponized Architecture.
THE CENTER FOR TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIA, Parsons The 
New School for Design is a transdisciplinary media research initiative 
bridging design and the social sciences, and dedicated to the explo-
ration of the transformative potential of emerging technologies upon 
the foundational practices of everyday life across a range of settings.
PUNCTUM BOOKS: spontaneous acts of scholarly combustion is 
an open-access and print-on-demand independent publisher dedi-
cated to radically creative modes of intellectual inquiry and writing 
across a whimsical para-humanities assemblage. punctum books 
seeks to curate the open spaces of writing or writing-as-opening, the 
crucial tiny portals on whose capacious thresholds all writing prop-
erly and improperly takes place. Pricking, puncturing, perforating = 
publishing in the mode of an unconditional hospitality and friendship, 
making space for what Eve Sedgwick called “queer little gods” – the 
“ontologically intermediate and teratological figures” of y/our thought. 
They seek to pierce and disturb the wednesdayish, business-as-usu-
al protocols of both the generic university studium and its individual 
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